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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jennifer E. Noyce 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: The “Knockings and Batterings” Within: Late Modernism’s Reanimations of 
Narrative Form 
 
 
This dissertation corrects the notion that fiction written in the late 1920s through 
the early 1940s fails to achieve the mastery and innovation of high modernism. It posits 
late modernism as a literary dispensation that instead pushes beyond high modernism’s 
narrative innovations in order to fully express individuals’ lived experience in the era 
between world wars.  This dissertation claims novels by Elizabeth Bowen, Evelyn 
Waugh, and Samuel Beckett, as exemplars of a late modernism characterized by 
invocation and redeployment of conventionalized narrative forms in service of fresh 
explorations of the dislocation, inauthenticity, and alienation that characterize this era. By 
deforming and repurposing formal conventions, these writers construct entirely new 
forms whose disfigured likenesses to the genres they manipulate reveals a critical 
orientation to the canon.  
These writers’ reconfigurations of forms—including the bildungsroman, the 
epistolary novel, and autobiography—furthermore reveal the extent to which such 
conventionalized genres coerce and prescribe a unified and autonomous subjectivity.   By 
dismantling these genres from within, Bowen, Waugh, and Beckett reveal their 
mechanics to be instrumental in coercing into being a notion of the subject that is both 
 v 
 
limiting and delimited.  These authors also invoke popular forms—including the Gothic 
aesthetic, imperial adventure narrative, and detective fiction—to reveal that non-
canonical texts, too, participate in the process by which narrative inevitably posits 
consciousness as its premise.    
I draw upon Tyrus Miller’s conception of late modernism to explicate how these 
authors’ various engagements with established forms simultaneously perform immanent 
critique and narrative innovation.  This dissertation also endorses David Lloyd’s assertion 
that canonical narrative forms are instrumental in producing subjectivity within text and 
thereby act as a coercive exemplar for readers.  I invoke several critics’ engagements 
with conventional genres’ narrative mechanics to explicate this process. By examining 
closely the admixture of narrative forms that churns beneath the surfaces of these texts, I 
aim to pinpoint how the deformation of conventionalized forms can yield a fresh and 
distinctly late modernist vision of selfhood.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“I swear that each of us keeps, battened down inside himself, a sort 
of lunatic giant—impossible socially, but full-scale—and that it’s 
the knockings and batterings we sometimes hear in each other that 
keeps our intercourse from utter banality”  
-Elizabeth Bowen, The Death of the Heart 
  
“It was as though the whole reasonable and decent constitution of 
things, the sum of all he had experienced or learned to expect, were 
an inconspicuous, inconsiderable object mislaid somewhere on the 
dressing table; no outrageous circumstance in which he found 
himself, no new, mad thing brought to his notice, could add a jot to 
the all-encompassing chaos that shrieked about his ears”  
-Evelyn Waugh, A Handful of Dust  
 
“And I, what was I doing there, and why come?  These are things 
that we shall try and discover.  But these are things we must not 
take seriously”  
-Samuel Beckett, Molloy  
  
 
 Each of these passages expresses the distinctly late modernist intuition that in the 
mid-twentieth century, the boundaries of the self are becoming increasingly troubled.  In 
Bowen’s, Waugh’s, and Beckett’s novels from the late 1920s through the late 1940s, 
selfhood is not a deep well of knowable consciousness residing within; rather, 
subjectivity is experienced as an affliction with which authors, narrators, and characters 
must grapple.  This depiction of the fraught nature of being is distinct from the 
autonomous and self-authenticating subjectivity posited and perpetuated in both the 
works of classic modernist fiction and other canonical narrative forms.  By 
acknowledging the “lunatic giant” that lurks beneath the performance of selfhood that 
culture and narrative require, Bowen, Waugh, and Beckett pursue subjectivity as a 
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question rather than as an extant and embodied phenomenon. By enlisting and 
reanimating the forms that coerce this outmoded conception of subjectivity into being, 
these authors welcome the “all-encompassing chaos” that afflicts those living in the years 
between world wars. Each of these author’s narrative methods “seeks to discover” a 
literary means to free that lunatic giant from the constraints of narrative convention. The 
result is a rigorous dismantling of canonical novel forms that, in turn, dismantles the 
reified conception of the subject as it had heretofore been configured in fiction.   
 This dissertation attempts to account for the confounding formal strangeness that 
characterizes this radical reconfiguration of selfhood as represented in fiction. Written in 
an era when both modernist and pre-modernist narrative formal conventions were clearly 
delineated and firmly entrenched, Bowen’s, Waugh’s, and Beckett’s novels construct 
complex interrogations of the problem of narrative conventionality.  By deforming and 
repurposing formal conventions, these writers construct entirely new forms whose 
disfigured likeness to the genres they manipulate reveals a critical orientation to the 
canon. These writers examine and undermine narrative conventions’ destructive power to 
coerce and prescribe a unified and autonomous subjectivity that no longer resonates with 
individuals’ lived experience in the 1930s and 40s.   
The texts that I examine in this project are all emphatically strange; they do not 
conform to many of the critical and readerly expectations of unity and formal cohesion by 
which ideas about “good literature” are formulated. Rather, they invoke conventionalized 
forms only to wrench them into shapes ideally suited to explorations of specifically late 
modernist configurations of selfhood and of the historical developments that nurture 
these configurations.  As a result, Bowen’s style is both seemingly innocuously 
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Edwardian and uncannily attuned to the shadow-side of modernity; Waugh’s A Handful 
of Dust is a satirical send-up that somehow pinpoints the tragic vacuity at the heart of the 
stories by which modern individuals make sense of their lives; Beckett’s trilogy is 
stylistically unrecognizable as anything but Beckett’s, yet precisely and painstakingly 
engages and undoes some of Western literature’s most recognizable narrative forms to 
mount a radical new vision of human consciousness.  In every case, these novels are 
often jarring and lack formal cohesion; such are the trademarks of their simultaneous 
invocation and critical redeployment of canonical forms. 
 These novels’ insightful attunement to the unique challenges that confront 
individuals during this era is reflected in their authors’ attention to the dynamic 
relationship between surface and depth.  This is the controlling thematic by which they 
and their narrators seek to understand the disparity between the deep well of interiorized 
subjectivity posited by previous literary forms and a growing sensation that this notion no 
longer resonates with their experiences of selfhood in the mid-twentieth century. Each of 
these texts’ authors focuses upon the dynamic interplay between the performance of self 
coerced by narrative and their respective conceptions of what it means to be a self living 
during the mid-twentieth century. Bowen’s attention to surface and depth reveals the 
lurking complexity that characterizes the experience of being; Waugh’s indicates that 
emptiness lies at the heart of the late modern self; Beckett reveals that a truly rich vision 
of selfhood must exceed the bounds of narrative.  
 These authors formally enact the interplay of surface and depth by undermining 
conventionalized narratives from within.  Each of these novels appears to be one kind of 
book on its surface, but a complex engagement with both historical circumstance and 
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narrative convention roils beneath.  Below the surfaces of these texts, a timely 
engagement with the issues of the late modernist era is ongoing; the formal recalibrations 
and deformations that these authors perform reveal new configurations of selfhood that 
defy the prescriptions of both modernism and older conventional narrative forms.  These 
formal redeployments furthermore reveal the destructiveness of narrative conventions 
that, by the late 1920s, have come to act as constraints upon writers, narrators, characters, 
and readers. These novels’ “strangeness” resides precisely in their uncanny attunement to 
the narrative conventions’ inadequacy to the task of expressing consciousness in all its 
richness.  
 By examining closely the admixture of narrative forms that churns beneath the 
surfaces of these texts, I aim to pinpoint how the deformation of conventionalized forms 
can yield a fresh and distinctly late modernist vision of selfhood.  Paradoxically, it is 
precisely these novels’ invocations of untimely and outmoded forms that facilitate both 
their critique of previous forms’ investment in interiority and their innovative depictions 
of the human self.  These texts, which so little resemble their modernist progenitors, 
manage to posit a radically nuanced understanding of selfhood that is precisely resonant 
with the era in which they were written, and yet they call upon highly conventionalized 
forms—the bildungsroman, the epistolary novel, autobiography, the Gothic, the imperial 
adventure narrative, detective fiction—to do so.  This project seeks to peer beneath the 
surfaces of these texts in order to theorize how Bowen, Waugh and Beckett perform this 
feat.   
 Tyrus Miller’s conception of late modernism elucidates the character of the 
strange corpus of fiction that emerged in the years after modernism’s apex in the mid-
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1920s. Miller pinpoints the late modernist era’s most salient development as a breakdown 
of distinction “between subject and object, between spectator and spectacle, between 
producer and consumer”  (43).  This breakdown constitutes the contextual and affective 
basis of late modernism, and takes shape in fiction as a vision a “general 
depersonalization and deauthentication of life in modern society” (42).   In the novels I 
examine, this breakdown takes various forms: the vast discrepancy between the veneer of 
selfhood one performs and the complex reality of individual consciousness in Bowen’s 
work; Waugh’s revelation that individuals’ lives are merely rote performances of 
outmoded scripts; Beckett’s mode of narration, which indicates the extent to which 
narrative subjectivity is an enacted performance.  These depictions vigorously resist the 
conventional function of narrative as an ongoing revelation of authentic and autonomous 
subjectivity.   Rather, they endorse and enact a late modernist dispensation that seeks to 
express the ongoing deauthentication of life and its progressive transformation into 
spectacle. This radical project requires a profound reformulation of those 
conventionalized narrative techniques—both modernist and pre-modernist—that placed 
faith in, and sought to narratively plumb, the depths of the self.   The result is a corpus of 
“unseasonable forms” that represent breaking points and “points of nonsynchronism” in 
the broad narrative of literary history (Miller 12).  
Because it is historically complicit in coercing and policing a prescriptive and 
delimiting conception of subjectivity, narrative itself is where this deflation of form 
necessarily begins.  David Lloyd’s analyses of bildungsroman and autobiography in 
particular reveals late modernists’ reasons for laying siege to these genres and others 
invested in depicting autonomous and unified subjectivity.  In Nationalism and Minor 
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Literature (1987), Lloyd argues that aesthetic culture itself has historically invoked a 
concept of man in general as not merely a producer of form, but as “producer, in 
particular, of the forms of himself through an aesthetic labor that transcends specific 
economic or political determinants.  That is to say, aesthetics posits the universal formal 
identity of the human” (6).  Culturally esteemed forms, including those that Bowen, 
Waugh and Beckett invoke and deform, posit a notion of humanness that, by virtue of its 
canonicity, becomes an exemplar to readers.  The effect of this universalized notion of 
identity upon “real people” is central to Lloyd’s analysis: the notion of culture 
perpetuated by the canon “is at once aesthetic and political” and “involves crucially a 
notion of historical development that provides the rationale for both the integrity of the 
canon and the integration of the State” (6).  The formulation of subjectivity coerced into 
being by canonical texts therefore has ramifications beyond the pages of literature; it not 
only facilitates the reification of aesthetic judgments but also makes readers complicit in 
the articulation of the bounds of a subjectivity that is at once individually constraining 
and universally prescribed and applied.  
The late modernist texts I examine in this dissertation work to dissolve the 
powerful mandate of development that underpins both the ascription of canonicity and 
the coercion of subjectivity.  They do so by invoking precisely the narrative forms that 
enact this mandate and wrenching them into new iterations that undermine it from within.  
These canonical forms belong to the canon of “major literature,” as Lloyd defines it: “a 
major literature is established as such precisely by virtue of its claim to representative 
status, of its claim to realize the autonomy of the individual subject to such a degree that 
that individual subject becomes universally valid and archetypal” (19).   Bowen’s, 
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Waugh’s, and Beckett’s respective deformations of canonical forms undermine precisely 
these forms’ claims to realize a vision of autonomous and universal subjectivity: 
bildungsroman, autobiography, the epistolary novel and the modernist travel narrative all 
undergo this critical reformulation. These authors’ experiments with popular literary 
forms also resist literature’s “major function:” the Gothic, the imperial adventure 
narrative, and detective fiction are each repurposed to undo the ascription of deep 
interiority that major literature insists upon.  
The resulting texts defy the defining features of major literature by manifestly 
resisting not only the “production of an autonomous ethical identity for the subject,” but 
also the requirement that the literary work itself “be autonomous, both self-contained and 
original” (Lloyd 19). The explicit derivativeness of Bowen’s, Waugh’s, and Beckett’s 
novels from canonical forms prevents these ascriptions of autonomy and originality; as 
Miller points out, late modernist fiction embodies “‘the force of exception’ within 
history’s tendency to conserve institutions and processes in the midst of historical 
change” (Miller 12, italics in original).  These writers’ strange and estranging forms 
actively resist the canon’s conservation of outmoded conceptions of aesthetic value that 
perpetuate a conception of human subjectivity that does not resonate amidst an increasing 
depersonalization and deauthentication of life (Miller 42).  Bowen, Waugh and Beckett 
furthermore insist upon a reconfiguration of narrative commensurate to the cultural, 
historical, and psychic realities of the mid-twentieth century.    
 This radical reconfiguration is, importantly, also a response to classic modernist 
fiction’s enactment of the functions of major literature.  These late modernists’ work 
exhibits a negatively critical orientation to the masterworks of high modernism that, 
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despite their radical narrative and formal innovations, perpetuate a notion of subjectivity 
that purports to be both authentic and knowable.  Indeed, the depiction of characters’ 
deepest selves is in many ways high modernism’s crowning accomplishment. By 
contrast, in the novels I examine, Bowen, Waugh, and Beckett undercut the investment in 
interiority that is modernist narrative’s hallmark and instead reach back further into 
literary history for canonical forms that can be redeployed in service of a new 
configuration of selfhood that is more precisely late modernist. The result is a set of texts 
that appear incongruous to the mid-twentieth century; they are untimely, unseasonable, 
and nonsynchronous (Miller 12).   
 These works little resemble the masterworks of modernism wherein narrative 
plumbing of complex “selves”—Stephen Dedalus, John Dowell, Clarissa Dalloway, Mrs. 
Ramsay—result in unified and formally masterful depictions of specific humans’ 
consciousness. Rather, these writers’ attunement to the flattening of their own historical 
present into a scenario results in texts that exhibit a lack of symmetry and formal balance 
(Miller 44, 13).  I argue that late modernism’s often formally jarring and confounding 
aesthetics should be read not as failure to achieve modernism’s formal virtuosity, but as a 
“reaction to a certain type of modernist fiction dominated by an aesthetics of formal 
mastery” (Miller 18).  These writers sought to depict the progressive “derealization of 
reality” that afflicted their era; as a result, their novels invoke, deform, and repurpose 
seemingly untimely forms (Miller 44).  By revealing these redeployments of canonical 
forms to be capable of profound and timely insight, Bowen, Waugh and Beckett “deflate 
the category of form as a criterion for judging literary works” (Miller 18).  These authors 
confront the challenge of developing a new configuration of narrative that befits the 
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historical, psychic, and cultural conditions of late modernism; in so doing, they construct 
a body of work that challenges the reified categories upon which our valuations of 
literature are based and insists upon narrative’s potential to offer radical insight into the 
experience of being a self in the world.  
In my second chapter, I examine the dynamic relationship that exists between the 
formally conventional surfaces of Bowen’s novels The Hotel (1927) and The Death of the 
Heart (1938) and the complex configurations of selfhood in evidence beneath these 
surfaces.  Bowen invokes the distinctly twentieth century phenomena of cosmopolitanism 
and the dislocation wrought by international mobility as premises for her investigation of 
the nature of selfhood in this era.  In Bowen’s depiction, cosmopolitan mobility provokes 
existential anxiety that can be ameliorated neither by secure national identifications nor 
personal or familial associations.  Bowen’s characters—be they homeless orphans or 
wealthy dowagers—are universally traumatized by their lack of “place” in the world.  
The trauma provoked by their rootlessness makes apparent the absence of deep and 
mobile interior subjectivities; there is no autonomous and consistent “self” to provide 
these characters security in the midst of profound dislocation.   
For Bowen, such dislocation is a salient feature of existence in the mid-twentieth 
century.  This is manifested in her novels’ invocations and revisions of the female 
bildungsroman, the epistolary novel form, and women’s autobiographical writing.  Each 
of these genres’ premise is to narrate the transformation of an underdeveloped individual 
into a self-authenticating and socially sanctioned subject.  Bowen depicts her characters’ 
total unmooring from secure identifications by undermining each of these genres from 
within. Sydney’s coming-of-age in The Hotel is initially configured according to the 
 10 
 
contours of a female bildungsroman; it purports to narrate her development into a mature, 
married, and coherent individual.  Bowen undercuts this developmental arc by insisting 
upon Sydney’s alienation not only from the institutions that mandate it, but from her own 
life: toward the end of The Hotel, Sydney “could see her life very plainly but there 
seemed no way back into it, the whole thing might have been painted on canvas with a 
clever enough but not convincing appearance of reality” (198).  The female 
bildungsroman plot would have Sydney coming into increasing knowledge of her deep 
self, but Bowen’s reconfiguration of this genre rather reveals that Sydney’s fundamental 
dislocation provokes awareness that her life itself is a veneer that merely covers over the 
emptiness at her core.   
Bowen’s specific reformulation of the female bildungsroman form is furthermore 
a critique of high modernism’s rejection of it.  Bowen does not merely reject the form in 
order to reveal its developmental arc’s oppressiveness; she rather reformulates the female 
bildungsroman to plumb the discrepancy that exists between one’s selfhood and the 
performance of self that the genre mandates. I compare Sydney’s coming-of-age in The 
Hotel to the protagonist’s in Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out in order to show how 
Bowen’s recalibration of the female bildungsroman undoes the form’s investment in the 
“dark places of psychology” which is, for Woolf, where subjectivity resides (108).  In 
this sense, Bowen, like Waugh and Beckett, pursues a literary means by which to 
represent the increasingly troubled consciousness of those late modernist selves whose 
experience of being is misrepresented by canonical modernist conceptions of deep, 
interiorized subjectivity.  
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Bowen’s invocations of female autobiographical writing and the epistolary novel 
form in her novel The Death of the Heart emphasize writing’s role in the coercion of 
subjectivity. Portia, the young woman at the center of this novel, attributes profound 
importance to the act of composition.  Her diary exists at the center of this text, and 
letters between various characters provoke much of the novel’s intrigue.  Portia’s diary 
attempts to inscribe a selfhood that enacts the historical role of women’s autobiography 
which posits “that a reality, hidden behind appearances, is independent of its inscription 
and its reading, and that representation in autobiography corresponds to it.  In addition, 
these narratives presume that autobiographers are the source and center of the meaning of 
their texts” (Nussbaum xii).  However, it is not the consummation of autonomous identity 
that is depicted in Portia’s diary, but her fraught and finally failed attempt at discursive 
self-creation.  This “failure” nurtures Portia’s growing awareness of the 
incommensurability of her consciousness and the conception of self that autobiographical 
writing demands.  
The epistolary novel form also posits a deep well of knowable subjectivity; 
Bowen exploits this convention by undermining the genre’s usual function of revealing 
“the subjective and private orientations of the writer both towards the recipient and the 
people discussed, as well as the writer’s own inner being” (Watt 191). Rather than 
penetrating to the core of Portia’s deepest subjectivity, letters in The Death of the Heart 
reveal the unacknowledged emptiness that hovers beneath the surface of individuals’ 
efforts to address themselves to others.   Both women’s autobiography and the epistle 
demand an enactment of selfhood that Portia comes to recognize is compelled by social 
obligation but in no way encapsulates her experience of being.  Bowen’s deformation of 
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these highly conventionalized forms thereby interrogates the status of subjectivity that is 
conventionally reified through textual convention.  The result is a distinctly late 
modernist critique of the epistolary subject.   
Bowen’s complex reconfigurations of canonical forms enact the function of 
“minor literature” that Lloyd theorizes.  By revealing these forms’ complicity in positing 
and modeling a formulation of subjectivity that no longer resonates with individuals’ 
experience, Bowen commences the “questioning of the founding principles of canonical 
aesthetic judgments” (Lloyd 23).  Because Bowen invokes these seemingly outmoded 
forms, her novels do not capitulate to standards of aesthetic quality that, by the late 
1920s, were well codified. Her novels’ insistence upon the prescriptiveness of these 
forms furthermore reveals their delimiting effect upon the literary imagination.  Her 
work, paradoxically by re-making old forms, makes possible a new vision of selfhood 
that exceeds the strictly circumscribed possibilities made possible in major literature.  As 
Lloyd’s formulation of minor literature enables us to understand, Bowen’s work does not 
fail to represent the “attainment of the autonomous subjectivity that is the ultimate aim of 
the major narrative;” rather, her method actively and artfully resists this representation 
(22).     
In my third chapter, I analyze the formal methods by which Waugh’s 1934 novel 
A Handful of Dust thematizes the surface vs. depth dynamic that characterizes the late 
modernist sensibility in fiction. Waugh’s satire points up the extent to which his 
characters are oriented toward shallow investments and pursuits; the novel’s satirical 
form also dictates that inner lives remained unexplored.  His deployment and 
reformulation of the Gothic—a form particularly attuned to issues of authenticity and 
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fakery—is a crucial aspect of this investigation of surfaces. The Gothic facilitates 
Waugh’s revelation of the dynamic by which individuals living during this era paper over 
the ongoing crisis of the subject.  The Gothic Revival home that is the centerpiece of 
Tony’s life—and of his narrative—embodies the failure of attempts to cover over fraught 
realities with seemingly authentic trappings.  
Importantly, Waugh’s specific use of the Gothic reverses the use to which it was 
often put by modernism.  Using T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) as an exemplary text, 
I argue that while modernists invoked the fearsome aspects of the Gothic to depict a 
generalized dread of the future, Waugh’s satire flattens this affect, revealing a yet more 
profoundly disturbing phenomenon: the vacuity of those living in the era of late 
modernism limits their capacity to be haunted.  Certainly, Waugh’s invocation of the 
Gothic—an apparently untimely and seemingly “unmodern” aesthetic—makes A Handful 
of Dust one of the “unseasonable forms” of late modernism (Miller 12).  But Waugh’s 
redeployment of this aesthetic facilitates his revelation that individuals living in the era of 
late modernism are devoid of the autonomous subjectivity prescribed by those narrative 
forms that posit and model the development of autonomous and self-authenticating 
subjectivities.  
Waugh’s novel also depicts the increasing penetration of individuals’ lives by a 
sense of lived mimesis that characterizes the 1930s and 40s (Miller 42).  The novel’s 
central character continues to organize his life according to the scripts inherited from his 
nineteenth century forebears; though historical and cultural reality no longer sustain 
them, he inhabits the roles of aristocratic estate owner and imperial adventurer. Tony 
turns to the Gothic Revival and the medieval as a means by which to manage the modern 
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vacuity of his time, which is marked by an obsession with fashion, décor, and trends.  
The pursuit of commodities, however, carries through his own engagements with the 
past; his apparently Gothic sensibility is characterized by a distinctly contemporary 
preoccupation with things. Tony’s naïve but persistent perception of himself as a 
nineteenth century estate owner provokes his personal downfall, revealing the expiration 
of this narrative.  He furthermore perceives of himself as a competent imperial adventurer 
on the model of the nineteenth century’s “boy-heroes” who were “pathfinders for the 
Empire and civilization,” but finds that his adventure far from English shores rather 
makes manifest his total inadequacy as an agent of civilization (Brantlinger 30). By 
revealing the profoundly negative consequences that result from Tony’s rote enactment 
of outmoded scripts, Waugh indicates the destruction wrought by individuals’ 
circumscription by narrative.  Paradoxically, as is true of both Bowen’s and Beckett’s 
work, Waugh’s depiction of this dangerous circumscription is facilitated through his own 
invocation and repurposing of the very narratives that circumscribe his characters’ lives. 
A Handful of Dust’s ending magnifies the destruction resulting from blind adherence to 
ideologically empty narratives when Tony becomes entrapped in a “living death” that is 
both instigated and perpetuated by narrative.  As I argue, Tony’s subservience to 
conventionalized narratives results in his immurement within the nineteenth century 
narratives by which he tried, and failed, to instill his life with significance. 
Waugh’s denigration of narrative convention is not, however, an endorsement of 
modernism’s radical techniques or sensibilities. A Handful of Dust’s orientation to the 
dynamic by which individuals cover over the emptiness that lurks within the self 
distinguish it from its modernist forebears, which sought to deeply plumb characters’ 
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extant subjectivities.  For Waugh, individuals’ unreflective enactment of roles is endemic 
to the mid-twentieth century; his narrative method therefore departs from modernist 
practices in order to account for the lack of deep interiority beneath these performances. 
By contrasting Tony’s experience of travel abroad with the one depicted in Virginia 
Woolf’s earlier novel The Voyage Out (1915), I show how Waugh revises this modernist 
narrative arc to culminate not in an epiphany of self-knowledge but rather in the reader’s 
recognition that there is no deep self for Tony to know.  I also compare Tony’s journey 
into a heart of darkness to Charlie Marlow’s in Conrad’s 1899 novella.  The two texts 
initially construct their protagonists’ adventures as journeys backward in time; unlike 
Marlow’s Heart of Darkness, however, Tony’s temporal orientation is entirely 
dismantled as a result of his journey away from England.  The contraction of empire 
mandates that the narrative of English superiority by which he understands both his 
cultural and existential status to be secured is no longer resonant.  As a result, Tony 
becomes entirely disoriented from time itself and, as a result, from his own life, which his 
traumatic journey transforms into a “company of phantoms” (200).  Waugh recalibrates 
these modernist narratives of foreign encounters in order to express the crisis these 
encounters provoke in the mid-twentieth century: a realization of the total lack of 
ideological justification for the narratives by which individuals previously made sense of 
their lives.  Waugh’s novel reveals that adherence to conventionalized narrative renders 
those living during the late modernist era both devoid of self and unable to imagine 
stories beyond those by which they are circumscribed; this is the truly horrifying lesson 
of Waugh’s Gothic finale. 
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My fourth chapter argues that Beckett’s trilogy—particularly its first novel, 
Molloy—systematically invokes and dismantles the protocols of the bildungsroman and 
autobiographical forms to reveal both their coercion of narrative subjectivity and readers’ 
complicity in this process of coercion.  Both bildung and autobiography depict a 
narrator’s or protagonist’s ongoing development of an autonomous subjectivity that is 
socially sanctioned and facilitates his or her integration into culture.  This form’s 
developmental arc is organized according to a set of conventions by which a narrative’s 
central character progresses from youthful ignorance, through trials, and into a phase of 
culturally sanctioned development.  I invoke Patrick Bixby’s analysis of Beckett’s 
reformulation of bildung to show that Molloy, wherein its two narrators, Molloy and 
Moran, instigate developmental journeys only to forestall progress at every turn, 
confronts the “developmental narrative of modernity, interrogating the concepts of 
identity and identification, while challenging the necessity of assimilation and 
accommodation” (33). By dismantling the form that mandates and models these concepts, 
Beckett reveals the extent to which the form itself coerces its narrators into enacting the 
prescriptive formulation of subjectivity inherent to bildung even as they resist this 
performance. 
Part I of Molloy is Molloy’s first-person narration of a personal journey.  As such, 
it explicitly invokes the precepts of autobiographical writing.  As Lloyd argues, 
autobiographical writing both produces and mandates a limited and delimiting notion of 
selfhood.  Because autobiographical texts are devoted “to producing the individual as 
autonomous, that is, as self-authenticating and self-authorizing,” autonomy then comes to 
be understood as the goal and end of individual development (Lloyd 162, italics in 
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original). Beckett’s rendering of Molloy’s autobiography, however, subverts Molloy’s 
personal, physical and—most importantly for my argument—narrative autonomy, 
thereby undermining the universal and archetypal notion of individuality that the form 
conventionally prescribes.   By making autobiography both the vehicle for and the object 
of his critique of this prescriptive subjectivity, Beckett exposes the methods by which the 
form typically coerces a self-authenticating and self-authorizing subjectivity into being.   
For Beckett, the act of narration is a central method by which narrative 
traditionally posits and mandates subjectivity.  Molloy’s narration of his journey in 
search of his mother constitutes Part I of the novel; Part II is the agent Moran’s narration 
of his pursuit of Molloy and of his eventual return home.  Both of these autobiographical 
narratives invoke and problematize the methods by which first person narration typically 
proceeds.  Molloy narrates a running meta-commentary upon the arbitrariness of his own 
role as the apparent source and end of his own text.  By commenting upon the mystery of 
his own narrative perspective and the process by which he himself is brought into being 
and “developed” throughout his text, Molloy spotlights the role of narrative itself in 
creating these phenomena.  Moran, because he is a detective commissioned to pursue a 
target, composes a “report.”  This report functions as another means by which Beckett 
reflects upon and undermines the process by which narrative coerces subjectivity into 
being even as it obfuscates this coercion.  Moran’s report writes Molloy into being.  
Furthermore, by adhering to the conventions of report-writing, Moran becomes a 
detective.  In this way, Beckett reveals that subjectivity (both that of the narrator and the 
subjects he seemingly narrates into existence) is not itself the source or end of narrative, 
but rather one of its effects.  
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This configuration of narration underscores Beckett’s critical orientation to the 
extant subjectivity that narration typically posits.  For Beckett, this notion of subjectivity 
acts upon readers as both a coercive exemplar and a limitation to their habits of reading.  
Molloy’s and Moran’s respective narratives methodically dismantle the conventions by 
which narrative typically calls into being the appearance of narrating “selves.”  Beckett’s 
careful reformulation reveals the extent to which readers are in thrall to this “universally 
valid and archetypal” subjectivity represented in canonical literature (Lloyd 19).  Indeed, 
Molloy’s violation of narration’s conventions undercuts narrative’s role as an aesthetic 
enforcer of cultural norms.  It also violates readers’ powerful habits of reading; despite 
the novel’s persistent reformulation of conventions, these conventions act as “cerebral 
reels” that condition readers’ reception of Beckett’s text (Beckett 112).  That its narrators 
deny their own narrating statuses constitutes a profound disturbance to the cultural role of 
subject formation that narrative conventionally enacts and prescribes.  This violation 
largely accounts for Molloy’s confounding strangeness. 
Beckett also invokes the genre of detective fiction, morphing its highly formulaic 
aspects to reveal both the textual policing of subjectivity that popular genres can perform 
and the coercive conventionality of narrative’s drive toward coherence.  Using Tzvetan 
Todorov’s typology of detective fiction as a lens through which to analyze Part II, I argue 
that Beckett invokes the inherent duality of the form—it consists of a crime and an 
investigation that yields the detective’s composition of a report—to facilitate his meta-
commentary on the prescription that narrative must progress toward coherence and 
resolution.  Whereas in a conventional detective narrative the story of the investigation 
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reveals “whodunit,” Moran’s narrative neither identifies Molloy’s crime nor provides 
retrospective coherence by “solving” it.   
Beckett’s trilogy is, nevertheless, a series of prose texts wherein protagonists 
narrate stories.  Molloy is a novel, though it undoes the conventions of novel writing 
more and more vigorously as it tends toward an ending.  Through this complex 
construction of narrative, Beckett pursues a method of creative expression by which a 
selfhood that exceeds the bounds of narrative convention might be depicted.  By 
exploding the conventions of narrative and narration, Beckett “unwrites” the prescriptive 
form of autonomous subjectivity that has heretofore been the condition and end of 
canonical narrative.    
Ultimately, these novels’ relationship to canonical forms is not derivative but 
rather visionary.  In being attentive to the specific methods of revision that these authors 
enact, I identify the radical potential of their formal reanimations to yield a fresh 
perspective on the historically specific experience of being during the late modernist era.  
These novelists’ invocation of untimely forms paradoxically facilitates timely and 
pointed insight into the precise nature of these forms’ inadequacy to express this 
experience. My dissertation insists that, as Susan Osborn claims about Bowen’s fiction, 
these authors’ work “offers unfamiliar ways by which we might reconceptualize the 
relationship between realism and modernism, the ambiguities of identity, and the 
obscuring effects of many familiar critical assumptions,” including those pertaining to 
canonicity and notions of genre (230).  These works’ jarring formal incongruities produce 
a defamiliarizing effect upon both readers and critics; this demands a fresh examination 
of literary and existential categories whose boundaries could previously be taken for 
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granted, including modernism, identity, and narrative form.  Certainly, this 
reconceptualization dethrones many foundational assumptions about literature.  As my 
dissertation argues, Bowen’s, Waugh’s, and Beckett’s late modernist novels perform 
precisely this function.  
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CHAPTER II 
LATE MODERNIST DISLOCATION AND BOWEN’S EVACUATION OF FORM 
 
Introduction 
 Bowen’s early novels explore the lives of mobile and solitary subjects dislocated 
from their homes and cultures.  Her formal techniques, too, provoke in readers the sense 
of “dislocation” that is a key aim of Bowen’s late modernist aesthetic.  As a result, critics 
of Bowen’s work have long interpreted her body of work as having a disjunctive 
relationship with literary history; her texts’ apparent likeness to the Edwardian novel of 
social manners is often interpreted as a reversion to the techniques that her immediate 
literary predecessors rejected in favor of radical linguistic and formal experimentation. 
Although recently critics have discovered a uniquely complex version of modernism 
lurking beneath the surfaces of Bowen’s work, her style was initially interpreted as a 
throwback to nineteenth century realism.1   
 This interpretation is encouraged by Bowen’s engagement and revision of a 
variety of pre-twentieth century forms, including the bildungsroman, the epistolary novel, 
women’s autobiography, the gothic romance, the “Big House novel,” and others.  By the 
late 1920s, when Bowen’s first novel was published, invocation of these seemingly 
outmoded narrative forms appeared out of step with the ethos of innovation that ruled 
early literary modernism.  Indeed, when the radical formal experimentation of Woolf, 
                                                
1 Early critics including Douglas Hewitt and William Heath classified Bowen as a writer of Edwardian 
novels of manners.  More recent critics including Jed Esty, Susan Osborn, Sinéad Mooney and Victoria 
Stewart—among a growing number— have queried this classification and situated her fiction within a 
corpus of modernism. The 2007 publication of a Modern Fiction Studies special issue on Bowen’s work 
indicated critical consensus that Bowen’s writing is more complex—and more modernist—than earlier 
critics perceived.  Others have delineated yet further categories for Bowen’s work to emphasize that her 
narrative innovations and investments go beyond those associated with classic modernism; chapters on her 
work in Marina MacKay and Lyndsey Stonebridge’s British Fiction After Modernism (2007) and Kristin 
Bluemel’s Intermodernism (2009) are two such examples.  
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Joyce, or Stein is the benchmark of “successful modernism,” then use of these old-
fashioned narrative techniques can be viewed as “failure.”  This assessment is reflected in 
a statement made by Douglass Hewitt who, as recently as 1988, read Bowen as a “minor” 
novelist who turned her back on technical innovation and wrote delicate small-scale post-
Jamesian studies, mostly of children and adolescent girls (198).  Careful attention to the 
particular ways that Bowen deploys old-fashioned forms, however, uncovers a complex 
engagement with and critique of the modernist techniques that she has often been accused 
of failing to execute.  Read on its own terms, even Bowen’s earliest work demands that 
we expand our vision of modernism in order to account for—and to understand more 
deeply—those works that perform an immanent critique of modernist ideologies and 
narrative techniques.   
 To read Bowen’s novels as both richly engaging pre-twentieth century forms and 
critiquing high modernist literary practices is to charge readers and critics with a difficult 
task.  Attention to her texts’ thematic, linguistic, formal, and aesthetic complexities 
results in an often estranging and sometimes disconcerting reading experience.  Susan 
Osborn, in a 2007 issue of Modern Fiction Studies devoted to Bowen’s work, identifies 
several features that pose a challenge to readers and critics: “weird and inconsistent 
mimeticism,” “dramatizations of impasse and non- or dissolved presence” and “elliptical 
dialogue and lacunae in plotting” (228).  Inconsistency, impasse, dissolved presence, and 
lacunae are narrative strategies indexing the fundamental transformation that late 
modernist dislocation wrought upon individuals’ subjectivities. Bowen’s unique style 
embodies this change.  As the medium by which she performs her renovations of pre-
modernist forms, this estranging style furthermore reveals the limits of high modernist 
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efforts to manage dislocation through cosmopolitan poses and radically complex 
innovations in form. 
 Bowen is critical of both pre-modernist narrative forms’ discursive creation of 
bourgeois subjectivity and high modernism’s investment in depicting characters’ deep 
selves through innovative narrative techniques. From her first novel, The Hotel (1927) 
through her sixth, The Death of the Heart (1938), Bowen ironically undercuts high 
modernist interiority by invoking and revising the very pre-modernist narrative forms that 
high modernists rejected. By deploying these earlier forms to mount a radically new 
notion of subjectivity, Bowen reveals their unrealized potential to perform complex 
narrative work.  Bowen’s vision of the subject mandates the development of a form that 
departs from high modernism’s orientation toward innovation and its insistence upon 
robust interiority.  Importantly, Bowen engages these pre-modernist forms affectionately; 
hers is not a parodic redeployment of tired forms.  Her restrained version of late 
modernism, therefore, indicates a complexly layered narrative style that both capitalizes 
upon and critiques the variety of narrative forms that preceded Bowen’s.   
 As other scholars have claimed, Bowen often invokes and then resists trajectories 
of development; in doing so, she continues in the modernist tradition of re-working the 
canonical bildungsroman form.  Jed Esty asserts that modernist writers transform this 
genre so that their texts emphasize not education or maturation, but the trope of “frozen 
youth.”  According to Esty: “Metamorphosis, dilation, consumption, evacuation, 
inversion: these stories spectacularly and conspicuously thwart the realist proportions of 
biographical time that had, from its inception, defined the bildungsroman” (2).  For Esty, 
novels of frozen youth disrupt protagonists’ progress toward socially integrated maturity, 
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which reflects a disruption in the teleological vision of history that casts the nation state 
as the endpoint of progress.  Modernism, he claims, “exposes and disrupts the inherited 
conventions of the bildungsroman in order to criticize bourgeois values and to reinvent 
the biographical novel, but also to explore the contradictions inherent in mainstream 
developmental discourses of self, nation, and empire” (3).  For Esty, the salient feature of 
these modernist novels of stunted youth is their ability to disrupt the teleological narrative 
of imperial development.  This has consequences for the individual and for literary 
history, according to Esty: 
many canonical works of the late Victorian and modernist period feature colonial 
themes of backwardness, anachronism, and uneven development that provide the 
symbolic basis for an anti-teleological model of subject formation.  This is the 
very model of social delay and narrative distension that will, in the hands of 
Conrad, Joyce, and Woolf, open up space for the novel of consciousness and 
thereby become the hallmark of modernist style. (14) 
For Esty the antiteleological orientation of imperially inflected novels of stunted growth 
is prerequisite to the exploration of consciousness for which high modernism is known. 
 Bowen and her late modernist cohort, however, plumb yet more deeply the model 
of consciousness posited by their high modernist forebears.  If, as Esty argues, Joyce, 
Woolf, and others were able to forge textual explorations of consciousness as a result of a 
new and anti-teleological model of subject formation, the late modernists query the very 
concept of subjectivity.2  While their high modernist predecessors were indeed deeply 
                                                
2 Samuel Beckett’s work is particularly well known for rigorously dismantling taken-for-granted notions of 
selfhood and subjectivity.  Characters in his plays and novels defy ascriptions of even the most basic tenets 
of subjectivity.  For instance, in The Unnameable (1953), names—the most legible and familiar markers of 
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invested in the narrative disruption of teleology, Bowen’s cohort emphasizes and 
explores the radically strange model of subjectivity that results from modernity’s 
reorientation of time and national space. In The Hotel and The Death of the Heart, Bowen 
is clearly invested in these destabilizing conditions’ consequences for individual subjects.   
 This disjunctive model of subject formation is Bowen’s central preoccupation in 
The Hotel and The Death of the Heart.  While Esty focuses on “the special capacity of 
modernist texts to give literary form to the collapse of progressive historicism as an 
organizing idea of European modernity and therefore of the European novel,” many late 
modernist novels written in the late 1920s and beyond focus squarely on the 
consequences of this collapse for those living in the aftermath of empire, World War I, 
and, in a literary context, both the nineteenth century bildungsroman and high modernism 
(19). In his work on Samuel Beckett’s revisions of the bildungsroman genre, Patrick 
Bixby configures these consequences to subjects as spatial, claiming that Beckett’s 
narrator-protagonists “explore the state of deterritorialization, a condition which positions 
each of them in opposition to the evolutionary narrative of modernity at large” (28).  This 
is the condition of Bowen’s protagonists’ lives, too; they are fundamentally dislocated 
from their home nations, which have been destabilized by the breakdown of empire and 
its teleological worldview.  The anti-teleological model of subject formation that results 
from this condition determines the particular contours of their stories of “frozen youth.”   
 The relationship of Bowen’s work to canonical modernist forms, as well as the 
pre-modernist narrative genres that preceded them, is decidedly critical.  In this respect, 
her early novels exhibit characteristics of what David Lloyd, building on the work of 
                                                                                                                                            
selfhood—are mutable, and the later part of the narrative is dominated by a creature identifiable neither as 
human nor inhuman.  The late modernist interrogation of the concept of subjectivity also occurs in the work 
of Wyndham Lewis, Djuna Barnes, Flann O’Brien, and others.   
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Deleuze and Guattari, terms “minor literature.”3  Considering Bowen’s work through this 
framework enables a productive understanding of the relationship of Bowen’s work to the 
literary canon, and to modernism more generally.  For Lloyd, major works of literature 
claim “to realize the autonomy of the individual subject to such a degree that the 
individual subject becomes universally valid and archetypal” (19).  In so doing, they 
perpetuate the concept of the autonomous subject as the “essence of the human,” which 
underwrites the coercive and assimilationist logic of the State, wherein whatever deviates 
from this human archetype is “seen as incompletely developed historically rather than as 
radically different” (19, 17).  For Lloyd, hegemonic state power relies upon a demand 
that the individual strive toward autonomous subjectivity in a manner analogous to 
culture’s evolution toward the endpoint of historical development.  The literature most 
able to realize this demand is the bildungsroman (19).   
 “Major works” of literature, Lloyd asserts, are “in some manner directed toward 
the production of an autonomous ethical identity for the subject” (19). Because 
decipherable ethical imperatives and their corresponding formulation of coherent 
subjectivity are precisely what she dismantles by disabling the functions of bildung for 
the young women in her texts, Bowen’s early novels resist this mandate.  Lloyd 
furthermore argues that a major work itself must be autonomous, “both self-contained 
and original, where the latter term implies the re-creation at a higher level of the original 
identity of the race” (19).  Bowen’s work is also recalcitrant to this characterization; her 
                                                
3 By employing this term, I do not wish to merely “label” Bowen’s work as minor.  Rather, recognizing that 
her work performs a “minor function” makes it possible to understand the real-world effects of Bowen’s 
formal and aesthetic practices. Because her work is resistant to coercive state assimilation and bourgeois 
prescriptions of subjectivity, it performs the role of “minor literature” that Lloyd describes.  Furthermore, 
this category helps us to think through why Bowen’s work was initially deemed a “failure” in relation to 
“major” works of canonical modernism, when in reality it exists in a complex, negatively critical 
relationship to the canon.   
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perpetually fraught relationship to the canon and the aforementioned attributions of 
“failure” to her aesthetic techniques indicate that her work is not commonly understood 
to reproduce an “original or essential identity at a higher and self-conscious level” (22).  
Indeed, until recently critics resisted granting Bowen canonical status for this very 
reason.  Lloyd’s formulation of minor literature enables us to understand the negatively 
critical role that Bowen’s work plays; she has not failed to represent the “attainment of 
the autonomous subjectivity that is the ultimate aim of the major narrative” (22).  Rather, 
she actively resists it.  By doing so, she, like other writers of minor literature, says Lloyd, 
commences the “questioning of the founding principles of canonical aesthetic judgments” 
(23). 
 The principles of aesthetic judgment that value high modernist linguistic 
experimentation, revolutionary narrative forms, and emphasis on interiority over the 
interrogation of subjectivity that Bowen performs, then, initially relegated her work to a 
position outside the canon.  Despite high modernism’s purportedly revolutionary ethos, 
Lloyd claims, the claims of canonical modernists including Eliot, Pound, and Yeats to 
transcend division and difference clearly position them within a major paradigm (23).  
Bowen, in her refusal to conceive of her work as “playing in some sense a prefigurative 
and reconciling role,” enacts the “negative critical aspect of modernism” that Lloyd 
ascribes to minor literature (23).  This critical posture is crucial to Bowen’s radical 
conception of a subjectivity that is recalcitrant to both the canonical mandate of 
transcendence of difference and the state’s demand for autonomous subjectivity.  Lloyd 
describes the function of minor literature as follows: 
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Rather than shore up the notions of subjectivity that underpin canonical aesthetics, 
and rather than claiming still to prefigure a reconciled domain of human freedom 
in creativity as even surrealism does, a minor literature pushes further the 
recognition of the disintegration of the individual subject of the bourgeois state, 
questioning the principles of originality and autonomy that underwrite that 
conception of the subject…Minor literature adheres constantly to a negatively 
critical attitude.  (24-5) 
Lloyd’s configuration of minor literature, then, reveals the negative critical relationship 
of Bowen’s work to a canon that posits—indeed, demands—an autonomous subject 
amenable to “formation” according to a progressive, evolutionary logic.  Furthermore, 
Bowen’s invocation of other seemingly antiquated narrative forms in addition to the 
bildungsroman, including the epistolary novel form and the genre of women’s 
autobiography, underlines the ways in which writing is historically complicit in the 
discursive creation and sanctioning of a prescriptive model of subjectivity.  
 
Subjectivity in/and Form 
 In The Hotel, her first novel, Bowen invokes a specifically Victorian formulation 
of bildung.  Combined with her “estranging” aesthetic techniques, the use of this form 
after the apotheosis of high modernism makes for a jarring reading experience.  By 1927, 
the year of The Hotel’s publication, writers had innovated a slew of experimental 
narrative structures: in Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Woolf used free indirect discourse to track 
the psychological machinations of her characters; Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) featured a 
collage of literary genres to create the “whole” of one Dublin day; Stein created 
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vignettes—portions of which she wrote in dialect—to create intimate portraits of her 
characters in Three Lives (1909).  None of these modernist narrative modes resembles the 
teleologically oriented coming-of-age novels so popular throughout the nineteenth 
century. Given that Bowen wrote in the wake of high modernism, her early novels’ 
apparent resemblance to such Victorian forms appears anachronistic and perhaps 
“unmodern.”    
 To read Bowen’s sophisticated use of the bildungsroman form as a reversion to an 
outmoded genre, however, is to miss her critique of high modernism’s failed attempts to 
cope with the profound dislocations of early twentieth century life.  The Hotel begins like 
many earlier novels about young women: an amusing community of characters meddles 
in the fate of one young woman who is positioned on the precipice of adulthood.  These 
are the same conditions that Jane Austen, the progenitor of the female bildungsroman 
genre, established at the outset of her works.  Readers are therefore invited to experience 
The Hotel as the story of Sydney Warren’s coming-of-age.  The narrative conventions of 
the female bildungsroman have trained readers to expect that Sydney will commit a series 
of social faux pas and endure her friends’ meddling during her journey toward adulthood 
and a socially advantageous marriage.  In seeming capitulation to these expectations, in 
the first several pages of Bowen’s novel, a fussy spinster named Miss Pym noses around 
the grounds of a Hotel located on the Italian Riviera.  As she does so, she discovers 
letters from Sydney’s future suitor, Rev. J.D.L. Milton, and engages in gossipy 
conversation with another traveler about Sydney herself.  In the mode of a Victorian 
novel, then, the stage is set for the events that will determine Sydney’s future.   
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 The novel’s form, too, exhibits traits of conventional Victorian writing.  The 
chapters are numbered, suggesting a teleological progression in which Sydney begins as 
an unformed, unmarried girl who will presumably mature into a socially gracious married 
woman.  The characters’ dialogue is formally punctuated and speakers are clearly 
identified; Bowen does not utilize the experimental and subjectivist narrative techniques 
of her immediate literary predecessors.  Furthermore, much of Bowen’s narration in The 
Hotel is occupied with the relaying of plot: characters walk to and from tennis courts; 
they make arch comments about others over dinner; they answer letters at writing tables.  
The logistics of plotting are on display here in a way distinct from the emphasis on 
interiority that characterizes much of high modernist narrative.  By adopting these 
Victorian tactics, Bowen invites a reading of The Hotel as a story of Sydney’s coming-of-
age in a pre-modernist mode.   
 As the novel progresses, however, Bowen rigorously renovates this narrative 
form.  Her particular re-working of the bildungsroman stands in creative tension with a 
series of modernist revisions of the genre.  According to Patrick Bixby, when the 
bildungsroman is “successful,” it can reconcile the desire for personal autonomy 
characteristic of modernity with the demand for social integration (25).  However, “a 
certain awareness of the possibility of failure or even a skepticism about the hero’s ability 
to succeed in his integrative project was always an ironic presence in the bildungsroman 
tradition” (28).  High modernist writers in particular explicitly invoked motifs of failure 
and exhibited skepticism in their treatments of the bildungsroman.  For instance, in The 
Voyage Out (1915), Woolf short-circuits a young woman’s integration into society by 
narrating her untimely death; in Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), 
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Stephen Dedalus does not become integrated into the culture or class into which he was 
born but rather leaves them behind.  Bowen, then, with her predilection for writing 
narratives about young people who fail to mature, makes her own contribution to 
modernism’s ongoing renovation of the bildungsroman form that Bixby has recently 
shown to be a crucially important, though often unnoticed, aspect of Beckett’s work. 
  
Bowen’s Critique of Interiority 
 Unlike her high modernist predecessors, however, Bowen’s re-working of the 
Victorian female bildungsroman indicates not the existence of a robust individual 
subjectivity, but rather the incommensurability of one’s being and the performance of 
“self” that purports to reveal it to the world.  In The Voyage Out, for instance, Woolf 
insists upon the existence of a rich interiority by indicating—via her heroine’s sudden 
death—that a socially sanctioned marriage would short-circuit the ongoing development 
of Rachel Vinrace’s “self.”  In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus 
is armed only with his dynamic subjectivity when he leaves Ireland to forge in his soul 
the uncreated conscience of his race.   In their revisions of the bildungsroman form, then, 
the authors of these canonical modernist texts configure modernity’s alienation as a threat 
to individuals’ existing and robust subjectivities.   
 By indicating that no such dynamic and decipherable self exists at the center of 
her young female characters, however, Bowen anticipates Beckett’s more formally 
radical interventions into the bildungsroman’s narrative of personal integration.  
According to Bixby, even as they invoke familiar features of the bildungsroman, 
Beckett’s novels “consistently deny the image of a subjectivity progressing from a stable 
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origin towards an ever more substantial presence, replacing this trajectory with a 
narrative in which identity is relentlessly in flux” (28).  In The Hotel, Sydney’s identity 
both lacks substance and fluctuates.  Although Bowen’s style is, in many ways, more 
formally conventional than Beckett’s, both authors interrogate and challenge the ethical 
imperatives of the bildungsroman.  According to Bixby: 
Rather than reinforcing a notion of identity foundational to major literature, 
[Beckett’s] writing performs the deterritorialization of the individual subject, 
interrogating the principles of authenticity and autonomy that guarantee its 
coherence and stability, and simultaneously defies the conventions of the novel 
form and bildungsroman tradition which dictate the necessity of coherent 
characters developing in the context of coherent sociological communities. (28) 
For Beckett, as for Bowen, the reconfiguration of subjectivity mandates a defiance of 
literary convention; late modernist subjectivity of the kind that these writers explore 
requires late modernist narrative forms.  In a late scene in The Hotel, Sydney is not 
socially integrated and poised for marriage; rather Bowen describes her as “inanimate and 
objective as a young girl in a story told by a man, incapable of a thought or a feeling that 
was not attributed to her, without a personality of her own outside of [her companions’] 
three projections upon her: Milton’s fiancée, Tessa’s young cousin, Mrs. Kerr’s protégée, 
lately her friend” (262).  In this scene, Sydney’s subjectivity is revealed to be neither 
authentic nor autonomous but rather the product of others’ projections upon her.  As 
such, it proves that Bowen’s deformation of the Victorian bildungsroman, like Beckett’s, 
performs a radical critique of conventional notions of a stable and coherent subject.   
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 In significant ways, Bowen builds on the modernist revision of the female 
bildungsroman that Woolf had already begun to develop in The Voyage Out in 1915. 4  
Like The Hotel, The Voyage Out explicitly engages the Victorian narrative conventions 
that led Woolf’s early readers to anticipate Rachel Vinrace’s maturation and marriage.  
But as the novel progresses and Rachel grows as an artist and begins to develop a mature 
consciousness, Woolf indicates that the culmination of her “coming-of-age” process 
should be not marriage, but independence.  Shortly after she accepts a marriage 
proposal—one that would solidify her place in the cosmopolitan upper class circle she 
inhabits—she contracts an illness and dies within days.  By killing off her protagonist in 
this way, Woolf offers a bold riposte to the female bildungsroman convention that 
circumscribes both her narrative practices and Rachel’s story.  
 Woolf therefore goes beyond deforming an inherited literary genre; indeed, she 
rejects conventional narrative practices altogether.  In the well-known version of her 
essay “Modern Fiction” published in 1925, Woolf exhorts modern novelists to reject 
established narrative conventions: “[t]he sooner English fiction turns its back on” popular 
writing practices of the nineteenth century, Woolf claims, “the better for its soul” (104).  
For Woolf, writing that is appropriate to the modern experience taps into an inner, 
                                                
4 Jed Esty asserts that, when considering Bowen’s work, one should not invoke the predictable Woolf 
comparison without good reason (“Antidevelopment” 258).  In this instance, examination of Woolf’s 
evolving relationship to inherited literary practices, as traced from The Voyage Out to her later essay 
“Modern Fiction,” yields insight into the modernist narrative techniques and postures that Bowen 
responded to by way of her seemingly anachronistic formal maneuvers.  Esty compares Woolf’s renovation 
of the female bildungsroman form to Bowen’s project in The Last September (1929). Esty claims “the 
language of [The Last September] encodes the broken and jagged time of a dying colonial modernity into 
the trope of adolescence, destabilizing the entwined allegory of individual and social progress endemic to 
the nineteenth-century bildungsroman” (“Antidevelopment” 259).  Bowen’s first novel, too, destabilizes 
the values endemic to the female bildungsroman.  However, in The Hotel, this destabilization reveals the 
psychic affliction wrought by late modernist dislocation.  Like Esty, I understand Bowen’s and Woolf’s 
deformations of the bildungsroman as modernist.  I see Bowen’s evacuation of this conventional form, 
however, as distinctively late modernist.  Bowen’s way of renovating these inherited literary practices 
reveals not the similarities in Woolf’s and Bowen’s work, but important distinctions between them. 
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irreducible dimension of consciousness that is not outwardly manifest.  According to 
Woolf, this “essential thing” cannot be conveyed when an author is compelled “to 
provide a plot, to provide comedy, tragedy, love interest, and an air of probability 
embalming the whole” (106).  Though succumbing to these compulsions results in novels 
“done to a turn,” Woolf claims that it precludes meaningful expression of reality as she 
understands it (106).  This reality, claims Woolf, is most richly portrayed via narrations 
of individuals’ interior lives.  Consciousness itself, she asserts, should be the “point of 
interest” for modern writing (108).   By exhorting modern writers to explore “the dark 
places of psychology,” Woolf announces fiction’s inward turn: modern writers should, 
Woolf asserts, be concerned with exploring and expressing the inner life of the mind 
(108).   
 In The Hotel, Bowen repudiates the ethos of interiority that Woolf calls for in 
“Modern Fiction.”  Certainly, by explicitly setting readers up to expect a reenactment of 
the marriage plot with which they are familiar, Bowen swerves away from the modernist 
interiority that Woolf valorizes.  In The Hotel, Bowen apparently returns to a narrative 
form that emphasizes interactions between community members, the complex intrigues 
of courtship, and one woman’s integration into her social class.  These are indeed the 
purported concerns of Bowen’s text and her characters, and together they constitute the 
conventional plot of a female bildungsroman.  But as the novel progresses, Bowen 
invokes these narrative conventions only to subvert them; by the novel’s end, these 
conventions are evacuated of their intended meaning.  
Woolf’s and Bowen’s novelistic practices are therefore distinct: whereas Woolf 
rejects the conventional female bildungsroman form (both by killing off Rachel Vinrace 
 35 
 
and by later declaring the insufficiency of nineteenth century realism in “Modern 
Fiction”), Bowen invokes and then evacuates it.  This distinction is attributable to the 
writers’ fundamentally different perceptions of the individual consciousness.  As she 
elaborates in “Modern Fiction,” Woolf believes that great modern writers have access to 
an “essential thing” or “spirit” that they express as vividly as possible in writing (105).  
For Bowen, however, modernity’s fundamental dissolution precludes the possibility of 
coherent subjectivity; she must therefore reject those high modernist genres that assume 
its existence.  Her evacuation of a form associated with “materialists,” then, facilitates her 
radical commentary on late modernist subjectivity.  Rather than rejecting a conventional 
form, as Woolf calls for, she empties it of the meaning associated with it.  In so doing, 
she pushes past high modernism’s emphasis on interiority to reveal the dynamic 
emptiness at the core of the late modernist subject.   
 
Late Modernist Cosmopolitanism & the Crisis of Subjectivity 
 In Bowen’s early novels, encounters with locations abroad exacerbate the 
sensation of being unmoored from place that all modern subjects experience.5  For 
Bowen’s characters, this sensation provokes a crisis of subjectivity, the outcome of which 
reveals that the self has nothing at its center.  This revelation is fundamentally different 
from that which characterizes depictions of journeys abroad in many high modernist 
texts.  Nels Pearson argues that certain prominent early British modernists “depict the 
dissociation from national histories and geographies as an encounter with—or a rising 
                                                
5 In The House in Paris (1935), in particular, every character is unmoored from his or her home place.  
From Leopold, a young English-Jewish-French boy adopted by an American family and taken to live in 
Italy, to Karen, an upper-class Englishwoman whose home place—like Sydney’s—is rendered 
uninhabitable by her experiences abroad, no character has a secure attachment to home.       
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feeling of being subsumed within—universal time or space” (320).  High modernists such 
as Wyndham Lewis (in his early work), Ezra Pound, E.M. Forster, and Woolf, Pearson 
claims, posit a vision of cosmopolitanism wherein one’s eminently portable and robust 
subjectivity enables a transcendence of national identifications.  Importantly, as Pearson 
points out, this transcendence is predicated on the “notion of a normative, stable, or 
‘traditional’ correspondence between history and geography” (321).  Certain of these 
high modernists’ aesthetic maneuvers, then, “work to negate something that can only be 
bestowed in the first place by the sovereign imperial state” (321).  For many of these 
writers, a coherent national identification—and a subjectivity capable of transcending 
that identification—conditions a depiction of cosmopolitanism as a series of encounters 
with universal time or space.   
 To be sure, however, not all high modernists envisioned cosmopolitanism as an 
enactment of this type of transcendent subjectivity at all times.6  Rebecca Walkowitz 
demonstrates that several high modernist writers meaningfully interrogated the 
complexities that transnational mobility posed in the early twentieth century.  She argues 
that, instead of using “metaphors of exile to represent various experiences of 
displacement,” writers including Conrad, Joyce, and Woolf “troubled the distinction 
between local and global that most conceptions of exile have presupposed” (6).  
Walkowitz’s analysis diverges from traditional accounts of international modernism by 
“replacing static models of modernist exile with more flexible, more dynamic models of 
migration, entanglement, and mix-up” (6).  According to Walkowitz, the high modernists 
she examines were always already engaged in an “analysis of self and location” wherein 
                                                
6 Pearson, too, acknowledges that “British modernist treatments of universality, or non-nationalistic modes 
of human interconnection, are of course not limited to such abstract and absolute proclamations” (320).   
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belonging to, affiliation with, and distance from, one’s home nation were perceived as 
overlapping and shifting phenomena (16).  Both Pearson’s and Walkowitz’s claims, 
therefore, evidence the challenge that cosmopolitan experience posed to high modernist 
writers.  At times, it provoked a sensation of being subsumed within an undifferentiated 
world; at other moments, it compelled artistic engagement with shifting notions of 
national belonging.   
 Bowen’s texts go beyond performing an “analysis of self and location” of the type 
Walkowitz describes (16).  Bowen’s position within the decrepit aftermath of an Anglo-
Irish culture, which was struggling to establish itself in the wake of the formation of the 
Irish Free State in 1922, makes her particularly attuned to the shortcomings of high 
modernism’s cosmopolitan framework to manage postcolonial subjects’ dislocation.  
According to Pearson, this insight leads Bowen to challenge high modernism’s 
presumption of “lost and gained modes of affiliation, past and present spheres of 
belonging, and national and transnational ways of identifying oneself” (322).  She does 
so by illuminating the consequences of “the unresolved status of one’s prior national 
belonging” for postcolonial and minority transnational subjects (Pearson 318).   For these 
individuals, Pearson claims, new “communal identities” are not contingent upon rejecting 
a previous, fully-formulated national or cultural identity (322).  Rather, for Pearson, these 
individuals, like Bowen, experience cosmopolitanism as “deferred and mobile 
attachment” (324).   
 Bowen does not envision cosmopolitanism as precisely “deferred and mobile,” 
however. Foreign encounters are, rather, the occasion for crises in subjectivity that reveal 
not a multiplicity of identifications, but rather these identifications’ emptiness.  This 
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dislocation is, according to Bowen, a condition of modernity: English and Irish, French 
and American, young and old characters experience their transnational mobility as the 
occasion for traumatic self-examination of this kind.7  Detachment from one’s home 
nation—whether one’s identification with it is “resolved” or “unresolved,” in Pearson’s 
terms—is intimately connected in Bowen’s early work to the emptied-out subjectivity 
that afflicts her characters. 
 Bowen’s insistence upon the psychologically destabilizing effects of modern 
dislocation is a hallmark of her late modernism.  This conception of late modernism both 
contrasts with and complements recent critical treatments of late modernist writing, 
including Esty’s analyses, in A Shrinking Island, of the later works of several canonical 
British authors.  Esty perceives that writers including Woolf, T.S. Eliot, and E.M. Forster 
developed aesthetic practices as means through which to contend with the contraction of 
the British empire.  These writers, Esty claims, translate this contraction “into a resurgent 
concept of national culture,” which results in a re-consolidation of England and English 
literature (2).  This re-consolidation mandates a revision of the postures of fragmentation, 
subjectivism, and aesthetic idiosyncrasy that Esty claims characterize modernism in its 
earlier and more classic iteration.  
 By theorizing this “shrinking island” phenomenon, Esty underlines the profound 
spatial re-orientation that occurred in the early twentieth century. This re-orientation 
determines the contours of several strands of late modernism, including some high 
modernists’ assertion of a “resurgent concept of national culture” (2).  Bowen’s response 
to this re-orientation, however, is determined by her position within the wreckage of 
                                                
7 In The House in Paris, for instance, dislocation traumatizes both Karen Michaelis, a young woman with 
roots in upper-class London, and Max Ebhart, a Jewish Frenchman without family or a home of his own.        
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empire.  Bowen’s Anglo-Irishness fosters a multivalent understanding of imperial 
contraction.  Her “unresolved” identification with her home place, then, mandates that 
her late modernism is formulated quite distinctly from the work of canonical modernists 
who reassert a salient Englishness as the antidote for the trauma wrought by imperial 
contraction.  In her early texts, Bowen configures imperial contraction not as an 
opportunity to assert the centrality of English culture (or any other national culture) but as 
an occasion for interrogating high modernism’s vision of a cosmopolitanism predicated 
on a robust and mobile interiority.  
 Like canonical English modernists in their late phase, Bowen responds in her 
work to the tensions inherent in modernism: for her, the preponderance of interiority in 
high modernism was insufficient to the task of expressing the late modernist problem of 
dislocation.  She therefore creates not new, revolutionary literary forms, but rather 
performs radical renovations of existing narrative structures.  Both Bowen and canonical 
modernists in their late phases, therefore, confront the transformation of empire in the 
early twentieth century and the shortcomings of high modernist techniques to fully 
grapple with this transformation.  Bowen, unlike Woolf, Forster, and Eliot, however, does 
not reassert a complete and insular culture at the center of her late modernism but rather 
reveals the absence at the center of both cosmopolitan subjects and of high modernism 
itself.    
 Bowen’s work exists within a corpus of late modernist writing that Tyrus Miller 
claims serves as “an index of a new dispensation, a growing skepticism about modernist 
sensibility and craft as means of managing the turbulent forces of the day” (20).  Bowen, 
like other late modernist writers, “developed a repertoire of means for unsettling the signs 
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of formal craft that testified to the modernist writer’s discursive mastery” (19).  By 
pointing up the shortcomings of high modernism’s reliance upon interiority and 
subjectivism, Bowen, in the same way that Miller ascribes to other late modernists, 
“weakened the formal cohesion of the modernist novel and sought to deflate its symbolic 
resources” (19).   
 According to Miller, the mainstream of European high modernist fiction focused 
on the problem of mastering a chaotic modernity by means of a variety of formal 
techniques (17).  Late modernism, however, “registers the ways in which intense social, 
political, and economic pressures of the period increasingly threatened the efficacy of 
high modernist form” (20).  Bowen’s early work registers the ways in which dislocation 
threatens the high modernist project of “discursive mastery” (Miller 16).  Her style 
exhibits almost none of the high modernist “stylistic ostentation” to which Miller refers.  
As a result, as Osborn points out, critics “have historically struggled to place or locate her 
vast oeuvre in one tradition or another” (227).     
 Neither is Bowen engaged in the project of “mastering a chaotic modernity” on 
the level of content (Miller 17). In The Hotel, Sydney becomes yet more unsettled as the 
novel progresses.  Her biography thematizes the sense of dislocation that Bowen 
attributes to modern cosmopolitans.  She is one among many of Bowen’s focal characters 
who, asserts Pearson, “do not possess an orientation that precedes their disorientation” 
(325).  Sydney is like many of Bowen’s other young female protagonists, for whom 
“notions of transnational modernity involving an unprecedented estrangement…don’t 
illuminate their predicaments.  It is not that they once belonged somewhere else and 
suddenly feel adrift in the globe-as-universe; rather, they always ‘belong somewhere 
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else’” (Pearson 325).  This is literally true of Sydney: she is an orphan who has only 
“relations” and therefore no identifiable genealogical “roots.”  Moreover, neither Bowen 
nor Sydney herself specify where Sydney’s home is located or with which “relations” she 
resides.  Nor does Sydney evince any particular identification with England.  This 
contrasts with many other characters in the novel who speak lovingly about, send letters 
to, and feel a resolved sense of allegiance for, England as home.  As a young upper class 
traveler without well-established family origins or attachment to home, Sydney’s status is 
itself a model of Bowen’s vision of late modernist cosmopolitanism: it does not render 
one’s identifications mobile or partial, but rather empty.  Sydney belongs nowhere.  
 Sydney’s status as a traumatized cosmopolitan signals Bowen’s refusal to enact 
the conventions of the female bildungsroman that she invokes from the outset of the 
novel.  Her “relations” aim to integrate Sydney into the proper place within her class and 
social circle.  As it progresses, however, The Hotel is essentially a narrative of Sydney’s 
failed attempts to establish the coherent subjectivity that her relations hope for.  Sydney’s 
experiences abroad, they believe, are an opportunity for her to cement her status within 
upper class English society: “an ideal winter had offered itself: sunshine, a pleasant social 
round.  Sydney could be out of doors all day long; she might distinguish herself in tennis 
tournaments, she might get engaged” (28).  Travel abroad, then, presents several 
opportunities to young women: to participate in society, to recreate, and to find oneself a 
husband.  Sydney’s relations hope these events might occur: they “had been delighted 
that she should go abroad with her cousin Tessa.  It had appeared an inspired solution to 
the Sydney problem” (28).  The problem: Sydney “passed too many” examinations in 
preparation for a career in medicine, “was on the verge of a breakdown,” and bitterly 
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resisted the year’s “enforced idleness” that constituted treatment for such a breakdown 
(28).  Here Bowen establishes that, before the events of the novel transpire, Sydney is 
dis-oriented from both a home place and a meaningful position within her own social 
class.  Bowen thereby simultaneously invokes and undercuts the bildungsroman plot.  
Like many young women in previous bildungsromane, Sydney is poised for marriage and 
integration into society; unlike many of them, she has no solid grounding in the social 
milieu of which she is expected to become a full-fledged member.   
 Sydney also exhibits a yet more fundamental kind of dislocation: she is an 
incoherent subject.  She, much like Lois Farquar in The Last September, both pursues and 
resists others’ characterizations of her self.  She is conscious of the vacuity of her own 
subjectivity, relying upon others to confirm that she is an individual at all.  Sydney 
approaches her relationship with Mrs. Kerr, her middle-aged companion, as a means by 
which she might ground and define herself: “It became no longer a question of—what did 
Mrs. Kerr think of her? but rather—did Mrs. Kerr ever think of her?  The possibility of 
not being kept in mind seemed to Sydney . . . a kind of extinction” (23).  Sydney 
conceives of her own identity as dependent upon someone else for its elaboration; she 
relies upon this external figure to lend her a coherence that she cannot achieve on her 
own. By depicting Sydney’s consciousness in this way, Bowen indicates the inadequacy 
of high modernism’s vision of a cosmopolitanism facilitated by a rich interiority.  Just as 
Sydney’s relations perceive that the external figure of a husband is necessary for Sydney 
to become fully integrated into her class and social circle, so does she herself perceive 
that she is fundamentally so unmoored as to be dependent upon others’ projections for a 
semblance of identity. 
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Late Modernist Subjectivity in The Hotel  
 Bowen furthermore questions the sufficiency of high modernist renovations of the 
bildungsroman to plumb the personal and geographical disorientation that modern 
individuals experienced. In The Voyage Out, Rachel’s fate indexes the modernist shift 
away from conventional narrative forms; both she and Woolf resist the plot that is 
allowed them. In The Hotel, Bowen narrates Veronica Lawrence’s courtship; she, like 
Sydney, is a young woman making the “social round” in Italy.  By constructing these 
parallel coming-of-age narratives and yet making Sydney’s story her focus, Bowen 
pursues the theme of alienation at which Veronica’s experience only hints.   
 Veronica, unlike Sydney, is not a “problem” for her relations to solve.  Rather, 
she embarks cheerfully upon the journey that is meant to end in her class-sanctioned 
marriage. But as her courtship with a young man at the Hotel progresses, Veronica begins 
to feel disillusioned by her social circle’s Victorian expectations regarding marriage and 
motherhood. In a long conversation with Sydney, Veronica asks, “Does it seem to 
you…that this world is entirely divided into rather stupid men and very silly women?  
And that the stupid are all one will have to hope for and that the silly are all one can ever 
become?” (164).  Here, she voices the feeling, expressed so forcefully by Woolf in The 
Voyage Out, that the Victorian marriage plot constrains modern young women.  Veronica 
explicitly articulates the plot’s arbitrariness: “Everybody’s the same and I must have 
somebody” (166).  Veronica’s cosmopolitan experience, like Sydney’s, is meant to 
facilitate her integration into her nation and class through marriage.  Instead, Veronica’s 
experiences overseas reveal that her choice of partners is arbitrary and that her courtship 
“comes, of course, from having nothing else to do here” (170).  For Veronica, as for 
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Woolf, a framework of cosmopolitanism exposes the bildungsroman plot as a mere script 
that offers nothing in the way of self-realization for young women.  If Veronica’s 
skepticism indexes modernist dissatisfaction with—and a desire to short-circuit—the 
expected fate of young English women in the early twentieth century, Sydney’s 
experience reveals that fate to be empty of meaning.   
 Late modernist dislocation is not limited to orphaned young women, however.  
Bowen rehearses a variety of cosmopolitan postures, some of which indicate fully 
“resolved” national identifications, only to reveal that trauma accompanies all varieties of 
cosmopolitanism.  Several of Sydney’s fellow travelers do seem to posses an orientation 
that precedes their disorientation (Pearson 325).  But Bowen uncovers the challenge that 
travel abroad poses even to the most self-assuredly sophisticated and well-grounded 
travelers.  Several of the novel’s older characters conceive of their experience on the 
Italian Riviera as an encounter with difference against which to contrast and solidify their 
own Englishness; for them, this encounter shores up their own already established 
notions of home.  This conception resembles the outcome of Victorian colonial travel as 
theorized by Simon Gikandi, who endorses Edward Said’s assertion that colonized 
peoples and imperial spaces were crucial to the development of European identity and its 
master narratives (5).  According to Gikandi, travel in and to spaces occupied by the 
colonial other was intended to “hallow a cosmological or theoretical space that Western 
society can inhabit” (89).  He claims that this space was, however, “constructed 
according to the dictates of a value system that predates touring” (89).8 For many of the 
                                                
8 In his analysis, Gikandi examines how Victorian imperial travelers define their own cultural values and 
practices in a negative relation to the colonial other. Though my project is not to examine Victorian 
experiences of travel, I argue that Bowen’s characters in The Hotel arrive in Italy equipped with a notion of 
Englishness defined negatively against foreignness.  Furthermore, I would argue that the deconstruction 
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Hotel’s visitors, their encounter with Italy, rather than facilitating an exposure to 
foreignness that might expand their vision, acts as a foil for their already existing notions 
of Englishness.  Their preexisting cultural values construct the Italian Riviera on a model 
of difference from their own cultural norms.   
 Bowen’s depictions of several characters—including the spinsters Miss Pym and 
Miss Fitzgerald, the snobbish socialites the Lee-Mittisons, and the self-righteous 
colonialist Mrs. Hillier—satirize and then deflate the Victorian reification of Englishness 
through travel.  Early in the novel, Bowen describes the Hotel’s dining room: 
Nearly everybody here was English: the air was allowed to come in pleasantly 
through the open windows under green-striped awnings and feel its way cool-
fingered from flushing face to face.  Nobody was hurried or constrained, time put 
out no compulsion and the afternoon might have stretched ahead, as it seemed to 
stretch, brightly blank.  Over it, however, habit had spun her web of obligations; a 
web infinitely fine and fragile from which it was yet impossible to break without 
outrage . . . Leisure, so linked up with ennui, had been sedulously barred away.  
Each armchair, each palm and bureau had become a trysting place where couples 
met to hurry off or groups were reunited.  (34) 
Bowen’s characteristically oblique style heightens this from a scene of mere description 
to a fraught engagement with Englishness.  The colon at the outset indicates that 
everything that follows is an elaboration upon the statement made before it: because 
everybody within is English, the room exhibits particular characteristics and fosters a 
particular mood.  Because these travelers anticipate that the air will “come in pleasantly 
                                                                                                                                            
that this notion undergoes throughout The Hotel points to the distinctly late modernist and postcolonial 
dimensions of national identity in Bowen’s work.  I use Gikandi’s analysis, then, as a way to describe the 
starting point of the characters’ evolving understandings of their own Englishness.   
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through the open windows,” it is allowed to do so.  The room seems to exist in order to 
fulfill these English travelers’ notions of the Italian Riviera.   
 More importantly, the ethos of Englishness asserts its influence here when 
travelers feel compelled to bar away leisure and ennui, despite the lack of compulsion or 
constraint to do so.  The travelers’ Victorian configuration of Englishness and 
foreignness as mutually exclusive categories dictates that the spirit of leisure associated 
with the Riviera is fundamentally opposed to the “precedents” of seriousness and hurry 
associated with the English themselves.  The English “habit” of busyness and “small 
engagements” cannot be ignored; to do so would be an “outrage.”  This description of the 
Hotel’s central meeting place rehearses the Victorian posture of international travel as a 
means by which to recapitulate and reify one’s home culture.  Even here, however, 
Bowen indicates that this posture does not inoculate travelers against the threat that 
cosmopolitan experience poses to their Englishness; after all, Italian ennui must be 
“sedulously barred away.” As the novel progresses, Bowen undermines the Victorian 
posture featured in this scene: even her most “Victorian” characters are traumatized by 
their eventual realization that they, too, are fundamentally dislocated. 
 In her narration of Sydney’s final interaction with Mrs. Kerr, Bowen forcefully 
demonstrates that a vision of cosmopolitanism that relies upon an existing and dynamic 
interiority falls short of compensating late modernist subjects for their traumatized sense 
of dislocation.  When Mrs. Kerr’s son Ronald appears at the Hotel and dominates his 
mother’s attention, Sydney is bereft.  After Mrs. Kerr obliquely informs her, over 
pastries, that Sydney has overestimated the intimacy of their relationship, they rise to 
leave the café where they are seated: 
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“Where now?” said Mrs. Kerr and laid a hand on Sydney’s sleeve in her anxiety 
to be directed.  Sydney could make no suggestion, she remembered they were on 
an edge of Europe and had an impulse in the still active top of her mind to suggest 
Prague, the Hook, or Rouen.  The facility with which it would be possible for her 
to cover larger distances and her present complete inability to move from the 
kerbstone presented themselves simultaneously. (198) 
Here, Sydney’s rejection by Mrs. Kerr—a very personal trauma—provokes a revealing 
crisis for cosmopolitanism: neither of the two women knows where to go.  Sydney has 
been completely unmoored from a relationship that she hoped would ground her, and has 
therefore been irrevocably set adrift.  Sydney can perceive of their location as only “an 
edge of Europe:” a liminal space that is not any one place at all.  Bowen configures this 
perception as a symptom of modern cosmopolitanism: Sydney has the impulse to suggest 
a number of other specific places they might go, and their mobility as modern 
cosmopolitans would allow it.  Yet she feels equally compelled toward both a rooted 
posture on the kerbstone and movement toward some other place.  In this moment of 
crisis and epiphany, she is neither mobile and liberated from identifications—whether 
resolved or unresolved—nor rooted.  She can go nowhere and can take no action.  
Importantly, even Mrs. Kerr displays an “anxiety to be directed.”  Despite the fact that 
she has already “come of age” in the manner required by the female bildungsroman plot, 
she too indicates that her sophisticated cosmopolitan posture does nothing to prevent a 
sensation of being fundamentally lost.   
 This scene is Bowen’s forceful declaration of the traumatic consequences of 
dislocation upon even the most tentative or indirect apprehension of subjectivity.  
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Sydney’s break with Mrs. Kerr, an emotional and personal event, evacuates her “home 
environment” of meaning for her: 
She could not command the few words, the few movements which should take her 
away from Mrs. Kerr; or imagine where, having escaped, she would find a mood, 
room, place, even country to offer her sanctuary.  Her home environment, apart 
from which the crisis of to-day, or these last weeks, had produced itself, was seen 
very clearly at this distance away from it but presented an impenetrable façade 
with no ingress.  She could see her life very plainly but there seemed no way back 
into it, the whole thing might have been painted on canvas with a clever enough 
but not convincing appearance of reality. (198) 
Sydney senses that no mood exists within herself that might provide relief from her 
present crisis.  Her own emotional resources—the interiority that Woolf calls “the dark 
places of psychology”—fail to reassure her that she might ever be able to achieve a stable 
emotional state in which to root her self.  Bowen then ties this crisis of subjectivity 
directly to place: “no room, place, even country” can provide “sanctuary.”  The 
meditative space of respite that Bowen evokes is deflated: in Sydney’s conception, the 
locations and nations that might once have offered her solace have lost their healing 
quality.  These voided locations, once layered with significance, have become empty; like 
the bildungsroman form, they are evacuated of the very task that justifies their existence.    
 More importantly, this moment in the text illuminates the connection between the 
outcome of Sydney’s traumatic experiences overseas and Bowen’s critique of high 
modernist narrative strategies.  Sydney’s total disorientation transforms her home into a 
place evacuated of meaning: as a result of the crisis of “today, of these last weeks,” she 
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can see but not access her own “home environment.”  By a similar dynamic, Bowen’s 
late modernist aesthetic reveals that high modernist renovations of Victorian narratives 
create merely a veneer that, though purportedly expressive of modernity’s crisis of the 
subject, covers over an incomplete exploration of modern dislocation.  Bowen’s 
renovation of an established narrative form, like those of several high modernist 
predecessors, critiques nineteenth century notions of what constitutes an acceptable fate 
for young women.  Her innovation is to utilize this same form to point up the 
shortcomings of high modernist versions of the female bildungsroman.  In so doing, she 
forges a late modernist critique of Victorian and high modernist narrative modes alike.  
Just as Sydney’s whole life might have been painted on canvas “with a clever enough but 
not convincing appearance of reality,” Bowen’s novel reveals both the vacuity at the 
center of Victorian narrative conventions and the insufficiency of high modernism’s 
renovations of these conventions to express the reality of a late modernism characterized 
by an unfathomable abyss of alienation and dislocation. 
 Bowen’s invocation of Victorian conventions is precisely what facilitates her 
critique of established modernist postures toward them.  Whereas, in The Voyage Out, 
Woolf circumvents the anticipated ending of the bildungsroman plot by rejecting it, 
Bowen empties it out.  Sydney is, after all, still alive.  But she can discover no meaning in 
the empty spaces of her own mind, her home, or locations abroad.  Bowen’s technique 
departs from Woolf’s exhortation in “Modern Fiction” that modern fiction should “turn 
its back on” the narrative strategies of the past.  Rather, by invoking and deconstructing 
these forms, Bowen asserts a canny critique of the high modernist turn toward interiority. 
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 For Bowen, dislocation is the salient attribute of life in the early twentieth 
century.  Her first novel vigorously explores the forms of this dislocation and its 
consequences for individuals.  By opting to use the female bildungsroman as the template 
for this exploration, Bowen performs a critique of the high modernist attitudes that 
prompted the dismissal of pre-modernist forms.  This complicated repudiation confirms 
Bowen’s place within a late modernist canon.  As Miller claims, “Precisely in their 
untimeliness, their lack of symmetry and formal balance, [late modernist works] retain 
the power to transport their readers and critics ‘out of bounds’—to an ‘elsewhere’ of 
writing from which the period can be surveyed” (13).  A reader’s sense that Bowen’s 
work is “out of kilter” with its time and place in literary history confirms Bowen’s 
insight: modernism failed to deliver on its promise to interrogate the alienation wrought 
by modernity.  Bowen’s late modernism, then, provokes a reconsideration of high 
modernism’s claim to plumb and to express the crisis of subjectivity that afflicted 
individuals in the early twentieth century.  For Bowen, this high modernist project 
stopped short of interrogating the anxious dislocation provoked by the contraction of 
empire and cosmopolitan mobility.  When we view her radical reconsideration of the 
female bildungsroman in this way, we are encouraged to both reconsider our 
understanding of modernism itself and to perceive late modernists’ forward-looking 
engagements with the ongoing social, political, and historical conditions of the late 
1920s, 30s, and 40s.     
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Subjectivity & Narrative Form in The Death of the Heart 
 While Bowen’s early novels The Hotel, The House in Paris, and To the North are 
suspicious of projections of the self as coherent and consistent over time, her 1938 novel 
The Death of the Heart explodes these projections once and for all.  Bowen’s characters 
in this text discover that subjectivity, as an interior framework around which individuals 
organize their selves, is a false imposition upon a vacancy at the core of the self.  In this 
novel, characters are not “in possession of” deep and unique interiority.  Instead, 
subjectivity itself is revealed to be merely a performance compelled by the powerfully 
coercive cultural narrative of development associated with bildung.  In The Death of the 
Heart, individuals perform selfhood in order to compensate for an unnerving reality: 
subjectivity is, in this late modernist moment, a hollowed-out space haunted by the 
specter of the robust, dynamic, and deep interiority that characterized high modernism.   
 The Death of the Heart is the culmination of Bowen’s narratives about young 
women. In it, the implications of Bowen’s explorations of individual subjectivity during 
late modernism come fully into focus.  These implications determine the novel’s outcome 
for her young protagonist, but they also place Bowen’s work squarely within a canon of 
late modernist writing that exhibits what Miller calls a “central paradox of late modernist 
literature in English: its apparent admixture of decadent and forward-looking elements 
and its consequent lack of a clearly defined place in the dominant frameworks of 
twentieth-century criticism” (7). By invoking pre-twentieth century narrative forms, 
Bowen thematizes the haunting of late modernist individuals by the “lunatic giant” of 
subjectivity,9 and the haunting of her own narratives by the pre-twentieth century forms 
                                                
9 This reference to a “lunatic giant” that every individual keeps “battened down inside himself” occurs at 
the conclusion of The Death of the Heart, wherein a peripheral character asserts that Portia is the only 
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that function to forge subjectivity.  This practice furthermore confounds the rigidly 
defined critical categories of realism, the bildungsroman, modernism, and even 
postmodernism.   
 The Death of the Heart, as Jed Esty asserts of The Last September (1929), 
“invokes yet programmatically cancels the generic protocols” associated with nineteenth 
century forms (257).   Esty’s approach places Bowen “at the center of a revisionary 
model of modernist fiction, understood in terms of the partial displacement of nineteenth-
century historical concepts of progress by twentieth-century anthropological concepts of 
difference as the major frame of reference for narrative form” (272).  The “spliced-
together” form of The Last September, says Esty, revises old genres to reflect extant 
historical phenomena.  Certainly, Bowen’s invocation of a variety of pre-modernist forms 
facilitates her commentary on historical developments.10  But more than a “revisionary 
model of modernist fiction,” Bowen’s early novels in fact constitute a critique of high 
modernism’s revision of the bildungsroman and related genres.  In other words, Bowen 
goes beyond merely revising established forms; instead, her reworking of anachronistic 
forms constitutes a corrective to those high modernist revisions that failed to fully 
illuminate the radical reconfiguration of subjectivity taking place in the 1930s and 40s.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
character who does not deny the presence of this giant within; in fact, he claims, she is ruled by the “lunatic 
giant” that haunts her consciousness (407).  An analysis of this important scene is included at the end of 
this chapter.   
 
10 For instance, in The Last September, Bowen’s literary treatment of the Irish War of Independence in the 
form of a novel of manners highlights the tension between ongoing tennis parties, dances, and teas, and the 
violent guerilla war that lurks below this antiquated surface.  Her revision of the bildungsroman enables 
Bowen’s commentary on the very real late modernist sensibility that Eddie expresses in The Death of the 
Heart when he asks “How can we grow up when there’s nothing left to inherit, when what we must feed on 
is so stale and corrupt?” (362). 
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Pre-Modernist Forms & Bowen’s Immanent Critique  
  When viewed in light of Bowen’s formulation of subjectivity as a haunted 
emptiness, high modernism’s faith in interiority is revealed to stop short of a full 
interrogation of twentieth century subjectivity.  While canonical high modernist novelists 
often relied upon interiority as a way to stave off fragmentation, Bowen acknowledges 
the emptiness at the center of the subject.  Bowen’s immediate high modernist 
predecessors were, like Bowen, thoroughly engaged with the crisis of subjectivity 
wrought by modernity.  In an effort to stave off the collapse of the self, many of these 
writers asserted a deep and dynamic interiority capable of organizing modernity’s chaos 
into a palatable—or at least tolerable—form.  For instance, Ford Maddox Ford’s John 
Dowell in The Good Soldier (1915) tells a fractured story indeed, but his dynamic 
interiority is precisely what gives it shape and furthermore reveals the complexity of his 
own deep psychology.  At the close of James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1916), Stephen Dedalus possesses a robust and knowable subjectivity with which 
he confronts his future and the institutions that govern his life.  Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. 
Dalloway (1925) is the story of Clarissa Dalloway’s preparation for a party, but the 
narrative that makes the novel a modernist masterpiece takes place within characters’ 
consciousnesses.  Similarly, in Woolf’s later novel The Waves (1931), the narrative is 
fractured and nonlinear, yet each of the novel’s six characters has thoughts and emotions 
indicative of a rich interiority. Dynamic and robust interior consciousness is a hallmark of 
high modernist narrative. 
 Bowen, however, emphasizes not one’s already-existing “soul,” but one’s origins, 
as the most powerful determiner of one’s subject formation.  Bowen is consistently 
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attentive to the ways that characters’ origins condition their experience in the world, their 
relationship to nation, and their most intimate emotions.  The Death of the Heart, too, 
begins with an exploration of its central character’s rootlessness; as the novel ends, 
however, Portia’s sense of dislocation is clearly deeper and more psychically significant 
than that wrought by geographical alienation.  In this sense, Portia’s status in The Death 
of the Heart embodies the ethos of “radical contingency” that Miller claims is a hallmark 
of late modernist writing (13).   
 Like many of Bowen’s young female focal characters, Portia Quayne’s coming-
of-age departs so markedly from the narrative of maturation that compels her toward 
“selfhood” that she experiences it as trauma.  The development of her subjectivity is 
prescribed by the culturally coercive narrative of maturation for which bildung is the 
literary analogue and exemplar.  Like many young heroines of nineteenth century novels, 
Portia struggles to mature into the young woman that her culture expects her to be.  But 
perhaps more surprisingly, she fails to develop the kind of robust interiority exhibited in 
so many works of high modernism.  Her relationship to subjectivity differs markedly, 
then, from both pre-twentieth century and modernist prescriptions.   
 In The Death of the Heart, Bowen explicitly thematizes the complicity of writing 
in the forging of subjectivity.  In so doing, she reveals the coercive power of the written 
word, and, in turn, the power of existing written forms to create and nurture the 
traditional conception of bourgeois subjectivity.  In the novel, writing has the menacing 
power of lending increased significance to events, things, and people; furthermore, in the 
novel, characters both perceive and fear that writing will bring events into being.  Portia 
expresses her own view of the power of writing in her reflections about a pile of letters 
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waiting for Anna upon her return from a trip to Capri: “Portia tried to imagine getting out 
of a taxi to find one’s own name written so many times.  This should make one’s name 
mean—oh, most decidedly—more” (310).  Simply by being written, words accrue 
significance beyond pen strokes on a page, and furthermore lend increased significance to 
an individual.  For Portia, the outward sign of one’s identity—one’s name in writing—
becomes increasingly meaningful to oneself through the act of writing.  This insight is 
shared by every character in the novel, each of whom understands the act of writing to be 
powerful and intimately bound up with the status of the subject.  It is for this reason that 
Portia’s diary inspires intense anxiety in all those who Portia writes about. 
 In The Death of the Heart, the constitution of a self through writing is a concrete 
focal point of Bowen’s critique of high modernist interiority.  Eddie, a shiftless young 
man with whom Portia has a relationship of sorts, hints at the menace that inheres in 
writing when he exhorts Portia: “I don’t want you to write about you and me.  In fact you 
must never write about me at all” (136).  Portia asks why, and Eddie responds: 
I hate writing; I hate art—there’s always something else there.  I won’t have you 
choosing words about me.  If you ever start that, your diary will become a 
horrible trap, and I shan’t feel safe with you any more.  I like you to think, in a 
sort of way; I like to think of you going, like a watch.  But between you and me 
there must never be any thoughts.  And I detest after-thoughts. (136-7)  
Here, Eddie asserts his position—which he shares with the novel’s other characters and 
with the novel itself—that the act of writing about individuals is an intentional act of 
construction.  In doing so, he registers a protest against autobiographical writing’s 
traditional role in reifying knowable subjectivities.  By equating Portia’s writing with art, 
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Eddie articulates that when one writes about another, “something else” adheres to that 
other subject as a result.  Because Portia chooses words about him, Eddie feels both 
trapped and unsafe with her; when she constructs her version of Eddie subjectively, her 
writing becomes threatening.  Eddie prefers to think of Portia herself as a piece of 
machinery, objective in its task, rather than as a thinking writer capable of attaching 
particular traits to him.  He critiques the process of reflection that makes it possible to 
write about an event after the fact; Portia’s “after-thoughts,” he fears, accrue significance 
(as does Anna’s identity, by virtue of her name being written repeatedly on her letters) in 
their writing.   
 While her deconstruction of the female bildungsroman is consistent throughout 
most of her early work, Bowen also invokes the genre of women’s autobiography in 
service of her interrogation of late modernist subjectivity in The Death of the Heart.  
Portia’s diary is the novel’s focal point; her diary entries make up large sections of 
several chapters throughout the text, granting insight into both Portia’s assessments of 
others and her own efforts to produce the kind of “self” that she senses others expect.  In 
doing so, Portia enacts the process of discursive self-creation that Felicity Nussbaum 
observes in eighteenth century women’s autobiographical writing. Nussbaum’s premise is 
that “the ‘self’ is an ideological construct recruited into place within specific historical 
formations rather than always present as an eternal truth” (xii).  Women’s autobiography, 
Nussbaum argues, confirms the bourgeois self but also make available textual 
subversions of its dominance (xxi).  Diaries and journals “urge readers and writers to 
recognize themselves in existing social relations, and to believe in a sameness that makes 
them like all other human beings, as well as in a difference that guarantees their 
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individuation.  They also offer a private space for experimentation, revision, and 
resistance to prevailing notions of identity” (Nussbaum xxi).    Women writing about 
their own experiences introduced distinct ways of understanding the self: on the one 
hand, writers understood themselves and were understood as individual subjects situated 
among many other equally autonomous subjects; on the other hand, they understood 
themselves as unique.   
 Autobiographical writing, then, both reified and allowed for conceptual variation 
in the bourgeois self that emerged in the eighteenth century.  According to Nussbaum, in 
seeking a paradigmatic model that would provide a “poetics” of eighteenth century 
autobiography, narratives about this autobiographical writing posited that “an infinitely 
varied but unified self exists” that is both like other human beings and unique, and can be 
imitated textually (9, 2).  In these narratives: 
[t]here is often an assumption that a reality, hidden behind appearances, is 
independent of its inscription and its reading, and that representation in 
autobiography corresponds to it.  In addition, these narratives presume that 
autobiographers are the source and center of the meaning of their texts, and that 
their aim is to write aesthetically satisfying works.  If we accept these terms and 
generic limits, eighteenth century self-writing can only be an attempt to strive 
toward nineteenth century models and notions of self, and our attempts to read it 
will be constrained by that view. (9)   
Cultural assumptions about autobiographical writing, then, posit a revelation of meaning 
by a truth-telling author.11   
                                                
11 This is a particularly inappropriate way to understand Portia’s diary, which is constrained by others’ 
directives about it, and by her own ideas about what is and is not appropriate material for the diary.  At no 
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 Furthermore, Nussbaum’s assertion that the nineteenth century realist novel 
constrains contemporary readings of eighteenth century autobiographical writing 
facilitates an understanding of the relation of The Death of the Heart to pre-modernist 
narrative strategies.  When viewed retrospectively, eighteenth century autobiographical 
writing gets interpreted as an anticipatory version of the unified and organized realism of 
the nineteenth century novel; in this way, eighteenth century autobiography’s shared 
sense of bourgeois selfhood becomes the condition for bildung’s coercive power.  The 
autobiographical aspect of Bowen’s novel operates in a similar way, though from a 
different historical vantage point.  If we understand Bowen’s use of autobiography as an 
attempt to strive toward high modernist “models and notions of self,” our attempts to read 
it will be, as Nussbaum warns, “constrained by that view.” Given the character of the 
modernist canon, we are therefore in danger of reading Bowen’s refusal of high 
modernist interiority—and the recruitment of a bourgeois subject—as a failure.  
Furthermore, Portia’s discovery that her constant reassertion of an “I” fails to forge a 
deep “self” on the model of nineteenth century realism renders her a “failed subject,” 
though the nature of her subjectivity is, for Bowen, fully and distinctly late modernist.  
Bowen, like Nussbaum, is aware of the degree to which literary history and generic 
categories constrain textual interpretations.  The Death of the Heart illuminates this 
constraint by engaging with a genre that both forges the bourgeois self and, when read 
critically, puts into relief the power of literary genres to determine our expectations 
regarding narrative form and subjectivity alike. 
                                                                                                                                            
point is Portia a totally forthcoming, “truth-telling” author; rather her writing is always conditioned by 
factors outside of herself.  Contrary to traditional understandings of autobiographical writing, then, Portia’s 
diary does not make manifest the interior thoughts and feelings of a coherent subject.   
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 Bowen likewise invokes the epistolary novel form in order to mine its unexploited 
potential for explicating the haunted status of late modernist subjectivity.  Within literary 
history, the epistolary form played an instrumental role in the discursive reification of the 
bourgeois subject: letters asserted a writer and a reader, both of whom were autonomous 
subjects.  Bowen complicates this traditional configuration of the epistolary form, which 
Ian Watt characterizes as follows: “letters are the most direct material evidence for the 
inner life of their writers that exist,” and “their reality is one which reveals the subjective 
and private orientations of the writer both towards the recipient and the people discussed, 
as well as the writer’s own inner being” (191).  Implicit in Watt’s description of the 
epistle is the assumption that, by 1748, when Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novel 
Clarissa was published, a bourgeois subject existed, and was capable of narrating not 
only his or her experience but also his or her “inner being.” Letter writers in novels, 
claims Watt, reveal their own “subjective and private” orientations in writing to others; 
they also reveal these to the reader of the text in which their letters are included.   
 In The Death of the Heart, Bowen troubles the generic function of the epistle by 
including letters that reflect not characters’ reified subjectivities, but rather the 
unacknowledged emptiness that hovers beneath the surface of efforts to address 
themselves to other subjects.   Her use of the epistolary form reveals its ability to 
interrogate, rather than recapitulate, the status of subjectivity during late modernism.  In 
The Death of the Heart, epistles between characters indicate not an “inner 
consciousness,” but an ongoing struggle with subjectivity that undermines Watt’s 
assertion that letters are a “short-cut…to the heart” (193, 195).  By using letters to disrupt 
the premise of subjectivity that underpins the epistolary genre, Bowen reveals the genre’s 
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powerfully coercive effect on both individuals and her own narrative.  She disabuses her 
characters and her readers of the assumption that, during this late modernist moment, 
subjectivity is configured in a manner consistent with traditional notions of epistolary 
subjectivity.    
 
Portia Quayne: Late Modernist Subject 
 Portia Quayne, the sixteen-year-old focal character in The Death of the Heart, 
experiences all types of alienation that Bowen explores in her early work; by exploring 
the combined effects of these phenomena, Bowen posits a radically reconfigured notion 
of subjectivity.  Portia lacks clear origins and family relationships, she is geographically 
dislocated, cosmopolitanism traumatizes her.  Portia’s father died several years before the 
events of the novel, and her mother Irene recently died abroad.  Consequently, Portia is 
sent to live in London with her half brother Thomas and his stylish wife Anna at Windsor 
Terrace.  Thomas is the son of Mr. Quayne and his wife; Portia is the daughter of Mr. 
Quayne and his mistress.  Before arriving at Thomas and Anna’s home, Portia was raised 
in shabby conditions throughout Europe: “Mr Quayne and Irene and Portia always had 
the back rooms in hotels, or dark flats in villas with no view” (21).   Portia has no origins 
and no home: because she herself is “accidental,” her roots are shallow and unattached to 
any particular place. 
 Portia’s dubious origin is the first of many strikes against her in the stylish world 
of complex social niceties that she has come to inhabit.  Because Portia’s existence does 
not originate in Anna’s upper class social milieu, Anna questions her very existence: 
“What is she, after all?  The child of an aberration, the child of a panic, the child of an old 
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chap’s pitiful sexuality” (323).  Being the “child of a panic” means that Portia lacks class- 
and socially sanctioned origins; for Anna, this renders indecipherable the contours of 
Portia’s self.  From the outset of the novel, then, other characters are suspicious of 
Portia’s personhood.   
 By situating Portia in Thomas and Anna’s home, Mr. Quayne attempts to 
overcome Portia’s suspect origins.  In his final letter, Mr. Quayne writes “because of 
being his daughter (and becoming his daughter in the way that she had), Portia had grown 
up exiled not only from her own country but from normal, cheerful family life” (13).  He 
assumes that his son’s home will be normal and cheerful simply because it is permanent, 
and believes that he is to blame for Portia’s “exile” from that kind of life.  His last request 
is that Portia be invited to live with Thomas and Anna for a year.  Indeed, moving in with 
her half-brother and sister-in-law means that Portia will, for the first time, live in one 
home for a substantial length of time.  However, contrary to her father’s wishes, she 
becomes increasingly dislocated—in effect, more homeless—as the novel progresses.    
 Several characters incorrectly attribute Portia’s “innocence” to her youth and 
naivete; in reality, Portia is, over the course of the novel, disabused of the unrealistic 
notion of coherent subjectivity.  On the surface, perhaps, Portia is merely an immature 
young woman whose self is not yet very powerfully articulated.  She is young and naïve 
about relationships and individuals’ sometimes nefarious motivations.  At various 
moments throughout the novel, Portia is literally “blotted out,” disappearing from view 
even when she is present (28, 337).12 Indeed, until the novel’s final few scenes, when 
                                                
12 Bowen describes Portia as being “blotted out,” and Matchett, the housekeeper, as “blotting up” light.  By 
describing the presence of both women as having a dynamic relationship with their surroundings, Bowen 
circumscribes them within the late modernist framework of subjectivity that she asserts in this novel.  
Neither Portia nor Matchett possesses the kind of static and reified subjectivity that Daphne and Dickie 
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Portia finally, in Thomas’s words, gains a “point of view”—until she fully embraces her 
late modernist relationship to subjectivity—she “did not count as a presence” at the house 
on Windsor Terrace (403, 301).  For these reasons, it is no wonder that Portia is referred 
to throughout as being innocent and almost a “natural” (267). 
 But Portia is afflicted by a much more complex consciousness than the 
“innocence” that others project upon her.  When Portia travels to the seaside to stay with 
Anna’s former governess Mrs. Heccomb and her loud and confident children Daphne and 
Dickie, it becomes evident that her innocence is strictly an outward marker of her own 
haunted subjectivity, and not a characteristic of her youthful self that will develop into 
wise maturity over time.  When Portia’s sometime boyfriend Eddie comes to visit, a 
group of young people goes to the movies; while there, Portia sees Daphne and Eddie 
“with emphasis, holding hands” (254).  In an awkward and emotional conversation 
afterward wherein Portia tries and fails to make sense of what she interprets as Eddie’s 
disloyalty to her, Daphne screams at Portia: “My goodness, who do you think you are?” 
(254, 267).  Daphne’s emphasis on you, here, indicates the indecipherability of Portia’s 
subjectivity.  Phrasing this comeuppance as a question, furthermore, underscores the 
indeterminacy of Portia’s self; Bowen insinuates that Portia is just as unlikely to know the 
answer as Daphne.  By way of response, “Portia, hands behind her, murmured something 
uncertain.”  Daphne demands that she clarify.  “I said, I didn’t know” (267).  Portia 
knows neither who she is, nor even who she thinks she is.  Daphne responds: “You’re 
                                                                                                                                            
possess, and toward which Thomas and Anna strive in efforts to stave off the chaos that lurks within.  
Furthermore, Bowen’s use of a visual metaphor to describe both women’s way of inhabiting the world calls 
attention to the interplay between surface and depth that Bowen understands as the defining feature of late 
modernist subjectivity.  Portia’s and Matchett’s visibility is mutable and depends upon interaction with 
their surroundings; this dynamic is analogous to the type of subjectivity that Matchett exhibits and which 
Portia finally adopts.  For these late modernist subjects, “selfhood” is itself mutable and forged only out of 
the dynamism between the surface performance of subjectivity and the emptiness within.        
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completely bats…you don’t even understand a single thing.  Standing about there, not 
looking like anything.  You know, really, if you’ll excuse my saying so, a person might 
almost take you for a natural.  Have you got no ideas?” (267). To Daphne, whose 
perception of Portia is consistent with others’, Portia looks like nothing, seems to have 
only limited mental capacity, and has no ideas.  She, as do others, configures Portia’s 
subjectivity as empty; she perceives that Portia is no one.  
 Yet Portia’s subjectivity is not merely undeveloped or empty; she has bursts of 
insight about the falsity of others’ projections of coherent selves.  Portia senses Anna, 
Thomas, and their adult friends watching her, critiquing her every move, and concludes: 
“they would forgive me if I were something special.  But I don’t know what I was meant 
to be” (98).  She recognizes that others expect that she will reveal her unique self through 
her actions and attitudes.  But she is also savvy enough to know that she cannot conform 
to this conception of the self.  She does not know what she was meant to be; she cannot, 
therefore, become it.  Here, Portia exhibits an insightful double consciousness.  She 
recognizes others’ expectation that individuals should develop a consistent and unique 
self, while she is also fully aware that no coherent interiority exists within to correspond 
with such a self.   
 Portia furthermore realizes that identity is both inconsistent and performed.  
According to Portia, judging people by their characters is “always a quite good way of 
judging, as people’s characters get so different at times, as it depends so much what 
happens to them” (294-5).  One’s very character—the persona one presents to the world, 
and by which one is both judged and identified—is, according to Portia, changeable.  So, 
even as she is circumscribed by the outmoded understanding of selfhood that posits a 
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deep and coherent interiority, she recognizes that it does not resonate with her own 
experience.  Dickie corrects Portia, saying “what happened to people depended on their 
characters.” Still, she persists in her belief: “I know Dickie sounds right, but I don’t feel 
he is” (295).  It seems to Portia that Dickie’s conventional notion of the self—one’s 
character determines the events of one’s life—is correct, but again she acknowledges her 
own instinct that his outmoded notion is inaccurate.  In this moment, Portia reveals her 
insight into the distinction between a traditional prescription of subjectivity and the 
performance of self that purports to express it.  In this sense, Portia is a stand-in for 
Bowen, whose conception of subjectivity does not posit a coherent “character” deep 
within but rather an ongoing dynamism between an indecipherable experience of being 
and the mandated performance of a coherent exterior “self.”    
 
The Failure of High Modernist Subjectivity  
 Portia’s destructive romantic relationship with Eddie, a manipulative young friend 
of Anna’s, exacerbates Portia’s trauma.  Eddie is twenty-three and has yet to come of age 
himself; he lives in rented apartments, has few family ties, and cannot hold a job or 
maintain friendships. Initially, Eddie tries to enact the “inward turn” of high modernism 
in order to cope with this crisis by invoking a conception of deep interiority. As the novel 
progresses, however, Eddie senses a tension between received ideas of what his 
subjectivity should be and the emptiness that he eventually discovers there; indeed, 
neither the bourgeois self posited by eighteenth century genres nor the deep and robust 
interiority of high modernism aptly characterize his being. Moreover, Eddie’s changing 
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conception of being itself mirrors the transition from high modernist to late modernist 
narrative treatments of subjectivity.    
 In a significant instance of Bowen’s redeployment of the epistolary form, Eddie 
first expresses his attraction to Portia in a letter.  He begins his letter by addressing 
himself to her: “What you did the other night was so sweet, I feel I must write and tell 
you how it cheered me up” (65).  Here, Eddie recapitulates the function of the epistle by 
expressing his “subjective and private orientations” (Watt 191).  In a manner consistent 
with Eddie’s evolution toward a late modernist sensibility, however, this expression soon 
gives way to a series of acknowledgements of his own inability to perform the type of 
bourgeois subjectivity that the epistolary genre prescribes.  He writes: “You know how I 
love Anna, as I’m sure you do too, but when she starts to say to me “Really, Eddie”, I 
feel like a wild animal, and behave accordingly.  I am much too influenced by people’s 
manner towards me…Directly people attack me, I think they are right, and hate myself, 
and then I hate them—the more I like them this is so” (65).  In his relations with others—
even his “intimate” friend Anna—Eddie feels like an untamed creature devoid of 
rationality, articulacy, and certainly the ability to address another in writing.   
 Here, Bowen invokes a form that traditionally asserts and shores up bourgeois 
subjectivity only to undermine it. While the inconsistency of one’s emotions does not 
equate to a lack of subjectivity, Eddie’s acknowledgement hints at the transformation he 
will undergo throughout the novel.  Here, he indicates insight into his own troubled 
relationship to high modernist conceptions of deep interiority: he is not a human, but an 
animal; he possesses not a coherent inner self, but a set of ephemeral emotions. By 
couching Eddie’s insights in a letter, Bowen dismantles the epistle’s coercive power to 
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reify a type of coherent subjectivity that is lacking in her characters; her invocation of the 
form, coupled with a resistance to its conventions, puts this old-fashioned genre to use in 
Bowen’s forward-looking interrogation of late modernist subjectivity.   
 Eddie’s relationship to his own subjectivity casts suspicion on the notion that 
individuals are in possession of a deep interiority that determines the contours of the self.  
Others find his lack of conformity to a coherent subjectivity disconcerting: he complains 
to Portia, “How can I keep on feeling something I once felt when there are so many 
things one can feel?  People who say they always feel as they did simply fake themselves 
up.  I may be a crook but I’m not a fake—that’s an entirely different thing” (260).  
Eddie’s feelings—expressions of sentiment attributed to his unique personality—are 
inconsistent.  He furthermore asserts that the same is true for everyone.  Also 
importantly, Eddie emphasizes that he is not a fake; his feelings are authentically 
incoherent and variable.  For Eddie, an authentic understanding of individual subjectivity 
posits an interiority that is not quite an “I,” that experiences different feelings over time, 
and that is authentic only by virtue of an acknowledgement of these truths.  Eddie 
exhibits anxiety in response to both the compulsory performance of subjectivity and the 
logic that posits a deep interiority as the inner analogue to this performance.  Here, Eddie 
diagnoses the modernist crisis of subjectivity: the foundational belief in a robust, unique, 
and inherent selfhood has broken down, and this produces profound anxiety.   Those who 
perform a consistent though inauthentic version of selfhood—those who assert a deep and 
coherent interiority—are, as Eddie asserts, fakes.  
 Eddie is therefore suspicious of high modernist notions of subjectivity even as 
they govern his understanding of himself.  He is explicit about what he understands as the 
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falsity of identity: “I suppose that I’m I at all is just a romantic fallacy.  It may be vulgar 
to feel that I’m anyone, but at least I’m sure that I’m not anyone else” (250). Eddie does 
not have a sense of a permanent essence of selfhood within; he does not view himself as a 
unique and robust “I,” but rather merely as the negative image of others’ selves.  
Furthermore, he indicates that the very concept of “I” is a romantic one; it is something to 
be hoped for, but is in fact a fallacy.   
 Eddie’s “inward turn”—his effort to apply a high modernist notion of subjectivity 
to his own experience—eventually yields not a discovery of a coherent “soul” deep 
within, but emptiness.  A prolonged scene during which Portia and Eddie discuss the 
nature of their relationship reveals the evolution of Eddie’s relationship to subjectivity.  
He claims “I cannot feel what you feel: I’m shut up in myself” (279).  He initially asserts 
that he cannot access the self within, though he is convinced it exists.  As he continues to 
speak, however, he diagnoses his struggle differently: “What you want is the whole of 
me—isn’t it, isn’t it?—and the whole of me isn’t there for anybody.  In that full sense you 
want me I don’t exist” (280).  Eddie articulates, here, a different notion of subjectivity: he 
characterizes it not merely as inaccessible, but rather as nonexistent.   
 In the subsequent scene, Bowen literalizes Eddie’s traumatic realization that his 
subjectivity does not conform to established prescriptions.  Eddie, Portia, and a group of 
friends are having drinks; Eddie is drunk and overemotional.  As the other members of 
the party grow increasingly uncomfortable with Eddie’s behavior, he writes his name in 
lipstick on a straw wrapper.  Eventually, Eddie “dropped his eyes, giggled and struck a 
match and burnt the long spill with his name on it in lipstick.  ‘There I go,’ he said” 
(288).  With this move of uncharacteristic finality, Eddie eradicates himself.  His 
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relationship with Portia has prompted him to look within, and he has found nothing there.  
As a result of his own crisis of subjectivity, Eddie comes to learn that he is not a self, an 
“I,” or in possession of a unique and dynamic interiority.  He enacts this realization when 
he literally eradicates himself in this bizarre ritual. 
 For Eddie, the realization that he is not in possession of a deep “self” is cause for 
anguish.  His sensibility is therefore consistent with those high modernist writers for 
whom inner consciousness underpins both their conceptions of subjectivity and the 
narratives that purport to reveal them.  Eddie fears fragmentation, seeks emotional 
coherence, and resists ascriptions that he feels don’t jibe with a deeply felt selfhood.  
Like canonical modernists, Eddie strives to orchestrate a narrative of himself that has the 
power to forge wholeness out of fragmentation.  He is traumatized by the realization that 
he is empty within and that, therefore, selfhood is merely a performance.  His status in 
The Death of the Heart, then, is that of the fragmented modernist who persists in efforts 
to forge an outmoded notion of self in an era inhospitable to it.  He experiences the crisis 
of subjectivity that is modernity’s affliction, but unlike Portia, he resists rather than 
resigns himself to a late modernist evisceration of subjectivity.    
   
Late Modernist Subjectivity as Dynamism 
 Matchett, the Quayne family’s longtime housekeeper, possesses a more 
complexly layered type of subjectivity.  Her consciousness of the dynamic relationship 
between past and present is a resource through which she staves off the crisis of 
subjectivity that afflicts the novel’s other characters.  While her sensibility appears 
outwardly reminiscent of the nineteenth century, in reality she is the only character who 
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is fully aware of the dynamism that exists between the performance of self that the 
teleological progression of bildung requires and the chaotic incoherence that it covers 
over.  Matchett’s embrace of this late modernist formulation of being ensures that she is 
not traumatized by changing formulations of subjectivity; rather, she embraces the utility 
of a relationship to subjectivity that both allows her to maintain a performed “self” and to 
acknowledge and engage the chaos of memory that others feel compelled to batten down 
or deny.   In this way, Matchett’s relationship to the past corresponds to Bowen’s: just as 
Matchett understands the past as integral to one’s ability to successfully navigate the 
present, so does Bowen mine pre-modernist narrative forms for meaningful ways to 
address specifically modern phenomena. 
 Matchett engages most meaningfully with Portia about the younger girl’s lack of 
origins, her feelings of being unmoored, and her budding sexuality.  She is, unlike 
Thomas, willing to discuss Portia’s birth, the breakup of Mr. Quayne’s marriage to 
Thomas’s mother, and Portia’s shabby cosmopolitan childhood.  Though definitely old-
fashioned, Matchett is not merely stuck in the past; rather, she mobilizes aspects of the 
past that have value in the novel’s present.  Matchett’s invocation of old-fashioned ideas, 
habits, and values is therefore a canny engagement with the radical shift in subjectivity 
that Bowen identifies and elaborates in The Death of the Heart.  Bowen describes 
Matchett’s attitude toward the past: 
Matchett’s ideas must date from the family house, where the young ladies, with 
bows on flowing horsetails of hair, supped upstairs with their governess, making 
toast, telling stories, telling each other’s fortunes with apple peel . . . But 
Matchett, upstairs and down with her solid impassive tread, did not recognize that 
 70 
 
some tracts no longer exist.  She seemed, instead, to detect some lack of life in the 
house, some organic failure in its propriety.  Lack in the Quaynes’ life of family 
custom seemed not only to disorientate Matchett but to rouse her contempt—
family custom, partly kind, partly cruel, that has long been rationalized away.  In 
this airy vivacious house, all mirrors and polish, there was no place where 
shadows lodged, no point where feeling could thicken.  (49-50)    
This passage, at its outset, indicates that Matchett’s ideas of what a family home should 
be are rooted in the past; apparently, she does not recognize that “some tracts no longer 
exist.”  Yet, in a characteristically Bowenesque reversal of this statement, the narrator 
asserts that Matchett does “detect some lack of life” in the house.  In other words, 
Matchett is very much aware that the “tract” of the nineteenth century family home, with 
its innocent young miss and established customs, does not exist.  In fact, she is 
disoriented and contemptuous of Thomas and Anna’s modern version of family life, 
wherein the partly kind and partly cruel reality of family life has been “rationalized” out 
of existence.  Matchett values the irrational, “thick,” and inconstant emotional reality of 
the kind of family custom she associates with the past.  Despite at first calling attention to 
the past’s charm, then, this passage in fact reveals its shadowy complexity.   Windsor 
Terrace’s “airy vivaciousness” bears no resemblance to this rich and multivalent vision of 
the past. 
 Notably, it is not the present, in and of itself, that Matchett views with contempt; 
rather she objects to the relegation of the past to the past and asserts its value in the 
present. With her “impassive tread,” Matchett seems to traverse the divide between past 
and present, and to profit by a familiarity with each period’s sensibility.  In her reading of 
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Bowen’s memoir Seven Winters, Victoria Stewart offers a conception of the relation 
between memory and subjectivity that helpfully illuminates Matchett’s subjectivity in 
The Death of the Heart.  For Stewart, Bowen’s memoir reveals the author’s evolving 
consciousness from that of a “phenomenal” relation to the world to a “realist relation, in 
which the autonomous existence of other things and other people is acknowledged” 
(335).   Seven Winters, therefore, “both describes and enacts a theory of subject 
formation.”  Essential to this formation, for Stewart, is that “the act of remembering is 
itself a constitutive part of the formative process” (335).  One’s selfhood is not 
formulated, then, by integrating an accumulation of events and lessons into the self, but 
rather in part by the act of remembering. Matchett expresses this phenomenon in a 
characteristic declaration: “those without memories don’t know what is what” (99).  For 
Matchett, only those individuals who can and do engage in the act of remembering obtain 
the kind of dynamic consciousness that allows one to successfully navigate this late 
modernist historical moment.  This view, furthermore, is borne out by the novel’s ending. 
 Bowen reiterates the importance of this dynamism by casting Matchett as the only 
character in the novel who discusses the events that preceded Portia’s arrival at Windsor 
Terrace. Early in the novel, in response to Portia’s prompting, Matchett narrates the day 
when Mrs. Quayne and Thomas learned of Portia’s birth.  Sitting at the edge of Portia’s 
bed, “only her apron showing,” she sat “as though her body were a vaseful of memory 
that must not be spilt” (95).  Here, Matchett embodies both rigid surface—her always-
visible apron—and the deep well of memory; she presents a version of herself to the 
world that acts as a cover for an ongoing and chaotic engagement with memory.  Bowen 
further magnifies Matchett’s dynamic presence: as she leans over Portia, “she felt as near, 
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now as anyone can be without touching one.  At the same time, as though to recreate 
distance, her voice pitched itself further away” (96).  Matchett is, at all times, both rigidly 
present and enamored of the past, just as she is intimately close but maintains a calculated 
distance.   
 Matchett passes on this dynamic relationship to subjectivity as a lesson to young 
Portia.  When Portia, late in the conversation, asserts “I just asked about the day I was 
born,” Matchett replies: “Well, the one thing leads to the other.  It all has to come back” 
(99).  According to the housekeeper, one cannot discuss origins without bringing the past 
into the present.  Furthermore, both she and Portia are aware that they are the only two 
inhabitants of their world who wish to discuss the past; according to Portia, “Except for 
you and me, nobody cares.” Indeed, no one but Portia asks Matchett about the Quaynes’ 
scandalous family history, though it is a history she shares with Thomas and Anna, both 
of whom batten down memory.13  Matchett’s response—“No, there’s no past in this 
house”—indicates that neither Thomas nor Anna possesses the kind of dynamic 
consciousness of self and past that Matchett wishes to inculcate in Portia, whose dubious 
origin and lack of roots alert her to the complex ways in which the past and memory itself 
have robust life in the present (99).   
 Bowen announces her own affiliation with Matchett’s dynamic late modernist 
sensibility by giving the housekeeper a crucial role in the novel’s final events.  Leading 
up to the ending, the novel is emphatic about Matchett’s starched white apron, which 
remains visible and unchanging no matter the circumstances.  Rather than being blotted 
                                                
13 Thomas, as the son of Mr. & Mrs. Quayne, clearly has an emotional investment in the breakup of their 
marriage and his father’s subsequent absence.  Yet Thomas flatly refuses any opportunity or request to 
discuss the past.  Anna literally shuts the bureau drawer on her own past by storing a sheaf of letters from a 
former lover inside. 
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out by the darkness (as is Portia, in more than one scene), Matchett’s blue dress “blotted 
the light up,” and her “apron’s harsh glaze” remains always visible (304). This emphasis 
on exterior phenomena would seem to attribute to Matchett a rigid sensibility, but 
attentiveness to Bowen’s explorations of individual consciousness throughout The Death 
of the Heart reveals instead that Matchett possesses a nuanced relationship to 
subjectivity.  The dynamic relationship between the past and the present that determines 
Matchett’s way of being in the world is recapitulated in the dynamism between 
surfaces—such as her starched white apron—and one’s inner life. Whereas Anna is busy 
hiding a stack of letters from her first fiancée, Thomas rejects any opportunity to discuss 
the past, and Eddie feels that self-obliteration is the only possible response to the 
challenges of the modern present, Matchett encourages Portia to keep her memory alive 
beneath the performance of selfhood that presents to the world.  
 In so doing, Matchett voices the sensibility that shapes Bowen’s novel: though 
The Death of the Heart, on its surface, resembles nineteenth century or Edwardian 
narrative models, in fact a dynamic and living engagement with past narrative forms is 
ongoing beneath this seemingly staid surface.  Such is the alchemy the Bowen performs 
through her renovations of established novel genres.  Matchett’s contempt for the lack of 
engagement with memory at Windsor Terrace, expressed succinctly with her claim 
“there’s no past in this house,” corresponds precisely to Bowen’s understanding of the 
relationship of literary history to one’s own writing: just as a house must have a past, so 
must a novel.   
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Coming of Age Beyond Bildung 
 By the end of The Death of the Heart, Portia’s distinctly late modernist 
relationship to subjectivity becomes painfully apparent.  After a traumatic split with 
Eddie, Portia leaves Windsor Terrace to find refuge with Major Brutt, an old-fashioned 
family friend, at his shabby hotel.  She asserts that she will not return to Windsor Terrace 
until Thomas and Anna decide what to do about her defection, and even then her return 
will depend “on what they do then” (390).   St. Quentin, Anna’s novelist friend, 
diagnoses in Portia the specifically late modernist relationship to subjectivity that Bowen 
narrates and Matchett embodies throughout the novel.  In an oft-cited and important 
passage, St. Quentin asserts:  
 I swear that each of us keeps, battened down inside himself, a sort of lunatic 
giant—impossible socially, but full-scale—and that it’s the knockings and 
batterings we sometimes hear in each other that keeps our intercourse from utter 
banality.  Portia hears these the whole time; in fact she hears nothing else.  Can 
we wonder she looks so goofy most of the time? (407) 
Here, St. Quentin explicates the vision of consciousness that Portia struggles to articulate 
throughout the novel.  She courts this lunatic giant when asking Matchett about her own 
origins; the lunatic giant is the source of both her frustration with and grudging 
acceptance of Eddie’s resistance to being written about in her diary; it is the lunatic giant 
that she hopes to escape by running away from Windsor Terrace, and which she hopes to 
be allowed to embrace if her brother and sister-in-law do the right thing, whatever Portia 
believes that to be.   
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 This lunatic giant is the knowledge that one’s authentic being consists not of a 
stable and decipherable interiority but rather a chaotic engagement with the past that 
bears little resemblance to the mature self prescribed by the narratives of bildung that The 
Death of the Heart (and several of Bowen’s other early novels) invokes and reworks. 
Whereas other characters are willing to acknowledge this lunatic giant only insofar as it 
might save their conversations from “utter banality,” Portia is particularly attuned to its 
“knockings and batterings;” indeed, she is able to deny neither its presence nor its nature.  
Importantly, Bowen configures this giant as existing inside of “each of us;” it is the inner 
consciousness that one papers over with the performance of self.  The interplay between 
the “knocking and battering” that occurs within and the exterior enactment of subjectivity 
is precisely what Portia has been experiencing throughout the novel.  By leaving Windsor 
Terrace, she declares that she cannot and will no longer try to deny history and memory 
in the way that Anna and Thomas expect her to do.  Rather, she will become fully 
immersed in the knockings and batterings that she constantly hears and which others 
deny.  In so doing, Portia embraces the insight that Bowen and Matchett share about the 
nature of late modernist existence: to live in society always mandates a performance, and 
this performance is the surface beneath which roils a dynamic and forever changing 
consciousness.   
 
Conclusion 
 Dynamism is the most salient hallmark of Bowen’s late modernist narrative 
technique.  Her early novels are marked by disjunction; they are both formally jarring and 
defy literary categorization.  This disjunction is a strangely dynamic one, however.  If 
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one reads Bowen’s work carefully, one might sense, for example, the morphing of a 
tightly focused autobiography into a meditation on the power of exactly such narrative 
forms to project a false notion of selfhood.  Moreover, attunement to Bowen’s complex 
style allows one to perceive her writing swerve toward literary convention only to startle 
afresh with a passage that resembles nothing but Bowen’s unique style.  Her work’s 
relationship to the literary prescriptions incumbent upon twentieth century writers is not 
one of unilateral rejection but a dynamic invocation, revision, and deformation.  By 
constructing her novels as ongoing interactions with familiar literary forms, she reveals 
both these forms’ limitations in expressing the true essence of late modernist 
consciousness and their utility in her forceful querying of this essence.   
This dynamic relationship to the canon—and the formally strange and challenging 
novels that result from it—marks Bowen’s work as characteristically late modernist.  As 
Miller argues, the “unseasonable forms” spun out by late modernists “represent breaking 
points, points of nonsynchronism, in the broad narrative of twentieth-century cultural 
history” (12).  Critical attunement to this nonsynchronism provides a corrective to initial 
perceptions that Bowen wrote novels of manners and sensibility; to read her novels with 
attention to the ongoing dynamism at work within them is to perceive not only their 
formally conventional—if delightful—surfaces, but their deep engagement with the 
experience of being.  Dynamism furthermore inheres in the relationship of Bowen’s work 
to classic modernism: even as, at times, she participates in modernism’s rejection of 
literary conventions, she is critical of the limitations that result from this rejection. Her 
insistence that the deformation of pre-modernist forms can plumb late modernist 
consciousness more deeply than high modernist narrative innovations produces a 
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negatively critical relationship to modernism: though the aesthetics of modernism haunt 
her novels, these novels’ unique forms facilitate Bowen’s ongoing responses to and 
reflections upon those aesthetics. 
The configuration of consciousness that Bowen depicts in The Hotel and The 
Death of the Heart furthermore inheres in the dynamic relationship between one’s 
experience of being and the performance of subjectivity that society requires.  This 
radical late modernist conception of consciousness therefore obliterates both the reified 
notion of autonomous subjectivity posited by nineteenth century literary genres and the 
deep selfhood prized by modernist aesthetics.  Bowen’s protagonists reveal that, in their 
lived experience, “selfhood” is a concept without a corollary: Sydney’s rootless 
cosmopolitanism brings her face to face with the emptiness at her core, while Portia’s 
dislocation makes her particularly attuned to the incommensurability of her 
consciousness and the “self” she is expected to display.  Rather than come of age, 
therefore, these young women arrive at an awareness of the contingent nature of 
existence in the era between world wars.  Their respective narratives thereby constitute a 
late modernist critique of static and prescriptive models of subjectivity that previously 
constrained both writers and individuals.  Precisely as a result of their ongoing interaction 
with conventionalized literary forms, Bowen’s radically complex narrative performances 
facilitate a complex understanding of the lived experience of those born into an era 
haunted both by the past and by modernity itself.    
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CHAPTER III 
 
WAUGH’S GOTHIC SATIRE AND THE “DEAUTHENTICATION” OF LIFE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Evelyn Waugh’s 1934 novel A Handful of Dust is a Gothic satire in which the 
author deploys his sharp-edged comic sensibility to depict and excoriate his characters’ 
shallow contemporary lifestyles.  Waugh invokes aspects of the Gothic—a seemingly 
untimely aesthetic—in order to mount a distinctly late modernist reflection on both the 
empty investments that characterize mid-twentieth-century modernity and the capacity of 
narrative forms to be productively deformed and repurposed for contemporary critique.  
The novel appears at first to be a relatively straightforward—and very funny—send-up of 
shallow modern figures, but its invocation of the Gothic produces a complex and, in the 
end, horrified realization about the vacuity that lies at the heart of conventionalized 
narrative forms, including the nineteenth century imperial adventure narrative, high 
modernist depictions of imperial travel, and the Gothic itself.  Even more profoundly, the 
novel concludes that, in the era between world wars, life itself consists in the habitual 
playing out of social roles that are no longer relevant.  Waugh’s depiction of the 
emptiness of narrative convention thereby functions as the aesthetic expression of life’s 
banal emptiness at this historical moment.   
 Waugh’s method in this novel facilitates a complex depiction of the progressive 
penetration of everyday life by mimetic practices; Tyrus Miller claims that this ongoing 
transformation of individuals’ authentic experience into a mere playing-out of social roles 
amounts to a “deauthentication of life” in the 1930s (42).  Waugh’s thoroughgoing satire 
depicts this transformation by flattening out the traditional effects of the Gothic, thereby 
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rejecting the melodramatic and fearsome aspects of the form.  In so doing, Waugh’s use 
of the Gothic offers a deep engagement with his contemporary reality, wherein life itself 
is increasingly experienced as devoid of affect; it is in the process of transforming from 
authentic engagement with one’s environment and other individuals into rote 
performance.  The invocation of the Gothic reveals that this literary form, which has been 
invested in questions of fakery and authenticity since its inception, is uncannily attuned to 
the progressive transformation of life into spectacle that marks the 1930s.  
 According to Tyrus Miller, late modernist writers were divested of the “cultural 
‘cosmos’—the modernist ‘myth,’ in its most encompassing sense—in which the singular 
works of high modernism seemed components of an aesthetically transfigured world” 
(14).  Instead these late modernists produced “the splinter-products of a shattered 
‘classic’ modernism,” “disfigured likenesses of modernist masterpieces,” and novels 
bearing “disfigured countenances” (Miller 14,13). Indeed, Waugh’s novel is formally 
disjointed, free of symbolism, and seemingly depthless in its affect; it little resembles the 
masterworks of modernist fiction wherein pyrotechnic and highly subjectivist literary 
techniques produce richly textured narratives. Importantly, A Handful of Dust betrays an 
awareness of the tenets of high modernism that it defies and offers—paradoxically, 
through a seemingly outmoded form—an innovative narrative approach that can engage 
yet more fully with the contingencies of life in the late modernist era.    
 Waugh’s late modernist approach to narrative conventions rejects modernism’s 
typical orientation toward the Gothic.  Rather than capitalizing upon its frightening 
aspects, Waugh uses the Gothic as a formal category to provide the ground for his 
interrogation of the inauthenticity of contemporary life.  Whereas high modernism—as 
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exemplified by T. S. Eliot’s seminal poem The Waste Land capitalized upon the fearsome 
elements of the Gothic to express the sense of foreboding that haunted individuals in the 
shell-shocked years immediately following World War I, Waugh flattens the affect of 
these elements.  In so doing, he recalibrates the Gothic in order to make it useful for his 
task of depicting the increasing “derealization of reality” that afflicts his characters 
(Miller 44).  As emblematized by his protagonist’s obsessive but empty devotion to his 
family’s “Gothic” legacy, for Waugh, the Gothic is a sensibility that prioritizes surfaces 
and undervalues authenticity; as such, it provides the framework for his interrogation of a 
lack of depth that he believes characterizes modernity.  
The Gothic inflection of Waugh’s treatment of form in A Handful of Dust carries 
through his re-articulation of a number of disparate formal elements that combine in a 
purposefully awkward fashion.  As part of a wide-ranging re-animation of the British 
novel’s buried past, Waugh’s novel recalibrates both the conventional nineteenth century 
imperial adventure narrative and familiar modernist depictions of travel abroad.  When 
Waugh’s central character, Tony Last, ventures away from England, he models his 
journey on those undertaken by the boy-heroes featured in nineteenth century novels of 
imperial adventure, wherein young men conquer the wilderness.  Waugh’s novel reveals 
that Tony’s belief in his own competence to reenact this type of adventure is grossly 
overblown; Tony’s mere status as a member of England’s ruling class is not enough to 
prevent him from being conquered by the jungle. Waugh’s depiction thereby inverts the 
typical function of imperial adventure fiction, whose narratives of heroes conquering the 
wilderness in the name of expanding the English empire bolstered the imperial project. 
Tony, however, falls quite short of becoming a conquering hero, and indeed finds himself 
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immured in a very Gothic “living death” where he must endlessly read aloud tomes of 
nineteenth-century British literature for the pleasure of his jungle host-cum-captor.  In 
this way, the narrative of British cultural superiority and stability that undergirds imperial 
fiction is shown not only to be empty but connected to an ineluctable past enclosing the 
imperialist hero in an endless purgatorial loop.  The novel’s finale thereby underscores 
Waugh’s broader exploration of depthlessness and inauthenticity while revealing the true 
horror lurking beneath the insouciant satire running through the earlier parts of the novel.  
Tony’s journey is furthermore uncannily similar to that which Virginia Woolf 
depicts in her first novel, The Voyage Out (1915).  Unlike in Woolf’s novel, however, 
Tony’s adventure does not prompt an epiphany that brings Tony to greater knowledge of 
himself.  Rather, A Handful of Dust reveals that there is no deep self for Tony to know; 
this revelation is one manifestation of the motif of surface and depth by which Waugh 
depicts the rote enactment of social roles that characterizes individuals’ lives in the mid-
twentieth-century. Like Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), furthermore, Waugh 
depicts Tony’s journey as a venture back in time, to a “primeval” era.  But for Tony, 
unlike for Conrad’s central character, this temporal orientation becomes muddled; in the 
era of late modernism, the “dark places of the earth” and 1930s civilization do not stay 
relegated to the temporal categories to which Tony tries to assign them.  As such, 
Waugh’s deformation of Conrad’s temporal scheme reveals the degree to which the 
narrative of modernist travel abroad is no longer commensurate to individuals’ lived 
experience.  Waugh’s revision of these canonical modernist narrative structures is an 
aspect of his recalibration of conventional arcs to make them yet more expressive of the 
transformation of life into empty spectacle that characterizes life in the 1930s. 
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Though A Handful of Dust is not thematically Gothic—indeed it little resembles 
the frightening melodrama that characterizes the genre—it uses the Gothic as a formal 
structure around which to organize its final horrifying revelation that life in the late 
modernist era is devoid of authenticity.  This inauthenticity constitutes a terrible “living 
death” from which one can expect no reprieve or even complete acknowledgement of its 
reality from others. The reformulation of the Gothic form, moreover, facilitates Waugh’s 
assertion that continued belief in conventionalized narratives wreaks destruction upon 
modern individuals.  This revelation is made most forcefully at the end of the novel, 
when Tony finds himself held captive in the jungle, reading and re-reading the novels of 
Dickens aloud to his captor.  Tony becomes entombed in a materialist and 
conventionalized literature; this dynamic embodies the destruction that, for Waugh, is 
wrought by blind adherence to narrative forms that no longer resonate with historical 
reality.  The narrative that his home culture creates about Tony, furthermore, renders him 
“undead;” his friends in England invent and endorse a story in which Tony’s adventure 
ends in his death, though he in fact lives on.  This strange motif of “living death” is a 
concrete manifestation of Waugh’s complex deformation of the Gothic in service of an 
elaboration of the unique conditions faced by those living in the era of late modernism. 
Though the novel’s plot does not set out to frighten the reader, therefore, its final 
revelation offers a frightening commentary indeed on the inauthenticity that characterizes 
life in the 1930s. Waugh’s narrative method therefore draws attention to the timely 
cultural critique that can be performed through the redeployment and deformation of 
conventional and seemingly untimely forms. A Handful of Dust invokes and manipulates 
conventionalized narrative forms; in so doing, the novel disrupts and haunts both a 
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modernism and a modernity characterized by empty investments.  This complex formal 
recalibration restores the disruptive power of the Gothic and thereby facilitates a 
sophisticated understanding of the ongoing “depersonalization and deauthentication of 
life in modern society” (Miller 42).  
 
 Varieties of Gothic in The Waste Land vs. A Handful of Dust 
The title and epigraph of A Handful of Dust are taken from T. S. Eliot’s 
innovative and groundbreaking 1922 poem The Waste Land.  Waugh’s title page quotes 
Eliot’s modernist masterpiece: “I will show you something different from either / Your 
shadow at morning striding behind you / Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; / 
I will show you fear in a handful of dust” (I.27-30).  These lines are characteristically 
both richly expressive and enigmatic; the fear evoked is palpable even as the image itself 
is difficult to envision.  The passage is, in this respect, exemplary of Eliot’s particular use 
of the Gothic in the poem, wherein identifiably Gothic elements give aesthetic expression 
to modernists’ powerful generalized dread of the future.  The shadowy elusiveness that 
characterizes this passage evokes the creeping sensation of unease produced by Gothic 
fiction since its inception.  The epigraph Waugh selects is therefore an explicitly 
modernist invocation of Gothic imagery.  
Waugh’s Gothic satire in A Handful of Dust functions as a late modernist 
recalibration of this modernist use of the Gothic.  His invocation of the Gothic highlights 
not its fearsome elements, as does Eliot’s, but flattens the Gothic’s affect as a method by 
which to reveal the banal character of life in the 1930s, which is a means by which 
Waugh composes entirely new horrors of emptiness and living death. Waugh’s epigraph 
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is therefore not a preface or a précis for his novel so much as a means by which the 
author establishes a line of inheritance from the modernist canon to his own novel.  The 
epigraph emphasizes the presence of the Gothic in both texts.  Importantly, however, 
whereas the Gothic elements of The Waste Land are expressive of real dread, Waugh 
evacuates the form of its explicit manifestations of threat and uncanny terror. Waugh’s 
flattened version of the Gothic rather recalibrates the form to depict the banal and 
mimetic character of his characters’ lives. 
Criticism on modernism and the Gothic is particularly attentive to the thematic 
relationships between Gothic writing and modernist projects.14 Andrew Smith and Jeff 
Wallace’s edited volume Gothic Modernisms takes as its premise that modernism and the 
Gothic shared a mutual obsession “with the rapidly changing relationship between culture 
and the quotidian” (1). By transforming Michelangelo into mass experience, for example, 
Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” establishes a connection between everyday 
experience and “a more profound world of longing, fear, and nostalgia—a world, in other 
words, of Gothic dimensions” (Smith, Wallace 1).  Both modernist and Gothic writing, 
claim Smith and Wallace, aim to “raise questions about reality” and are furthermore 
joined by “their fascination with the potential erosion of moral value, and with the forms 
that amorality can take” (Smith, Wallace 3). Certainly, in A Handful of Dust, Waugh 
explores the consequences wrought upon characters for whom institutions including the 
aristocracy, the church, and socially cohesive communities have lost the power to provide 
stability and moral guidance. The horror of the novel emerges, in part, from the 
                                                
14 Other texts that explore the connections between modernism and the Gothic include: Jim Hansen’s 
Terror and Irish Modernism: The Gothic Tradition from Burke to Beckett (2009), John Paul Riquelme’s 
edited volume Gothic and Modernism: Essaying Dark Literary Modernity (2008), and Lucie Armitt’s 
History of the Gothic: Twentieth Century Gothic (2011). 
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evacuation of these institutions’ meaning and its characters’ resulting moral bankruptcy.  
While Waugh indeed deploys a Gothic aesthetic in service of an exploration of “the 
forms amorality can take,” critics’ rich claims about modernism and the Gothic 
concentrate mostly on thematic similarities.  Waugh’s recalibration of the Gothic, 
however, is particularly attuned to the formal characteristics of the Gothic that, when 
flattened into satire, precisely express the deauthentication and depersonalization of life 
that is specific to late modernism (Miller 42).  
Waugh’s epigraph and title have drawn the attention of critics who seek to 
theorize the relationship between Eliot’s and Waugh’s aesthetics, and between their 
respective uses of the Gothic. Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik have noted that A Handful of 
Dust selectively parodies the Gothic, and in so doing draws upon the form’s powerful 
resources in order to create “a darkly comic critique of Modernity” (225).  Certainly, 
Waugh calls upon the Gothic as an unconventional means by which to investigate and 
express contemporary phenomena; his redeployment of the form is thoroughly modern.  
In this sense, as Horner and Zlosnik argue, Waugh’s Gothic parody on the one hand 
mocks the forms and tenor of an older literature, which “paradoxically reaffirms it as a 
mode of articulating contemporary fear and anxiety” (226).  Both Waugh and Eliot 
capitalize upon this aspect of the Gothic: it facilitates aesthetic engagement with ongoing 
historical realities.  Horner and Zlosnik pair Waugh’s use of the Gothic with Eliot’s: A 
Handful of Dust “both lightly nods to the moment of high Modernism whilst pillaging the 
Gothic tradition for the appropriate tropes and motifs with which to represent the 
alienation inherent in the modern condition” (231).  Certainly, Waugh, like Eliot, 
references the Gothic; his relationship to high modernism is not precisely a “nod,” 
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however.  While Eliot’s poem uses Gothic tropes to represent this modern alienation, 
Waugh’s “pillaging” is put to a distinct purpose: representing the empty banality that 
characterizes the late modernist era.  In this sense, Waugh’s recalibration of the Gothic 
goes further than merely foregrounding the Gothic strain within Eliot’s writing (Horner, 
Zlosnik 231).  Rather, Waugh’s Gothic satire extends the utility of the form to express the 
transformation of life into banal spectacle. 
In The Waste Land, Eliot invokes Gothic imagery both to establish the “living 
dead” or “death-in-life” motif that conditions the entire poem, and to create a foreboding 
sense of a dark future. The Gothic elements in Eliot’s poem are a means by which to 
elaborate and explore the central question of whether the conditions of modernity are 
sufficient to nurture life.  Eliot is most attuned to Gothic’s “skin-crawling” elements: bats 
with baby faces crawl upward upon a wall, a corpse is planted in the garden, eerie 
portraits peer down from the wall as footsteps sound on the stair.  These images are of a 
piece with the presentations of supernatural, sensational and terrifying incidents that 
appeared in the traditional Gothic, and which “produced emotional effects” on readers, 
“rather than developing a rational or properly cultivated response” (Botting 4). The Waste 
Land, which is widely recognized as one of the ur-texts of modernism, capitalizes upon 
the Gothic’s tendency to create emotional disturbance in the reader to achieve some of 
the poem’s most discomfiting effects. Eliot’s modernist re-working of this antiquated 
form thereby engages the melodramatic register of the Gothic that, at the time of the 
form’s conception in the eighteenth century, “signified a trend towards an aesthetics 
based on feeling and emotion” (Botting 3). Indeed, at some points in The Waste Land, 
thematically Gothic imagery is precisely what produces the sensations of foreboding and 
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discomfort that make Eliot’s poem so powerfully expressive of modernist alienation and 
dread of the future. 
 Both Eliot and Waugh, therefore, mobilize Gothic tropes in service of thoroughly 
contemporary critique. Eliot’s Gothic elements give aesthetic form to the palpable 
presence of death within life that afflicts those living in a post-WWI urban landscape. In 
A Handful of Dust, however, Waugh’s Gothic satire interrogates the challenges wrought 
by the breakdown of social relations and cultural institutions specific to the moneyed 
classes in 1930s England. Waugh’s Gothic satire explicates the “deauthentication of life” 
and the transformation of authentic human experience into spectacle that results from the 
dissolution of aristocratic values and the breakdown of meaningful social relations 
(Miller 42). Waugh’s pointed and satirical invocation of the Gothic is a means by which 
he dramatizes this deauthentication; as such, it differs fundamentally from Eliot’s Gothic 
portrayal of the newly haunted character of life in the twentieth century.   
The combination of satire with the Gothic sensibility that characterizes the greater 
part of A Handful of Dust disallows the kind of emotional response that melodramatic 
Gothic fiction from earlier centuries provoked, and which Eliot’s poem echoes in its 
Gothic passages.15  Whereas the Gothic moments in Eliot’s poem are truly creepy, 
Waugh’s deployment of the Gothic reveals the deadening of emotion that afflicts 
individuals in an era of widespread commodification and social alienation.  Waugh 
                                                
15 Importantly, when the novel switches registers upon Tony’s arrival in South America, its affect ceases to 
be flattened.  At that point, the horrifying consequences of Tony’s empty life leading up to his journey into 
the wilderness are brought fully into relief by Waugh’s reanimation of the imperial adventure narrative.  
The invocation of this seemingly antiquated form reveals that because Tony’s life has become merely a rote 
enactment of his aristocratic role, disaster is the only fate possible when he is removed from his home 
culture.  Tragedy inheres in the novel’s final scenes because the novel’s preceding content renders Tony so 
completely vacuous.  The jarring formal discontinuity that occurs at the end of the novel is therefore 
fundamental to both Waugh’s rendering of late modernist experience and this novel’s “nonsynchronous” 
form (Miller 43). 
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flattens the affective function of the Gothic upon which the disturbing character of The 
Waste Land so depends and draws instead upon the form’s ability to express and process 
complex historical ambivalences.  Precisely by not being “scary,” Waugh’s Gothic satire 
reveals the horrifying truth that, in the 1930s, individuals are so alienated from 
themselves and from one another that even the most tragic events have lost their power to 
frighten.16 
 A central motif in The Waste Land is the intermixture of death and life; where life 
asserts itself, death impinges.  The lilacs that breed out of the dead land in the poem’s 
first stanza depict this dynamic precisely, and one of Eliot’s speakers articulates it thus: 
“I was neither / Living nor dead” (I.39-40).  This imagery is evoked throughout the poem, 
when life-giving or life-sustaining elements combine with death or bodily destruction.  
This combination recalls the “undead” personages that populate Gothic tales.  These 
characters include the immortal vampires who, though not quite living, cannot die; 
Frankenstein’s monster whose life is made possible only by others’ deaths; the portrait of 
Dorian Gray that pulses with life as Dorian himself fades into death. Throughout its many 
iterations, a central and most frightening element of the Gothic is the blurring of the 
distinction between the living and the dead. This fear haunts Eliot’s poem.  In the years 
following World War I, life itself was haunted by the tangible reminders of death Eliot 
evokes in The Waste Land: zombie-like combatants trudging across London bridge; a 
conversation about abortion over drinks in a bar; the creeping of rats among bones along 
the Thames.  The presence of death in the midst of new growth, as in another speaker’s 
                                                
16 The novel is rife with examples of fundamentally disturbing events whose presentation is not tragic but 
flat.  A peripheral and absurdly melodramatic character, Jenny Abdul-Akbar, suffers domestic violence at 
the hands of her ex-husband; in the novel’s first scene, the maids jump from a top window, fearing fire; 
even John Andrew’s parents display an underwhelming emotional response to his death.  In each of these 
instances, Waugh’s satire evokes not our sympathy but our laughter at these characters’ expense. 
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question “That corpse you planted last year in your garden, / Has it begun to sprout?  Will 
it bloom this year?,” exemplifies this “death-in-life” motif (I.71-2). This liminality—a 
sense of existing somewhere between life and death—accompanies a traumatized 
emergence from the nineteenth century into a new era that offers little possibility for the 
amelioration of this trauma.  Individuals in this predicament are not dead, but neither are 
they riotous with life: in this sense, they resemble the flowers who breed out of dead land.  
The poem’s Gothic elements, therefore, are fundamental to its portrayal of modern 
subjects as “undead.”  
 Waugh’s characters, too, are neither dead not truly alive; their status is not 
precisely liminal, however, so much as it is hollowed-out. Brenda, Tony, and their peers 
in A Handful of Dust go through the motions of living.  They engage in the empty 
pursuits of redecorating, gossip, and travel to and from London for social events.  These 
shallow pursuits are the stuff of their lives.  In an era during which the aristocracy, which 
gave their ancestors’ lives substance, is in the process of fully breaking down, the events 
that previously lent their lives meaning have been evacuated of significance. Tony’s role 
as landlord has been reduced to merely paying sporadic visits to his tenants; his religion 
is now a routine bereft of spiritual content; most crucially, with John Andrew’s death, his 
ancestral line is ended.  Tony is thereby reduced to merely playing out the script passed 
down to him as the inheritor of his family’s estate, Hetton Abbey, though it is no longer 
meaningful.  Even as his house literally falls down around him, he persists in enacting 
this script, fulfilling its tenets in an unreflective and rote way. Tony’s life therefore 
becomes a mimetic practice; he plays the role of aristocratic landlord, though his actions 
no longer hold meaning or exert influence.   
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In this sense, Waugh’s depiction of his characters is consistent with a late 
modernist representation of life as being “increasingly penetrated by mimetic practices,” 
including role-playing and ritualized behavior (Miller 42-3).  The tendency that Waugh’s 
characters display toward empty and rote actions is thereby consistent with the 
“generalized mimeticism” that Miller observes in late modernist aesthetics.  This 
generalized mimeticism is “an involuntary process for individuals, a compulsory 
lowering of the threshold of difference between subjects and objects, their unconscious 
assimilation to an objective environment” (43). The disturbing lack of depth that 
Waugh’s characters display is therefore not the fearsome “death-in-life” exemplified in 
The Waste Land, but rather indicates a lack of life in the self.  Waugh’s characters are not 
the haunted, zombie-like denizens of modernist London; they are, rather, hollowed-out 
figures who—often enthusiastically—persist in playing roles that are no longer 
meaningful.  Their lives have become performances; in this sense, they are no longer 
subjects whose complex subjectivities are being formed in response to emotional and 
social circumstances.  They are, rather, objects in a spectacle. This is the horrifying truth 
that Waugh’s satirical depiction of his characters’ ritualized behavior reveals. Waugh’s 
text indicates that, in their shallowness, late modernist individuals—unlike their 
modernist forebears—have little capacity to be haunted.  
 
Waugh’s Late Modernist Gothic Satire 
 Importantly, this late modernist dispensation in fiction demands a reconfiguration 
of the self and its boundaries.  According to Miller, the breakdown of the division 
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between reality and spectacle put into doubt many of the basic tenets of modernism’s 
aesthetic ideology (45):   
The heroic subjectivity of the innovating artist; the organic convergence of form 
and content in a symbolic unity set down by the artist on paper, on canvas, in 
stone; the exhibition of stylistic mastery as a criterion of value; the belief in an 
underlying myth of aesthetic order to history; and the possibility of redeeming 
tradition through its transfiguration into art. (45) 
Waugh intuits this new dispensation; his depiction of his characters as players in the 
performance of their own lives confirms the breakdown of the division between reality 
and spectacle.  The formal expression of this breakdown is a fractured novel form that is 
rooted firmly in the contemporary present even as it enlists old-fashioned forms in 
service of its reflection upon the “loss of a stable, authentic social ground” (Miller 43). 
Gone is the coherence lent to modernist writing by symbolic unity and mastery.  Rather 
than a coherent whole, the novel is a series of episodes whose ending is stylistically 
distinct from what precedes it. A Handful of Dust is thereby a late modernist novel in the 
vein that Miller theorizes: in the empty space of high modernism’s dissolution, Waugh, 
like other late modernists, “reassembled fragments into disfigured likenesses of 
modernist masterpieces: the unlovely allegories of a world’s end” (14). 
The form of Waugh’s novel is mystifying and confounding: when Tony leaves 
England to pursue adventure in the South American wilderness, an abrupt shift in tone 
and style occurs. The beginning two-thirds of A Handful of Dust is consistent with 
Waugh’s earlier work: it is a firmly tongue-in-cheek satire of every character that 
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provokes knowing laughter throughout.17  But the final ominous section marks a distinct 
shift away from outright laughter and a more pointed engagement with established 
narrative arcs associated with imperial adventure and travel, including the nineteenth 
century imperial adventure form and narrative depictions of journeys away from 
civilization by Virginia Woolf and Joseph Conrad.  The ending is, furthermore, genuinely 
disturbing in a way that previous chapters’ satirical mode disallows.  The resulting text 
therefore seems incongruous, and lacks organic or symbolic unity. 
The confounding formal strangeness of Waugh’s novel can be attributed to a 
characteristically late modernist orientation in fiction that Miller theorizes. Miller points 
to the novels of Wyndham Lewis, Djuna Barnes, Samuel Beckett, and Henry Miller as 
exemplars of a late modernism that both unfolds alongside ongoing developments in high 
modernism and is a precursor to postmodernism.  This late modernism takes shape in 
“unseasonable forms” that lack the symbolic unity and discursive mastery that 
characterized high modernism (Miller 12).  Late modernist novels are not governed by 
the overly schematic structures for which high modernist fiction is known (as exemplified 
by Joyce’s 24-hour narrative of a precisely recreated Dublin) or conditioned by a deep 
psychological engagement with complex subjects (as is true of Woolf’s and Joyce’s 
subjectivist narration).  Rather, “untimely phenomena like late modernist fiction represent 
breaking points, points of nonsynchronism, in the broad narrative of twentieth-century 
cultural history” (Miller 12). Their late modernism inheres precisely in the impasse they 
present to an understanding of literary history wherein the symbolic mastery, unity, and 
stylistic ostentation of modernism constitute the apex of literary expression.   
                                                
17 These novels include Decline and Fall (1928), Vile Bodies (1930), and Black Mischief (1932). 
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A Handful of Dust exemplifies this nonsynchronism.  The novel is jarring because 
of its structure but also for its seeming historical incongruity; the Gothic elements that 
inform the novel’s form are, by 1934, almost two centuries old. But it is precisely this 
nonsynchronism that facilitates this seemingly innocuously satirical novel’s power to 
reveal the frightening consequences of the transformation of life into spectacle.  A 
Handful of Dust engages the tenets of the Gothic form in a subtle and pointed reflection 
on a late modernist reality.  As such, the novel enacts a Gothic function. Though it does 
not aim to frighten or provoke emotion in the same manner as its Gothic forebears, the 
novel in many ways performs the same cultural work as the Gothic fiction of the 
preceding two centuries: it processes the horror that results from the clash between 
tradition and modernity; it orients itself around questions of authenticity and fakery, 
producing authentic emotion in response to conventionalized and purely textual 
phenomena; it provides a “safe” site for the playing out of anxieties that have often truly 
terrifying ramifications for individual subjects. By performing these functions in a novel 
that is squarely focused on contemporary individuals confronting specifically 
contemporary challenges, Waugh creates an “elsewhere of writing” from which the late 
modernist historical moment can be surveyed (Miller 13).  
Waugh’s indirect satire is operative in his reworking of the Gothic. Indirect satire 
depicts extreme behavior without offering any explicit commentary.  Certainly, Waugh’s 
characters exhibit extreme self-interest, a blatant disregard for (or, in Tony’s case, a naïve 
devotion to) tradition, a distinct lack of family feeling, and absurdly strong devotion to 
superficial things.  But the novel does not instruct readers to evaluate characters on these 
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bases.  Indeed, Waugh’s depiction of his characters’ callousness and naiveté provides 
most of the novel’s humor.  
This orientation to the novel’s events is crucial to the late modernist recalibration 
of the Gothic that Waugh enacts throughout the novel.  By housing what appears to be a 
send-up of both the foolish pursuit of contemporaneity and a naïve devotion to dying 
institutions within indirect satire, Waugh both capitalizes upon the humor this send-up 
generates and subtly deploys the Gothic in a way that encourages reflection upon 
modernism’s more straightforward engagement of the form.  This novel’s satirical 
register makes the literary Gothic more difficult to detect in A Handful of Dust than in 
many modernist texts, but is instrumental in facilitating the articulation of Waugh’s 
critical stance toward conventional invocations of the Gothic. 
 
The Gothic Revival: Monuments to Inauthenticity 
One of the novel’s most explicitly Gothic elements is Tony’s Gothic Revival 
home, Hetton Abbey.  Tony is enamored of the authentic history that he believes Hetton 
embodies, though in reality the house is a monument to the vagaries of historical trends. 
The features of Tony’s home—its bedsteads, crumbling plaster, and shelves of childhood 
books—are of a piece with the home itself, which is a Gothic Revival shrine to an 
idealized narrative of English history (15). Hetton Abbey is a physical manifestation of 
the values associated with the nineteenth century Gothic Revival in England.  During this 
period, Victorians looked to the art, architecture, and literature of England’s Middle Ages 
as a way to organize English history into a line of inheritance from England’s pre-
industrial golden age to the present.  
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This narrative construction of history was a central function of the Gothic Revival 
in architecture. Chris Brooks claims that, as acknowledged symbols of power and long-
established features of the British countryside, “castellar gothic” buildings, of which 
Hetton Abbey is an example, “were particularly suited to the ideological task of 
naturalizing land ownership and its attendant political authority” (164).  Nineteenth 
century Gothic structures’ material presence furthermore functioned as an antidote to the 
bafflements of modernity: “Gothic’s ‘reality’ was a talisman to ward off a world many 
felt to be increasingly unreal.  The thronged cities appeared ever more anonymous and 
alienating, the face-to-face dealings of community vanished in an impersonal capitalist 
order” (Brooks 305).  As Brooks points out, the Victorian era was characterized by the 
breakdown of seemingly solid institutions and beliefs: burgeoning capitalism depended 
on intangible credit and speculation; Biblical beliefs gave way to geologists’ fossil 
evidence and evolution; revolution threatened monarchies all over Europe (305). The 
Gothic Revival emerged out of the anxiety provoked by these modern phenomena; the 
solidity of these new structures built on models from the Middle Ages grounded their 
inhabitants and seemingly counteracted the disintegration that characterized the mid-
nineteenth century.   
The Gothic Revival enlisted the literary and aesthetic legacy of the Middle Ages 
even as it obfuscated the roles of industrialization and circulation of capital in the 
construction of its structures.   According to Brooks, “In Romantic gothic’s ideological 
landscape, the mysterious, wealth-producing forest and the magically built castle join the 
monastery with its hidden treasure as archetypes in a modern fairy story.  The landscape 
is held in being by the sorcery of capital, and the enchantment […] is woven by the 
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Picturesque” (164).  Modern factories produced the decorative tiles, bricks, and other 
materials out of which Gothic Revival structures were built. This dynamic, in which 
contemporary nineteenth century industrial processes enabled the construction of 
“Gothic” buildings, illustrates one way in which an emphasis upon surfaces is 
fundamental to the Gothic; edifices such as Hetton Abbey were made to appear 
antiquated, though this appearance could only be produced through contemporary means. 
Waugh’s novel focuses squarely upon the fundamental role played by modernity itself in 
creating “Gothic England.”  Though Hetton Abbey purports to be an emblem of 
England’s ancient and aristocratic past, for Waugh it embodies a specifically late 
modernist conundrum wherein history itself seems to function as a veneer that overlays a 
vacuous present.  
Tony, however, is clearly in thrall to Hetton’s Gothic enchantments but willfully 
blind to the modern processes and conditions that produce them.  Hetton’s battlements, 
clock tower, “ecclesiastical gloom,” stained-glass windows, brass bedsteads, tapestries, 
and other Gothic features “were a source of constant delight and exultation to Tony; 
things of tender memory and proud possession” (15).  For Tony, as for his nineteenth 
century forebears, this Gothic structure itself participates in the “modern fairy story” that 
naturalizes the Lasts’ land ownership and influence. Hetton Abbey literally replaces the 
genuine history of the estate with a fetishized version of the past that projects the Last’s 
position back into the Middle Ages.   
Because Hetton Abbey is a Gothic Revival structure, it is neither authentic nor, on 
the scale of English history, even “old.”18 The “county Guide Book” states: 
                                                
18 Waugh’s description of one of the London social clubs of which Tony is a member exemplifies this 
dynamic: “The air of antiquity pervading Bratt’s, derived from its elegant Georgian façade, and finely 
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Between the villages of Hetton and Compton Last lies the extension park of 
Hetton Abbey.   This, formerly one of the notable houses of the county, was 
entirely rebuilt in 1864 in the Gothic style and is now devoid of interest.  The 
grounds are open to the public daily until sunset and the house may be viewed on 
application by writing.  It contains some good portraits and furniture.  The terrace 
commands a fine view. (14) 
Tony’s ancestors razed the original Gothic structure and built a Gothic Revival estate in 
its place.  Hetton is, therefore, a monument to the mid-nineteenth century’s notion of 
contemporaneity: in 1864, to rebuild in a Gothic style was to be in keeping with the 
fashion of the times. By recasting Hetton Abbey in a historically significant style, Tony’s 
ancestors rendered it historically insignificant.  
 Hetton Abbey’s status as a tourist attraction—albeit one that seems to have fallen 
out of favor—furthermore underscores its inauthenticity.  The notion that the house “may 
be viewed” emphasizes the importance of appearance and impressions to Hetton’s 
purported historicity. Tourists’ gratification upon viewing historical sites occurs in 
response not to the presence of actual historical objects and elements, but the feel of 
historicity.  As is true of all tourist attractions, Hetton Abbey is only worth seeing insofar 
as it provides an elaborate demonstration of that which it purports to embody.  The more 
encaustic tiles and castellar features it displays, therefore, the more “historical” it feels to 
the viewer.  Tony is conscious of the crucial role that appearances play in conjuring the 
authenticity with which he wants to endow Hetton: he escorts all of his guests throughout 
                                                                                                                                            
paneled rooms, was entirely spurious, for it was a club of recent origin, founded in the burst of bonhomie 
immediately after the war” (11).  This is perhaps the novel’s most explicit acknowledgement that, for the 
characters in this novel, history itself is merely an “air of antiquity.”  The façade and the paneling in this 
scene literalizes these characters’ “papering over” of their banal existences.  
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the home, pointing out its Gothic Revival features, despite their boredom and lack of 
interest.  Ironically, the home is “devoid of interest” precisely as a result of its having 
been reconstructed in the Gothic Revival style.  Though Tony persists in a belief that the 
appearance of historical authenticity constitutes the thing itself, his guests’ boredom and 
Hetton’s lack of status as a tourist attraction underscores both the home’s inauthenticity 
and the absurdity of Tony’s single-minded mission to bestow historical significance upon 
a structure that is thoroughly a product of its own time.  
 In the Victorian era, the production of “history” followed a dynamic similar to the 
construction of the Gothic Revival version of Hetton Abbey. Like Tony, Victorian 
England aimed to preserve, but in fact created, its own version of historical England.  
Victorians did so by embracing a projection of medievalism.  Lorretta M. Holloway and 
Jennifer Palmgren claim that throughout the nineteenth century, “popular culture 
embraced medievalism so much that the historic Middle Ages became, in many ways, of 
secondary importance to the majority of Victorians” (1).  As is true of Tony’s notion of 
Victorian “history,” for the Victorians, everything about the medieval era became a 
matter of interpretation, “not an ‘authentic past’ but an authentic fantasy” (Holloway, 
Palmgren 1). The dynamic of the cultural production of the Victorian era, as is true of 
Hetton Abbey, is to raze historical fact and reconstruct in the style of the medieval past.  
Tony participates in the imaginative reconstruction of English history by 
embracing the “Arthurian” strand of the Victorian medievalism. The house’s bedrooms 
explicitly invoke this Arthurian “past”:  
 the bedrooms with their brass bedsteads, each with a frieze of Gothic text, each 
named from Malory, Yseult, Elaine, Mordred and Merlin, Gawaine and Bedivere, 
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Lancelot, Perceval, Tristram, Galahad, his own dressing room, Morgan leFay, and 
Brenda’s Guinevere, where the bed stood on a dais, the walls were hung with 
tapestry, the fireplace was like a tomb of the thirteenth century… (15) 
The bedrooms are named not for extant historical figures, but “from Malory;” their 
source is a poetic and narrative rendering of an imagined strain of English history.  This 
is, nevertheless, the history Tony means to evoke with the tapestries and tomb-like 
fireplaces.  These decorative features are, of course, Gothic Revival reproductions of 
thirteenth century features; they are physical objects that produce an appearance of 
historical authenticity.  But they, like the Arthurian figures for which the bedrooms are 
named, are in fact emblems of the eras in which they were produced, and of those eras’ 
self-styled narratives of cultural affirmation.   
For Brenda, these bedrooms are manifestations of the house’s dated decrepitude, 
but for Tony they are “things of tender memory and proud possession” (15). They are 
among the things with which he had grown up that “were a source of constant delight and 
exultation” (15).  They feature largely in his memory because he associates them with the 
happy childhood that he spent at Hetton Abbey; the Arthurian rooms are a repository for 
Tony’s nostalgia.  Importantly, these rooms are also things of “proud possession.”  Tony 
owns the rooms, the tapestries they contain, and the window that looks out onto the 
“spires of six churches” (15).  More significantly, however, this moment in the text 
implies Tony’s ownership of the Arthurian characters to which the bedrooms refer.  
“Yseult,” “Mordred,” and “Galahad” are things of “proud possession;” this indicates the 
extent to which the narrative of an imagined English past not only conditions his memory 
but is also commodifiable.  Tony turns the heroes and villains of Arthurian legend into 
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rooms he can possess and then decorate in a Gothic Revival style.  They are thereby 
subsumed into the narrative of the past to which Tony subscribes.  This narrative depends 
upon the commodifiability of medieval culture and aesthetics even as it obfuscates this 
commodification.  The very things that exist in Tony’s memory as warm reminders of 
England’s noble past, then, become commodities alongside the chromium plating and 
sheepskin rugs that Brenda covets. Just as the Gothic Revival commodified the Gothic 
itself, Tony’s “possession” of his Arthurian bedrooms commodifies the Arthurian strand 
of medieval culture.   
The blurring of memory and possession in Tony’s imagination exemplifies the 
predominance of “spectacle and simulacra” that Miller identifies as fundamental to the 
late modernist sensibility (62). Tony’s worldview in A Handful of Dust blurs the 
boundary between memory, wherein past phenomena continue into the present as 
memory, and possession, wherein phenomena associated with the past (even an imagined 
one) become material objects that can be owned. This is consistent with the 
“deauthenticated world” in which Tony lives; his home is a spectacle devoted to an 
imagined history, and this version of history is itself a simulacrum without an original.  
Everything that for Tony embodies “memory and proud possession” is inauthentic; as 
such, his devotion to the appearance of historicity becomes a ritualized behavior separate 
from any authentic social or intellectual connection (Miller 43).  This is a manifestation 
of the “lowering of the threshold of difference between subjects and objects, their 
unconscious assimilation to an objective environment” that characterizes late modernism 
(43).  Tony is immersed in a world of objects with which he endows historical and 
emotional significance that is nevertheless based upon an illusion. Tony’s self-conception 
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has become inseparable from the commodities and inauthentic trappings of the invented 
history to which he devotes himself; the conflation of his selfhood and his “things of 
proud possession” thereby enacts the “disruption of stable differences” that Miller detects 
in late modernist fiction (62).   
 The spirit of tradition that Hetton purports to embody is furthermore caught up in 
an ethos of trendiness and consumption.  Tony is sure that the house’s Gothic and 
Arthurian elements will come back into vogue, despite their distinctly unstylish 
appearance in the 1930s. He knows the bedrooms are not in the fashion: whereas “twenty 
years ago people had liked half timber and old pewter; now it was urns and colonnades” 
(15).   But Tony is convinced that “the time would come, perhaps in John Andrew’s day, 
when opinion would reinstate Hetton in its proper place” (15). The restoration of Hetton’s 
“proper place” is associated not with Tony’s reputation as a landowner or the profitability 
of his estate, but with the home’s aesthetic style. In this way, the novel reveals his notions 
of tradition to be another face of Brenda’s approach to the world.  Moreover, Tony’s 
belief that the Gothic Revival style will come back into vogue is further evidence that this 
aesthetic representation of history as spectacle will continue to spin out into the future.  
One trend after another will be subsumed into the ongoing commodification of a history 
that was always an illusion. 
The novel thereby insists that Tony’s “historical” sensibility is every bit as 
vacuous as the hyper-modern ethos that initially appears as its opposite, and which 
Brenda and her social circle embody. Tony’s and Brenda’s first scene emphasizes their 
differences and therefore seems to establish a distinction between them.  Tony first 
appears laying in bed, happily planning the improvements he will make to augment 
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Hetton’s appearance of historical authenticity, while Brenda reads the London papers in 
her modern bed next door: “Brenda lay on the dais.  She had insisted on a modern bed” 
(16). While “all over England people were waking up, queasy and despondent,”  “Tony 
lay for ten minutes very happily planning the renovation of his ceiling” (16).  Fantasizing 
about how to make his home appear more historically significant distinguishes Tony from 
his contemporary peers, who are presumably occupied with more contemporary matters. 
The more typical—and despondent—English citizen evidently has no such preoccupation 
with the past. As the novel progresses, however, Waugh insists that Tony’s obsession 
with historicity is merely an alternate manifestation of the obsession with trendiness 
enacted by Brenda and her ilk.  
The necessity of availing himself of modern manufacturing and construction 
practices in his quest to make Hetton Abbey appear historical highlights the extent to 
which Tony’s quest depends upon consumption.  In order to maintain Hetton, Tony, like 
his Gothic Revival forebears, must participate in modern consumer culture by purchasing 
factory-produced goods. Waugh thereby reveals that Tony’s pursuit of the past is 
dependent upon the present; in fact, modern phenomena are precisely what enable his 
delusional pursuit of the past.  Tony is, therefore, more like his English compatriots (and 
Brenda’s shallow friends) than at first it seems; he, too, is obsessed with surfaces and 
consumes contemporary products in a manic pursuit of perfecting these surfaces.  
Brenda’s chromium plating is just a contemporary version of Tony’s encaustic tiles; both 
literalize the preoccupation with appearances that Waugh perceives as a late modernist 
affliction.  
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Therefore, though Brenda and Tony initially appear to embody two fundamentally 
opposed orientations toward contemporary life, the contrast between them is actually a 
means for Waugh to satirize the falseness of this dichotomy. Brenda, who immerses 
herself in chic, urban modernity in London, and Tony, who identifies with Gothic 
Revival England, express two superficial faces of modernity.  Both are obsessed with 
keeping up appearances by engaging in the practices common to their “set;” both are 
vigorous consumers; both highly value décor consistent with their respective aesthetics.  
The spouses understand themselves to be fundamentally different: Brenda thinks Tony 
“madly feudal” and “detests” the house, while Tony “gets rushed off his feet in London” 
(39, 36, 41). But both are obsessed with surfaces: appearing “the part,” having the right 
wall coverings, playing the role they’ve chosen for themselves.  
In this sense, the spouses’ vacuous sensibility and manner of living enact the 
“contemporary ‘derealization’ of reality, its progressive replacement with simulacra and 
spectacles” that Miller detects in late modernist writing (Miller 44). Tony models his 
selfhood upon the estate owner of the nineteenth century, and his habits, emotions and 
actions are all conditioned by his effort to fulfill this role.  Conversely, Brenda wishes to 
become a preeminent London socialite; all of her energies are put toward playing this 
part. Tony’s and Brenda’s existences are conditioned by the scripts they have chosen.  As 
a result, the become performers in the play that is their lives. In the late modernist era, 
Miller argues, the present becomes flattened into a scenario, and life itself becomes a 
spectacle (44).19  Waugh’s Gothic satire depicts this flattened present.  Therefore 
                                                
19 In making this assertion, Miller paraphrases Wyndham Lewis’s Men Without Art (1934).  
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Waugh’s  “form,” like the work of Lewis, Barnes, and Beckett, reflects and reflects 
critically upon the loss of a stable, authentic social ground (Miller 43).   
 
Waugh’s Redeployment of Gothic Form 
Waugh’s most explicit references to the Gothic form occur in his rather 
inelegantly named chapters “English Gothic,” “English Gothic-II,” and “English Gothic-
III.”  Waugh’s repetition seems to insist on the “gothicness” of these chapters, even 
though they are not thematically gothic: no monsters, bats, or shadows appear in these 
chapters, and their “creepiest” element is arguably the characters’ callousness.  Waugh’s 
flattening of the affective component of the Gothic furthermore prevents these chapters 
from being melodramatic or frightening.20  Their being delineated as Gothic, however, 
extends the subtle critique of modernist invocations of the Gothic implied by the novel’s 
title and epigraph.  “English Gothic” narrates the breakdown of Tony and Brenda’s 
marriage; it is the novel’s longest chapter and focuses most squarely on the shallowness 
of Brenda and her ilk.  The subject of “English Gothic-II” is Tony’s pretended infidelity 
at a seaside resort; this will facilitate a quick and easy divorce, though Brenda’s affair 
with John Beaver is the real reason for their split.  “English Gothic-III” is the novel’s 
very brief final chapter wherein Tony’s cousins, who inherit Hetton after Tony’s apparent 
                                                
20 One oft-cited scene in “English Gothic-II” is an exception to this claim.  Tony sees the necessity of 
faking his infidelity as “phantasmagoric, and even gruesome” (137).  It provokes a moment of realization 
wherein he senses that “the whole reasonable and decent constitution of things, the sum of all he had 
experienced or learned to expect, were an inconspicuous, inconsiderable object mislaid somewhere on the 
dressing table” (137).  This recognition of the diminution of his life’s significance magnifies the “all-
encompassing chaos that shrieked about his ears” (137-8).  Though this is certainly a moment of insight in 
which Tony frames his horror in explicitly Gothic terms—phantasm, gruesomeness, shrieking—it is 
incongruous with the rest of the chapter.  This moment of melodrama thereby serves to underscore the 
shallowness with which Tony responds to his subsequent humiliations, and the extent to which even a 
moment of Gothic horror cannot bring him face to face with the role his own empty investments have 
played in bringing about his fate.  
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demise in South America, go about the daily business of running a silver-fox farm from 
Hetton’s stables; this is the means by which they hope to continue funding the estate.  
Each of these chapters narrates an intrinsically contemporary event.  Callous infidelity, 
divorce, and the displacement of the aristocracy by profit-making business are 
manifestations of precisely the kind of breakdown of authentic relationships and 
traditional institutions to which high modernism was an aesthetic response.   
Waugh’s naming of these developments as “Gothic” underscores the degree to 
which the Gothic has, within modernism, become a way of naming or categorizing the 
fearsome quality of contemporary social phenomena.  As this project’s analysis of the 
Gothic elements in The Waste Land previously explored, traditionally Gothic themes and 
elements are instrumental in Eliot’s expression of modern fear and alienation in 
particular. By defining as Gothic the distinctly modern developments that take place in 
what are consistently cynically funny chapters, Waugh reveals the overly pat use to 
which modernism put the Gothic. Whereas modernist aesthetics capitalized upon the 
affect traditionally produced by Gothic narrative’s emphases on horror and mystery, 
Waugh’s late modernist Gothic satire flattens this affect, thereby morphing the form to 
express more precisely the “deauthentication of life” that characterizes his era (Miller 
42).   
Furthermore, content that might, in another novel, undergo “Gothic” treatment 
occurs in chapters that are not titled “Gothic.”  This emphasizes Waugh’s subtle critique 
of modernism’s straightforward invocation of the Gothic.  The Last’s son’s death occurs 
in a chapter entitled “Hard Cheese on Tony;” this flippant tone ironizes this chapter’s 
disturbing central event, to which characters exhibit an underwhelming emotional 
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response.  Waugh’s seemingly inverted naming scheme for his chapters thereby 
announces the extent to which his use of the Gothic is not a straightforward invocation of 
its fearsome elements.  Rather, the Gothic becomes not a category or way of naming a 
narrative tendency, but a complex engagement of a conventionalized form to engage with 
the social and historical conditions particular to Waugh’s era.  Rather than capitalizing 
upon the frightening elements of the Gothic, Waugh undoes the conventions of the form 
to innovate a discomfiting portrayal of the “‘derealization’ of reality” between the world 
wars (Miller 44).   
 
Waugh’s Recalibration of Modernist Narrative 
Importantly, the style of Waugh’s novel—satire—mandates the absence of 
interiority. Because Waugh’s satire is made possible by a devotion to surfaces—of 
objects, of relationships, of individuals’ psyches—it is therefore antithetical to 
modernism’s investment in the expression of characters’ inner lives.  In A Handful of 
Dust in particular, the satire facilitates both the novel’s humor and its critique of 
modernity’s obsession with surfaces.  Jonathan Greenberg refers to Waugh’s technique as 
an “external method,” which “does not so much deny the interiority of the self, but rather 
suggests that it is oddly unknowable, buried beneath layers of social custom and 
ritualized expression” (356).21 For Greenberg, intimate knowledge of characters—for 
                                                
21 James McNaughton makes a similar argument about Beckett’s approach during the same era.  He claims 
that Beckett’s fiction discloses a central theme: “everything from modernist postures and political positions 
to images and phrases appear to him increasingly repetitive, imitative, and, in the sense that the usual 
appears novel, provincial” (56).  The layers of custom and ritualized expression that paper over Waugh’s 
characters’ emptiness is an alternate manifestation of the project that McNaughton claims is at the heart of 
Beckett’s fiction in the 1930s: an investigation of “how ideology is sustained, and how simplified 
interpretations repeated with old words shape experience long after those words have ceased to match 
social reality” (67).  McNaughton’s analysis of Beckett’s work focuses on its politically engaged 
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both readers and other figures in the text—is prevented by the cultural and social habits 
that have become, for them, rote performances. Waugh’s “external method” thereby 
formally enacts the “flattening of the present into a scenario” (Miller 44).  Just as social 
customs and ritualized expressions bury the authentic self, so does Waugh’s satire make 
intimate knowledge of a character’s psyche “unknowable” for his readers. 
This marks a profound departure from the emphasis high modernist fiction placed 
upon exploring the deep recesses of characters’ consciousness.  Modernist narrative 
techniques—stream of consciousness narration, a preponderance of free indirect 
discourse, first-person point of view (even if an unreliable narrator’s)—promised to 
reveal characters’ inner lives and contradictions. Waugh’s nonsynchronous Gothic satire, 
written in third-person point of view and laden with dialogue, refuses these narrative 
tenets of modernism.  His novel is instead composed in a spirit of reportage; “outward 
signs” are the only means by which to judge characters (Greenberg 355).  
This stylistic choice is fundamental to Waugh’s elaboration of the ritualized and 
aestheticized nature of social life in the 1930s.  The characters’ self-knowledge goes no 
deeper than is (or can be) reflected in Waugh’s “external method” (Greenberg 356).   The 
novel’s formal character can therefore be understood as a recalibration of narrative 
techniques to the specific cultural phenomena and historical realities at play in the novel.  
Whereas the pyrotechnic innovations of modernism sought to express what lay in the 
deepest recesses of modern subjects’ minds, such techniques ill befit an era afflicted by 
the transformation of authentic human experience into spectacle.  Waugh’s satirical 
“external method” thereby reveals the limits of modernist narrative modes: it is not the 
                                                                                                                                            
dimensions; though Waugh’s novel does not indicate this type of engagement, it, like the work of Beckett 
and other late modernists, evaluates “the failures of modernism to accomplish its critique” (56).   
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exploration of interiority but of surfaces that can yield timely insight into Waugh’s era 
and culture.  
 Tony’s journey to the South American wilderness late in the novel brings him 
face to face with precisely the type of physical and existential challenges that would, in a 
high modernist novel, be likely to precede deep self-examination and discovery.  But 
because this is Tony Last, and because he is the central character in a late modernist 
Gothic satire, no such self-awareness is provoked by his harrowing experiences.  After 
Tony’s divorce proceedings are underway, he elects to leave England and join an 
eccentric young Dr. Messinger on an expedition to discover a mythical city in South 
America, located in what “may be Brazil or Dutch Guiana” (157).  Tony feels that going 
away is the conduct expected of a husband under the circumstances, and for the time 
being, the associations of Hetton are poisoned for him (156-7).  It pains him to think of 
running into Brenda’s lover or other old friends at the social clubs he frequents; so it is 
“with this feeling of evasion dominant in his mind” that he initially plans to embark on a 
cruise or other “civilized” journey.  But when Tony meets Dr. Messinger, he becomes 
absorbed in the doctor’s narrative about a legendary city which the doctor claims exists in 
the folklore of local people, but which non-native people have yet to discover. Tony is so 
taken by this description of the City that he signs up on the spot to join the expedition.  
 Tony imagines the City as an embodiment of the Gothic Revival.  This idealized 
city becomes an illusion that sustains him throughout the arduous sea journey away from 
England and the even more threatening trek through the South American wilderness.  In 
this respect, the City fulfills the same role as Hetton: it is an illusion that appears 
antithetical to—and a safe haven from—the cruel and shallow nature of modern life.  
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Tony “had a clear picture of it in his mind.  It was Gothic in character, all vanes and 
pinnacles, gargoyles, battlements, groining and tracery, pavilions and terraces” (160).  In 
Tony’s imagination, the City is a glorious embodiment of Gothic Revival aesthetics; 
clearly, he has not divested himself of his delusional faith in the power of an illusory past 
to salve his modern wounds.  Waugh’s depiction of Tony as persistently besotted with 
this imagined Gothic version of the City underscores Tony’s devotion to illusion and 
fakery. Tony continues to seek authentication by associating himself with the values of 
his ancestors, which are emblematized in the façade of Gothic Revival aesthetics. The 
pinnacles and gargoyles that Tony imagines will adorn the City are a manifestation of the 
total containment of his consciousness by the narrative that governs both his 
understanding of history and, more fundamentally, his life.   
 Waugh’s novel furthermore recalibrates the modernist treatment of travel abroad, 
wherein journeys to distant places prompt a traumatic and authentic engagement with 
characters’ deepest selves.  A central and early example of this modernist trope is 
Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out (1915).  This novel exemplifies early modernist 
fiction’s characteristic depiction of journeys abroad: they are occasions for traumatic 
revelations about deep truths.  In such texts, characters confront the ugly realities of 
Britain’s influence in the colonies and beyond, have disturbing encounters with native 
people and environments, and endure forced self-examinations that typically bring them 
into more intimate contact with their deepest selves.  The Voyage Out, Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness (1899), and E.M. Forster’s A Room with a View (1908) and A Passage 
to India (1924) all conform loosely to these modernist themes.  A central element of these 
novels is the degree to which journeys abroad bring characters more closely into 
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acquaintanceship not with the people they meet (though this occurs), but with their own 
interior consciousness. Waugh’s depiction forecloses this possibility, however:  his 
characters are so thoroughly circumscribed by their rote adherence to empty narratives 
that no authentic selves exist deep within to be plumbed.   
 Woolf’s early modernist female bildungsroman and Waugh’s late modernist 
Gothic satire are formally and stylistically distinct.  The journeys away from England that 
their central characters undertake are, however, uncannily similar. Tony and Rachel 
Vinrace, Woolf’s young female protagonist, both travel to South America.  Their ocean 
journeys take place on ships populated by an idiosyncratic cast of characters.  Most 
significantly, both Rachel and Tony contract fever in the South American wilderness.  
Fever not only brings these characters face to face with their own mortality, but also 
prompts a backward-looking assessment of their lives.  Though these novels depict 
“voyages out” that bear similar outlines, they were written at very different historical 
moments.  In this sense, they exemplify the formal, stylistic, and thematic distinctions 
that characterize travel narratives at the outset of modernism and during an era of late 
modernism, respectively.  In A Handful of Dust, Waugh engages the tenets of the 
modernist story of travel abroad, but his novel communicates a very different orientation 
toward modernity: his central character’s experience is characterized not by epiphany, but 
by a persistent lack of self-awareness.    
 In The Voyage Out, Rachel’s entire story is one of growing self-possession and 
self-knowledge.22  Rachel’s journey to South America is an important step in her 
                                                
22 Importantly, Rachel dies before she can act upon her newly gained self-knowledge.  Jed Esty’s 
Unseasonable Youth (2013) theorizes the phenomena of “frozen youth” and “uneven development” 
featured in several modernist novels (including The Voyage Out), wherein the bildungsroman plot is short-
circuited or spun out endlessly.  In Rachel’s case, fever kills her before she can become the woman she 
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integration into her social class now that she is of marriageable age; prior to this trip, she 
is sheltered, absorbed in her own musical pursuits, and socially ungraceful.  The cast of 
characters that surrounds her on the journey observes the start of her evolution into a 
charming hostess and mature woman.  It is the natural outgrowth of this process that she 
should become engaged to Terence, another young person poised for induction into his 
social class by way of a successful marriage.  But in this text, as is true of Woolf’s fiction 
in general, events are not the most significant aspect of the narrative.  Rather, the 
modernist preoccupation with the psyche predominates.  Indeed, Woolf’s first novel 
offers early hints of the deep exploration of individuals’ interiority that characterizes—
and distinguishes—Woolf’s later novels, including Mrs. Dalloway (1925) and To The 
Lighthouse (1927).  Late in the The Voyage Out, Rachel reflects at length upon the degree 
to which she is simultaneously becoming fit for civilization and increasingly aware of 
civilization’s oppressiveness.  The novel is, therefore, not strictly the story of Rachel’s 
admittance into upper-class English society, but her coming of age into conscious 
selfhood. 
Just after Rachel becomes engaged to Terence, and immediately before the fever 
that will kill her becomes apparent, she expresses her growing awareness of the rigidity 
of the social codes that govern her life in an extended reflection, presented in Woolf’s 
trademark free indirect discourse.  It indicates Rachel’s complex recognition that her 
most intimate self cannot be fully manifested within her social milieu, but that the mores 
that rule her existence also provide security: 
                                                                                                                                            
envisions in her moments of epiphany. Furthermore, the socially prescriptive culture in which she lives 
forecloses the possibility that she can live in a manner fully commensurate to her character and her desires.  
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She felt herself amazingly secure as she sat in her arm-chair, and able to review 
… the entire past, tenderly and humorously, as if she had been turning in a fog for 
a long time, and could now see exactly where she had turned.  For the methods by 
which she had reached her present position, seemed to her very strange, and the 
strangest thing about them was that she had not known where they were leading 
her.  That was the strange thing, that one did not know where one was going, or 
what one wanted, and followed blindly, suffering so much in secret, always 
unprepared and amazed and knowing nothing; but one thing led to another and by 
degrees something had formed itself out of nothing, and so one reached at last this 
calm, this quiet, this certainty, and it was this process that people called living. 
(306) 
Now that she is engaged, Rachel is secure; she now has a designated and esteemed role as 
a future wife and mother.  She is mystified as to how she came to inhabit this role, 
however: she has been, up to this point, “following blindly” the example of those who 
came before her—her aunts, the Dalloways—and whose example her social class 
obligates her to emulate. But in this moment, Rachel comes to recognize that she, like 
other women of her class, has emerged into what “people called living.”  She possesses, 
suddenly, a deep self-awareness: she recognizes her own lack of agency and the power 
that cultural norms have over her behavior and her future even as she capitulates to—and 
even welcomes the security ensured by—these phenomena.  She is suddenly in 
possession of a profound understanding of the relationship between herself and her 
culture.  
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In this respect, Rachel is fundamentally unlike Tony Last; the culmination of her 
story is a profound self-examination that facilitates a more authentic understanding of her 
culture of which she was previously incapable.  In contrast, Tony, though brought face to 
face with both his own mortality and the contingency of his role within his own culture, 
does not engage in this sort of self-reflection.  Over his lifetime, he too has been “turning 
in a fog for a long time:” he unreflectively enacts the part of upper class English boy, 
then young man, then estate owner. Unlike Rachel, his continued and delusional belief in 
the solidity of a culture that is, in reality, both artificial and in decline prevents him from 
any recognition of its role in determining the character of his life or his fate.  Whereas 
Rachel’s revelation is an insightful glimpse into the role her culture and class have played 
in determining who she has become, Tony’s lack of insight into the inauthenticity of his 
own culture prevents the kind of modernist revelation that Rachel experiences.   
Tony’s lack of interiority and self-revelation is symptomatic of the late modernist 
orientation of Waugh’s novel. A Handful of Dust’s narrative depicts the transformation of 
life itself into spectacle.  Tony’s existence has itself become a play in which is he the 
central player; this is the “generalized mimetism” to which Miller refers (43). The 
persistence of Tony’s delusion is attributable not to his naiveté or exceptionality but to 
the nature of life during the late modernist era.  The modernist preoccupation with 
interiority gives way to a deauthentication of life so complete that neither travel abroad, 
nor mortal illness, nor divorce, nor the death of his son, can force Tony into an 
investigation of his deepest self.  Indeed, Waugh’s novel reveals that Tony has no 
authentic self.  He is, rather, so circumscribed by the culture in which he lives that his 
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novel ends not with a modernist epiphany but his relegation to an eternal purgatory in 
which he is no closer to self-knowledge than he was while ensconced at Hetton Abbey. 
 
Waugh’s Subversion of the Imperial Adventure Narrative 
 
 Upon Tony’s departure to South America, A Handful of Dust invokes yet another 
seemingly outmoded literary genre: the imperial adventure novel. Waugh’s rendering of 
Tony’s doomed adventure to the edge of civilization maintains the lineaments of imperial 
adventure even as it divests the form of its original function. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the imperial adventure novel popularized stories of young men dispatched to the 
edge of empire to confront and conquer native environments and people, thereby 
exercising the power of British civility over barbarism.  The literary form thereby 
affirmed and bolstered the British imperial project at a time when other world powers 
(including the United States) were emergent and Queen Victoria’s holdings across the 
globe were being divided amongst European nations.   
In A Handful of Dust, Waugh empties these conventions of their affirming 
function by depicting the inevitable failure of Tony’s effort to become a conquering hero. 
In an era of imperial contraction during which a notion of imperialism as a noble British 
civilizing mission has long since lost traction, the imperial adventure story’s role in 
bolstering empire is no longer resonant; nevertheless its features remain codified and 
consistent. Like the Arthurian romances for which Hetton’s bedrooms are named, the 
imperial adventure form—in its conventional manifestation—has ceased to be a timely 
response to ongoing historical predicaments, though as a literary form it is coherent as 
ever.  It is precisely these narratives’ untimeliness that makes them an ideal ground for 
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Waugh’s late modernist reworking of the imperial adventure form, which underscores 
that a narrative of imperial expansion is yet one more story that has ceased to give 
meaning to individuals’ existence both at home and abroad. 
 Adventure fiction for young readers became a veritable industry from the 1830s 
on (Brantlinger 31).  In these narratives, heroes either emigrated or traveled to the far 
reaches of the British empire; they were typically young men dispatched to do Britain’s 
work in India, the Caribbean, and Africa.  In most imperial adventure fiction, Patrick 
Brantlinger claims, “boy-heroes are forever proving their manliness through their pluck 
and derring-do” (33).  These novels frequently imitated either Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
or Scott’s Waverley novels, or sometimes both; the form was always highly 
conventionalized (Brantlinger 30). According to Brantlinger, “adventure fiction is 
typically focused on the future: crossing frontiers and exploring new territories, the white 
heroes are pathfinders for the Empire and civilization.  Almost always, civilization is 
equated both with the supposed superiority of the white race and with colonization by 
white settlers” (30).  In these novels, pathfinding heroes discovered territories that were 
yet to be annexed by the Empire.  As such, they gave literary expression to the principles 
behind Britain’s ongoing imperial projects in the colonies: the heroes’ adventures were 
undertaken in service of adding future wealth and territory to the home nation.   
 Waugh’s novel, however, undoes the orientation toward the future exhibited in 
imperial adventure fiction.  While Tony certainly “crosses frontiers” and “explores new 
territories,” he is not a pathfinder on behalf of Britain as he does so.  The most obvious 
sense in which this is true is that Tony does not return or report back to England; what 
discoveries he makes remain his alone, and his adventure will bestow no future benefit 
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upon his home nation.  More central to Waugh’s method of morphing genres’ 
conventions in service of his late modernism, however, is Tony’s lack of “pluck and 
derring-do” (33).  Though he fancies that he embodies the competence and authority of 
England’s ruling class, Tony has no skills or abilities that might make him a competent 
colonial adventurer; he is the very antithesis of the boy heroes featured in nineteenth 
century imperial adventure fiction. Tony is entirely dependent upon Dr. Messinger, who 
translates from the natives’ several languages, informs Tony what is safe and unsafe to 
eat and drink, navigates on their behalf, and negotiates with the native people for 
transportation and assistance. Left to his own resources, Tony’s “adventure” would have 
ended the moment he stepped off the ship upon which they arrived in South America.  
Though his journey itself resembles those undertaken by the “boy-heroes” of nineteenth 
century imperial adventure fiction, then, his own limitations make him entirely unfit for 
adventure at the edge of civilization.  
Moreover, Waugh’s insistent reversal of the tenets of the form reveals that the 
imperial adventure narrative is yet another empty script that continues to condition 
individuals’ behavior and expectations despite its total lack of resonance in the late 
modernist era.  The narrative of imperial adventure is one story among many that Waugh 
reveals to be merely a set of conventions. Despite their apparent untimeliness, however, 
Waugh’s deformation of these forms reveals their utility in confronting and processing 
uniquely late modernist phenomena. Tony’s initial attitude about the journey, which is 
confident and ignorant in equal parts, reflects the extent to which the imperial adventure 
narrative conditions his understanding of what can transpire when an English man of 
status ventures into the wilderness. Tony’s confidence is baseless, but is rooted in his 
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knowledge of the plots that constitute imperial adventure fiction.  His unreflective 
enactment of a script whose plot is determined by this highly conventionalized genre 
proves yet again that the meaning of his life lies not deep within the recesses of his self, 
but rather consists in the playing-out of already established narratives.  
Waugh inverts imperial adventure fiction’s typical orientation to the future by 
depicting Tony’s conception of his adventures as reenactments of past discoveries and 
epic journeys.  Throughout the nineteenth century, adventure fiction worked to affirm and 
bolster ongoing imperial projects via depictions of competent British males taming wild 
environments and populations.  At the time of A Handful of Dust’s publication in 1934, 
however, the empire was no longer in a state of expansion, but contraction; British fiction 
could therefore no longer project a larger and more illustrious empire into the future.  
Tony’s orientation to the past reflects this reality.  His journey is undertaken with a 
“feeling of evasion dominant in his mind;” his primary motivation for leaving England is 
not primarily to discover new territory, but to avoid his painful past (157).  Furthermore, 
the imagery and historical contexts that condition Tony’s imagination about the nature of 
his adventure are rooted not in the future, but in the past.  He discusses the quest for the 
legendary city to a fellow passenger in the following way: 
Peruvian emigrants in the middle ages and their long caravan working through the 
mountains and forests, llamas packed with works of intricate craftsmanship; of the 
continual rumor percolating to the coast and luring adventurers up into the forests; 
of the route they would take up the rivers, the cutting through the bush along 
Indian trails and across untravelled country; of the stream they might strike high 
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up and how, Dr. Messinger said, they would make woodskin canoes and take to 
the water again. (163-4) 
Tony imagines that he shares a kinship with ancient adventurers who have travelled the 
same territory in centuries past.  The reader, who knows that Tony is neither industrious 
nor trained to navigate such a perilous journey, can easily recognize that this is a story 
that Tony is telling himself.  This narrative is, furthermore, a story that Dr. Messinger has 
told.  As is indicated by the acknowledgement “Dr. Messinger said,” Tony’s description 
of their adventure is merely a rote recital of the story he has heard from Dr. Messinger.  
This is a concrete demonstration of the extent to which Tony’s very ability to imagine is 
conditioned by the stories that he has heard. In this way, Waugh insists that the 
conventions of narrative delimit the imagination.  As such, they are constitutive of the 
“scripting” of reality that characterizes late modernism.   
 Tony finishes his monologue about his upcoming adventure with a final flourish: 
“finally they would arrive under the walls of the city like the Vikings at Byzantium” 
(164).  This last assertion brings together several aspects of Waugh’s critique and 
redeployment of narrative convention: Tony’s imagination, here, is limited to facts he 
remembers from history class, and his conception of himself as a “Viking” is furthermore 
consistent with his identification with the middle ages. 23 Whereas the “boy-heroes” of 
nineteenth century imperial adventure novels add to the empire by discovering and 
conquering new territories; Tony imagines himself as enacting a triumphant discovery 
that has already occurred.  The total circumscription of his consciousness by 
                                                
23 Later, when Tony and Dr. Messinger have penetrated further into the wilderness than any map 
documents, Dr. Messinger declares “From now onwards the map is valueless to us.”  At Dr. Messinger’s 
words, “memories of Tony’s private school came back to him,” “of inky little desks and a coloured picture 
of a Viking raid, of Mr. Trotter who had taught him history and wore very vivid ties” (177). 
 119 
 
conventionalized narratives forecloses the possibility that Tony can imagine a future.  
This is consistent with the late modernist dispensation of writers who responded to a 
modernist movement “grinding to a halt and an aesthetic on the threshold of dissolution” 
by sinking “faithlessly into a present devoid of future” (Miller 14). A Handful of Dust is, 
therefore, a manifestation of the “closure of the horizon of the future” that is 
characteristic of late modernist fiction (Miller 13). 
 
Heart of Darkness, Temporal Disorientation, and the Gothic  
 Tony’s journey deep into the South American jungle is reminiscent of Charlie 
Marlow’s imperial adventure into the African wilderness in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
(1899). Conrad’s novella explores the moral ambivalence of European imperial projects; 
indeed this proto-modernist text’s continued significance is due in large part to its richly 
layered and skeptical engagement with the rationale for imperialism, the ethical 
conundrums it produces, and its effects upon both its agents and its victims. Heart of 
Darkness narrates a journey away from England that depicts the complex consequences 
that occur when individuals privileged by England’s power and stability penetrate into 
unknown and wild territories.  In this sense, it provides a productive comparator for the 
strange ending of Waugh’s novel, wherein Tony leaves England and journeys 
progressively further into a “heart of darkness.”  Furthermore, as was true for Marlow in 
Conrad’s text, Tony’s journey provokes his geographical and psychological 
disorientation.  A comparison of Conrad’s and Waugh’s distinct approaches to these 
types of disorientation provides a framework through which Waugh’s portrayal of late 
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modernist disorientation can be understood as a recalibration of the literary tendencies 
that preceded it.  
 Critical debate exists about the extent to which Waugh’s novel—particularly its 
ending—bears the direct influence of Heart of Darkness.24   Waugh’s biographer Martin 
Stannard argues that “there is no evidence of Waugh’s having read Heart of Darkness” 
and points to Waugh’s claim that he is “not a devotee” of Conrad’s work (185).  
Extraordinary as Waugh’s ignorance may seem, Stannard observes, Waugh’s reading 
habits were “eclectic” and focused most closely on his contemporaries’ work (185).  As 
other critics have argued however, comparing these texts is instructive regardless of the 
depth of Waugh’s knowledge of Conrad’s novella.  
Both texts depict an Englishman’s journey to the far reaches of civilization; as 
such, they represent distinct moments in England’s imperial project.  While Heart of 
Darkness depicts the ethical ambivalence wrought by imperial penetration in the 1890s, A 
Handful of Dust’s similar plot represents the vacuity of such adventures during a moment 
of imperial contraction.  Moreover, each text’s distinct relationship to the imperial 
adventure narrative highlights ongoing shifts within literary history. Conrad’s novella 
maintains the constitutive features of the nineteenth century form while warping aspects 
of its ideological content.  As a result of his participation in the imperial project, 
                                                
24 This lively debate about the indebtedness of A Handful of Dust to Heart of Darkness is documented in 
the journal Connotations, in which Stannard responds to Edward Lobb’s contention in his article “Waugh 
Among the Modernists: Allusion and Theme in A Handful of Dust” that Waugh’s novel should be read “in 
terms of its cultural allusions and references to other writers, particularly Conrad and Eliot” (131).  
Stannard responds with a vigorous protestation that Lobb’s analysis suggests that Waugh is “in part 
carefully re-writing Heart of Darkness and that his ‘allusions’ are essential to the intertextual play of A 
Handful of Dust” (185).  The editor of the Evelyn Waugh Newsletter and Studies, John Howard Wilson, is 
also “doubtful about Waugh’s debt to Conrad, which is unsupported” in Waugh’s biographies, nonfiction, 
and other sources (211).  My project grants that Waugh may indeed have been ignorant of, or even resistant 
to, Conrad’s novella.  Nevertheless, comparing the two authors’ work offers insight into the manner in 
which narrative and narrative conventions shift over time.  In particular, viewing Waugh’s work in terms of 
Conrad’s allows a productive tracing of the relationships between empire, surface, commodification, and 
interiority as modernism emerges and ebbs between the 1890s and the 1930s.    
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Conrad’s Marlow sees into the “heart of darkness” at its center; his resulting oral 
narrative constitutes a reflective unraveling of the triumphalist imperial adventure 
narrative itself.  In A Handful of Dust, however, the imperial adventure narrative becomes 
a site at which Waugh demonstrates the emptiness of conventionalized narratives more 
generally.  Analysis of the significant similarities and distinctions that these novels 
exhibit therefore offers a rich understanding of the ongoing evolution of narrative 
responses to historical reality and, furthermore, of the progressive emptying-out of 
narrative forms throughout the early part of the twentieth century.  
 Conrad’s and Waugh’s respective depictions of their protagonists’ temporal 
orientations provides concrete insight into narrative responses to the imperial projects in 
the 1890s and 1930s. Marlow (like Tony) depicts his journey into the heart of darkness as 
a journey back in time.  As he famously declares when embarking upon the river in 
search of Mr. Kurtz, “Going up that river was like travelling back to the earliest 
beginnings of the world” (33).  Marlow describes the environment as “primeval” and 
“prehistoric;” the further from civilization he ventures, the more ancient the world 
appears (26, 35). It is not strictly geographical distance or dislocation that conditions 
Marlow’s understanding of his environment, then.  Crucially, his customary relationship 
to temporality is fundamentally altered by his journey.  
 Conrad’s rendering of temporality resonates most precisely with Tony’s when 
Marlow invokes the journeys of ancient explorers and conquerors as precursors to his 
own.  When Marlow’s narration begins, he asserts “I was thinking of very old times, 
when the Romans first came here, nineteen hundred years ago” (5).  He furthermore 
refers to Knights, Gauls, fleets at Ravenna, and men in togas.  In so doing, he narratively 
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constructs a line of inheritance between his own ship full of sailors and the ancient 
imperial agents who initially conquered and “civilized” London.  This is the same kind of 
narrative construction Tony performs when he asserts that he and Dr. Messinger “would 
arrive under the walls of the city like the Vikings at Byzantium” (164).   
 Waugh’s and Conrad’s narratives are distinct in several crucial ways, however. 
Marlow returns to England with a new and more conflicted understanding of the imperial 
project in which he has participated.  Tony, however, is unable to return to his home 
country and therefore does not act as an agent of anything.  More fundamentally, 
however, Waugh’s narrative reveals that imperialism itself has become a script by which 
Tony governs his undertaking yet he is powerless to imbue his actions with any cultural 
or ideological significance. Whereas Marlow, despite his moral quandary about the 
imperial project, returns to England and lies to Kurtz’s “Intended” in order to paper over 
the ethical complexities that haunt imperialism, Tony’s experience reveals that there is no 
justification for his journey, whether in Tony’s own mind or in actual fact.  Though Tony 
leaves England to enact the same script that Marlow did when he ventured into the heart 
of darkness, his experience reveals that this script is merely a set of conventions and is 
devoid of any ability to lend meaning to Tony’s journey and, therefore (given his reasons 
for embarking), his life.   
 Waugh reveals the “scripted” nature of this narrative through his depiction of 
Tony’s changing relationship to time as he ventures further from the center of 
civilization.  At the outset of his journey, Tony imagines his own trek as Marlow did, as a 
journey back in time.  But as his journey progresses, Tony’s temporal confusion becomes 
a central aspect of his disorientation.  In the beginning of their journey through the forest, 
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Tony lays in his hammock thinking about home: “‘Half-past eight,’ thought Tony.  ‘In 
London they are just beginning to collect for dinner’” (170).  But soon “it occurred to 
Tony that it was not half-past eight in England.  There was five hours’ difference in time.  
They had altered their watches daily on the voyage out” (171). As the men venture 
further into the heart of the wilderness, Tony’s rigid sense of time becomes confused: he 
cannot remember whether London is five hours ahead or five hours behind.  He then 
engages in an absurd process of rationale: “It ought to be easy to work out.  The sun rose 
in the east.  England was east of America so he and Dr. Messinger got the sun later.  It 
came to them at second hand and slightly soiled after Polly Cockpurse and Mrs. Beaver 
and Princess Abdul Akbar had finished with it…” (171).  This rationale signals the 
emerging breakdown of Tony’s ability to relegate things to their “proper” temporalities.  
By initially imagining that it is “half-past eight” for both he and Brenda, Tony reveals his 
continued identification with the temporality of England.  He continues to perceive of 
himself as belonging to the world of Hetton, and so he persists in imagining that his life 
can continue to be governed by its temporality.  
But Tony’s glimpse into the reality that “half-past eight” signifies differently for 
him and for Brenda signals his emerging consciousness that he now belongs to a different 
temporality than is operational at Hetton. Tony’s temporal confusion disrupts his ability 
to assure himself of his proper place—both temporally and existentially.  This breakdown 
not only threatens Tony’s sanity, but it also reveals the extent to which his own 
systematization of time is merely a convention that cannot be sustained when faced with 
the challenges of travel in the wilderness.  Furthermore, Tony’s assertion that the sun 
comes to them “slightly soiled” after Brenda’s shallow and future-oriented friends 
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“finished with it” indicates Tony’s continued and misplaced belief in the superiority of 
his orientation to the past, which actually belies his fetish for commodification and 
consumption.   
Tony’s increasing temporal disorientation revises the rigid sensibility represented 
in Heart of Darkness.  As his journey becomes increasingly fraught, Tony no longer 
understands himself as governed by an “English” temporality that is a starting point for 
the projection into the past that both he and Marlow perform at the outsets of their 
respective journeys. Marlow’s frame narrative begins long after his journey to fetch 
Kurtz out of the jungle is complete; he has journeyed to the heart of darkness and lived to 
tell the tale.  Marlow’s narrative nevertheless configures his adventure as a journey 
backward in time.  This contrasts with the confusion of Tony’s rigid temporal sensibility.  
This disruption of the temporal logic of imperialism is central to Waugh’s recalibration of 
modernist aesthetics to the late modernist era. Though Tony persists in his effort to 
render his voyage as a reenactment of earlier and more glorious journeys, he fails because 
the timeline that governs the narrative imperial adventure is disrupted by the realities of 
an era in which the myth of empire has lost traction.25  By underscoring the arbitrary 
nature of this timeline—and the fact that it can be disrupted—Waugh reveals that the 
narrative of imperial penetration into the wilderness is merely a narrative.  It is the 
scaffolding upon which Tony’s own adventure narrative initially hangs, but late 
modernism’s profound disorientation dictates that this narrative is indeed merely 
scaffolding.  
                                                
25 These realities include: the vacuity and “generalized mimetism” that characterizes Tony, Brenda, and 
their peers; the ideological bankruptcy of the imperial project; the ruling class’s ineptitude in executing its 
responsibilities, including estate oversight and colonial administration (Miller 43).  
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When Tony contracts fever, the phenomena that he previously categorized as 
belonging to the past incur upon his present. When he is in the grip of fever, Tony is 
“fitfully oblivious of the passage of time;” his illness makes him literally unable to 
recognize the transition from day into night, or to distinguish morning from evening 
(199). More significantly in terms of Tony’s psychological disorientation, he begins to 
hallucinate that Brenda is present with him in the jungle.  In the midst of a fever-induced 
delusion, he stares intently at an odd shape some distance away in his canoe; eventually 
he “realized that it was a human being” (194).  His conversation with Brenda combines 
memories from their marriage at Hetton, events associated with John Andrew’s death, his 
travails thus far in South America, and other more absurd references.   
In a profoundly embodied way, then, the very phenomena he’d been hoping to 
avoid in his “feeling of evasion” becomes present to him even in his location so distant 
from Hetton Abbey (157).  In South America, Brenda “wore a ragged cotton gown” of 
the same pattern as the native women and reminds Tony that he must attend his County 
Council meeting (201).  When Tony asks, “But it isn’t Wednesday?,” Brenda replies, 
“no, but time is different in Brazil; surely you remember?” (201).26 Here, Brenda voices 
Tony’s sensation that time does not function universally.  If “time is different in Brazil,” 
this introduces complexity into Tony’s willful imaginative construction of himself as an 
ancient explorer.  Furthermore, if Brenda, whom he is actively trying to relegate to the 
past, can appear as an embodied presence in his present, then Tony’s configuration of 
time up to this point is undermined.  The temporal relegation of things to their precise 
places—his slotting them into the right locations in the timeline that governs his 
                                                
26 Tony repeats the line “time is different” twice; he is clearly preoccupied with his radical temporal 
disorientation (202, 207).    
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existence—is disrupted by the illness he contracted on his journey.  Through this 
depiction, Waugh makes literal the destruction of the narrative that casts Englishmen as 
triumphant explorers of an earlier era. 
 Tony’s fever literalizes a forceful reemergence of the Gothic form.  When Tony is 
in the grip of fever, Brenda appears to him as an embodied presence, though she is not, in 
fact, present.  He also participates in conversations with old friends and acquaintances.  
When it finally becomes clear to Tony that fever has rendered him completely helpless—
his tremors cause him to spill the tank of kerosene that is his only source of light—he 
“lay awake in the darkness crying” (200).  Just before dawn, “the fever returned and a 
constant company of phantoms perplexed his senses” (200).  Very real aspects of his life 
in England—his wife, his friends, his relationship with his son and his tenants—have 
been Gothicized into phantoms by his fever.  For Tony, his confrontation with the 
wilderness facilitates a temporal and geographical disorientation that exposes his real life 
as phantasmic.  In this sense, Waugh’s depiction of Tony’s harrowing experience in the 
jungle reveals the extent to which all the narratives by which Tony formerly governed his 
life have been rendered into merely a “company of phantoms.”  His life itself has been 
transformed into a spectacle—and a terrifying one. 
 Importantly, this truth is only apparent to Tony when he is in the grips of fever.  
When the fever is temporarily dormant, Brenda disappears and Tony returns to his polite 
English self: he acknowledges to Dr. Messinger “I’m afraid I’m being a great nuisance” 
(195).  The fever is cyclical: though Tony believes that he is “well” each time the fever 
abates, Dr. Messinger explains the truth.  “It’s no use your thinking you are cured 
because you are out of fever for one day.  That’s the way it goes.  One day fever and one 
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day normal” (195). Tony can anticipate that one day he will be haunted by phantoms, and 
the next his sanity (and seemingly his health) will return.  Tony himself cannot discern 
when he is sick or well; such is the nature of his Gothic affliction.   
A similar cycle of dormancy and reemergence is characteristic of the Gothic genre 
since its inception.   Indeed, as Kelly Hurley claims, “Gothic in particular has been 
theorized as an instrumental genre, reemerging cyclically, at periods of cultural stress, to 
negotiate the anxieties that accompany social and epistemological transformations and 
crises” (Hurley 5).  Like the fever that prompts Tony’s horrified recognition of the 
vacuity of his own reality, the Gothic form itself emerges periodically throughout literary 
history as a site for the negotiation of cultural anxiety.  Clearly, one of A Handful of 
Dust’s central preoccupations is the processing of anxiety provoked by the transformation 
of life into empty spectacle that afflicts those living in the late modernist era. Hurley’s 
observation that the Gothic is particularly attuned to social and epistemological crises 
provides further rationale for Waugh’s use of this form in his 1934 text; these are 
precisely the crises that Tony endures throughout the novel.  The novel’s Gothic finale 
underscores the utility of this form in negotiating specifically late modernist anxieties and 
furthermore allows Waugh to reveal the ominous nature of these cultural shifts even 
within this very funny satirical text.  
 
“Living Death” and Entombment in Text 
 
 At the end of his narrative, Tony becomes “undead.”  This Gothic condition is a 
crucial aspect of Waugh’s late modernist dispensation: it both reflects a “closure of the 
horizon of the future” despite the persistence of both Tony’s life and Waugh’s literary 
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career, and it betrays Waugh’s skepticism of modernist aesthetics to fully express the 
contingent nature of life in the 1930s (Miller 13). Dr. Messinger dies, unspectacularly, in 
a small waterfall when seeking help for Tony.  After this event, Tony stumbles through 
the forest, still in the grip of fever and covered in insect and bat bites.  He is saved when a 
native woman discovers him, shoeless and raving, and brings him to Mr. Todd.  Mr. Todd 
is a half-Barbadian, half-indigenous settler in the isolated Brazilian interior; he has settled 
a small savannah, upon which he raises a few cattle and fruit trees.  As he tells Tony 
later, “Most of the men and women living in this savannah are my children.  That is why 
they obey—for that reason and because I have the gun” (208).  Mr. Todd rules over his 
estate with a concealed menace that Tony recognizes only after his convalescence is 
complete.  Mr. Todd brings Tony back from the brink of death and insanity by healing his 
fever with medicines derived from native plants.   
Mr. Todd appears to be Tony’s savior until it becomes clear what he gains by 
Tony’s presence: a literate person whom he can force to read aloud the complete works 
of Charles Dickens. Mr. Todd inherited a collection of Dickens’s texts from his father 
and he is “more than fond, far more” of these texts; “You see, they are the only books I 
have ever heard” (209).  Mr. Todd is clearly enamored of the material stability reflected 
in Dickens’s fiction: he listens, enrapt, and asks questions about the characters and their 
relationships.  Dickens’s didactic nineteenth century materialism constitutes Mr. Todd’s 
sole impression of English culture and the extent of his knowledge of literature. The 
material reality evoked during these readings is that of nineteenth century London; 
furthermore, in Dickens’s depictions, institutions including the aristocracy, imperialism, 
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and the church have yet to undergo the radical breakdown that occurred in the early 
twentieth century.  
In A Handful of Dust, this insistent irruption of Dickens’s outmoded literary form 
has a Gothic effect: Waugh’s depiction renders the national literary culture of nineteenth 
century England undead. By 1934, the Victorian novel has long since lost currency, but 
Tony (as compelled by Mr. Todd) brings it back to life.  In fact, the authors within whose 
legacy Waugh writes are precisely those who “killed” the materialist novel: Woolf’s and 
Conrad’s anti-Victorian subjectivism and impressionism were fundamental in 
formulating a modernist ethos in fiction.  Waugh’s narration of Tony’s ominous end 
insists, however, that some strange power remains within the literary forms that preceded 
modernism. Paradoxically, the recurrence of these outmoded literary styles in Waugh’s 
novel reveal—in all its complexity—the specifically late modernist situation in which 
Tony is trapped.   
In ways that resonate with the explorations we see in other late modernist writers 
such as Bowen and Beckett, Tony is circumscribed by narrative; his every thought and 
action is dictated by the stories he continues to tell himself, despite their incompatibility 
with life in the 1930s.  By literalizing Tony’s rehearsal of the nineteenth century 
sensibility with which he so closely identifies, Waugh declares the completion of the 
“generalized mimetism” of Tony’s existence (Miller 43).  The narratives by which he has 
governed his life, in the end, are no more resonant or applicable to his late modernist 
existence than those found in Dickens’s fiction.  
Mr. Todd insists that Tony bring Victorian materialism back to life.  Tony’s wish 
to inhabit the nineteenth century—to live in the era of the Gothic Revival—is therefore 
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granted, but only at the cost of remaining trapped by his captor, forced at gunpoint to read 
Dickens’s collected works until his inevitable death. By giving new life to this old 
literature, Tony becomes entombed within it.  Tony’s final scenes spent reading to Mr. 
Todd therefore reveal not that Tony is fundamentally a “nineteenth century” man, but 
rather that his consciousness and actions are determined (and delimited) not by an ethical 
code, religious belief, or the stability of his class position, but by narrative. He is, 
therefore, fundamentally a creature of the late modernist era.  
Tony becomes “undead” in both a physical and a temporal sense as a result of his 
fate in the Brazilian wilderness.  After Tony has lived on Mr. Todd’s savannah for a year 
or more, a search party of Englishmen arrives. Mr. Todd ensures that Tony is drugged so 
that he sleeps for several days, and he conceals Tony’s presence.  When Tony awakes, 
Mr. Todd tells him that the search party “took some photographs of the little cross I put 
up to commemorate your coming.  They were pleased with that” (216-17).  The cross—
though Mr. Todd suggests that it memorializes Tony’s arrival—thereby becomes 
“evidence” of Tony’s death. The search party reasonably assumes that the cross is a 
marker for Tony’s grave; as such, they conclude that Tony’s body is buried beneath it.  In 
this way, a narrative is constructed in which Tony’s physical death has already taken 
place; the members of the search party are “pleased” with this story because it offers a 
series of events to fill the timeline of Tony’s life.  The cross therefore emblematizes 
Tony’s “undead” status: though he remains living, the cross renders him “dead.”  
Moreover, Tony’s temporal disorientation is made complete when Mr. Todd gives 
his watch to the members of the search party.  “As you could not greet them yourself,” he 
says, “I gave them a little souvenir, your watch.  They wanted something to take back to 
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England where a reward is being offered for news of you” (216).  Given Tony’s lack of 
intimate knowledge of nature, he is powerless to decipher time on his own.  Furthermore, 
without his watch he is unable to orient himself to the passage of time back home; he can 
no longer do the math in order to imagine what Brenda is doing at any given moment.  
He is also lost, in a temporal sense, to the world with which he identifies; he inhabits a 
netherworld in which time exists, but it is not the time that governs the “world of the 
living.” Tony is alive and well in the historical past, entombed as he is within the walls of 
Victorian literature.  But he is no longer a citizen of modernity.  
Importantly, it is narrative that entraps Tony within “living death;” Mr. Todd 
offers up precisely the kind of plot details that his own narrative training dictates will 
constitute a believable story. The cross and the watch are concrete and symbolic objects 
that suggest, in no uncertain terms, that Tony has died.  Furthermore, the narrative Mr. 
Todd composes becomes the narrative that the search party will deliver to those who 
know Tony.  This narrative therefore “kills” him.  Narrative thus becomes “truer” than 
the actual life it purports to represent.  Tony is not dead, but Tony’s story declares that he 
is.  Tony is therefore rendered “undead” by the “generalized mimetism” inherent to late 
modernism, wherein narrative conditions and delimits the events and character of 
individuals’ lives.   
 
Conclusion 
 Waugh’s final chapter, “English Gothic-III” is four pages long; its jarring change 
in setting content contributes to the lack of symbolic unity and late modernist 
“disfigurement” that characterizes A Handful of Dust (Miller 14).   This strange chapter is 
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therefore crucial to the novel’s form and furthermore emphasizes the “perilous 
breakdown of distinction—between subject and object, between spectator and spectacle, 
between producer and consumer” that Miller argues characterizes late modernism (43). 
The chapter opens on a scene at Hetton Abbey.  Tony’s industrious cousins have 
inherited the estate and turned it into a silver-fox farm.  Most of the Abbey’s rooms have 
been shut, an economical range has been installed in the kitchen, and the cousins employ 
a “skeleton staff” of servants.  The estate no longer resembles the monument to the 
Gothic Revival that it did when Tony lived there; it is, instead, a modernized and 
functional enterprise.  A dedication of a memorial to Tony takes place in the chapter; 
Waugh describes the service in four short paragraphs. 
In several distinct ways, the memorial embodies the late modernist Gothic 
sensibility that Waugh develops throughout the novel.  First, the memorial itself is Mrs. 
Beaver’s idea; initially she suggested the more ambitious—and costly—idea that they 
might “have the chapel redecorated as a chantry” (221).  Waugh’s satire is in full force 
here: Mrs. Beaver was responsible for outfitting Brenda with a well-decorated apartment 
in London and for covering the walls at Hetton with chromium plating.  Her continued 
investment in purely aesthetic objects even after—indeed, in response to—Tony’s tragic 
“death” reveals the empty investments of the culture she represents.  This final scene’s 
satirical register certainly contrasts with Tony’s Gothic entombment at the end of the 
previous chapter; in the context of Waugh’s late modernist Gothic satire, this puts a fine 
point on Waugh’s social critique.  The matter-of-fact manner in which Mrs. Beaver seeks 
to profit by Tony’s death underscores this novel’s overall Gothic effect: to reveal the 
horrifyingly shallow and inauthentic character of contemporary life. 
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The memorial also encapsulates Waugh’s critique of narrative as a force that 
determines fates and circumscribes lives. The stone reads: “TONY LAST OF HETTON / 
EXPLORER / Born at Hetton, 1902 / Died in Brazil, 1934” (220).  The stone declares 
that Tony is dead, and that he died in Brazil.  As the reader is aware, Tony lives on in the 
Brazilian wilderness, reading Dickens’s novels aloud in Mr. Todd’s hut.  Nevertheless 
the memorial acts as a finale to Tony’s life; because the memorial exists, and because it 
declares him dead, he is dead.  The memorial is the “THE END” that marks the end of 
the narrative that Mr. Todd insinuated to Tony’s search party, and which the search party 
delivered to England, and to which everyone who knew Tony now subscribes.  The story 
of Tony’s death has, in this case, become truer than reality.  Though Tony lives on, he 
has been made dead by the narratives created about him.   
The memorial’s description of Tony as an “explorer” furthermore creates a 
narrative that both far outstrips reality and conforms to the basic features of the imperial 
adventure narrative that governed Tony’s initial excursion. Tony’s familiarity with these 
narratives gave him baseless confidence in his “pluck and derring-do;” these stories’ 
conventions furthermore give Tony’s family and friends a ready-made script for how to 
understand Tony’s journey and its end.  A man of the ruling class who ventures out into a 
heart of darkness is an “explorer;” this narrative renders unimaginable the actual failure 
of Tony’s adventure.  The well-known and highly conventionalized narratives that depict 
such journeys dictate that there is only one way to understand Tony’s adventure. Again, 
the story of Tony becomes truer than his reality.  The memorial thereby embodies 
Waugh’s complex critique of narrative itself: in an era of late modernism, narratives 
cannot provide the ideological security they offered in the era of Dickens.  Waugh’s 
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novel furthermore reveals that conventionalized narratives are destructive in their 
capacity to delimit individuals’ actions and imaginations. 
The most powerful way in which the memorial embodies the distinctly late 
modernist ethos of this text is as an object that facilitates Tony’s “living death.”  Tony is 
not, in fact, dead, but the memorial declares that he is; in this sense, he is both living and 
dead.  Crucial to Waugh’s critique of the consumption and obsession with objects that 
characterizes this era is the memorial’s status as an object. It was Mrs. Beaver’s idea to 
construct the memorial; she commissions its construction and orchestrates its unveiling.  
The novel’s final moments focus not the life or death of the person being memorialized, 
but on the object itself.  Tony himself is thereby commodified into an object.  This 
commodification both satirizes his own devotion to commodities during his lifetime and 
ensures that his “undead” status will remain permanent.  In terms of the novel’s social 
critique, the large stone stands as a monument to the “undead” status of those living in 
the late modernist era: their “living death” is innocuous, empty, enacted as a matter of 
habit, and void of ideological or ethical significance.  
As Miller argues, late modernists “carry the signs of death on their faces, the 
disfigured countenances they show to their postmodern successors. Paradoxically, 
however, these very signs of disfiguration charge their work with its contemporaneity” 
(13).  A Handful of Dust does not endorse modernism’s straightforward engagement of 
Gothic’s fearsome melodrama; neither does it engage modernism’s investment in 
interiority or its conventionalized narrative arcs.  Rather, it flattens the affect of the 
Gothic form, warps modernist and other narrative conventions, and satirizes individuals’ 
insistent devotion to empty narratives.  In so doing, Waugh produces a strange and 
 135 
 
estranging novel that precisely captures the shared sense among late modernists that 
“their contemporary reality—both subjective and objective—was somehow becoming 
‘less real’” (Miller 45).  In this sense, Waugh’s novel, which appears initially to be an 
innocuous social satire, both offers an unexpectedly penetrating critique of his own era 
and marks the emergence of a postmodern sensibility wherein reality itself is constituted 
by simulacra.     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
BECKETT’S DISSOLUTION OF NARRATIVE SUBJECTIVITY  
THROUGH THE DISASSEMBLY OF FORM 
 
Introduction 
 
 The project of Samuel Beckett’s trilogy is to narrate a formulation of selfhood 
that is neither contained nor constrained by narrative.  To this end, the novels of the 
trilogy—published in French in 1951-1953 and released in English in 1958 with the titles 
Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable—systematically expose and explicate the 
matrices of literary and narrative convention by which authors typically compel 
subjectivity into being. By mobilizing and then undoing the defining features of several 
conventionalized narrative forms, including the bildungsroman, autobiography, and 
detective fiction, Beckett reveals their complicity in producing a limiting and limited 
formulation of subjectivity. His trilogy furthermore highlights modernist aesthetics’ role 
in reinscribing this prescriptive formulation of the subject despite its formally 
revolutionary ethos.  Beckett’s narrative method in the trilogy thereby reveals that both 
pre-twentieth century forms and the modernist investment in interiority assume and 
perpetuate a configuration of subjectivity that is both prescriptive and coercive.  Beckett 
enlists and transforms basic elements of narrative and well-worn narrative forms in order 
to produce a late modernist “unwriting” of the human consciousness as it had heretofore 
been conceived in narrative fiction.   
The novel form itself provides the ground for Beckett’s critique of 
conventionalized narrative practices’ coerciveness.  Because the development of the 
individual into a socially sanctioned subject is the premise of several canonical novel 
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forms, these forms are both the objects and the vehicles of Beckett’s critique. As 
Beckett’s immanent critique unfolds, his method demonstrates that narrative does not 
reveal the true essence of the self, but rather produces a textual performance of 
autonomous subjectivity that conforms to the “universally valid and archetypal” 
subjectivity represented in canonical literature (Lloyd 19). Despite its apparent 
nonconformity to canonical narrative practices, careful attention to the trilogy’s 
construction reveals that the texts’ strangeness is, in part, due to Beckett’s manner of 
wrenching recognizable forms into the service of his radical project.  Beckett’s 
invocation of these highly prescriptive narrative frameworks forces an examination of 
these frameworks’ role in circumscribing the socially sanctioned perception of what it 
means to be human.   
The first novel in the trilogy inaugurates this immanent critique. Molloy begins as 
a first person autobiographical narrative; as the narrative progresses, this premise is 
deconstructed even as it haunts the text.  The autobiographical form’s coercive 
articulation of subjectivity is an imperative against which each of Beckett’s subsequent 
protagonists struggles; indeed, this is what might be called the texts’ central “conflict.”  
Beckett also enlists the bildungsroman subgenre—a form that itself echoes autobiography 
in several key respects—in his pursuit of a means by which to dismantle the process of 
identity formation that circumscribes his characters.  
 Beckett’s enlistment of the detective fiction form in his ongoing dissolution of the 
narrative subject highlights the degree to which highly prescriptive narrative 
conventions—and the popular literary forms that employ them—contribute to the 
ascription of a reductive identity to characters.  The detective fiction form enacts the 
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ongoing construction of a detective’s “report;” the protagonist is obligated to produce a 
narrative that both reconstructs and resolves the “crime.”  In order to produce this 
narrative, the detective surveils the target of the investigation, deciphers his attributes, 
and then renders him legible through text.  In so doing, the detective writes the 
subjectivity of the “criminal” into being.  In this way, detective fiction nurtures a process 
of increasing legibility that culminates in narrative resolution; it is premised upon the 
ongoing and increasing decipherability of the “criminal’s” subjectivity.  
Beckett’s invocation of this form also reveals the narrator’s legible subjectivity to 
be produced by the conventions of the form.  Even as the detective polices the identity of 
the “criminal,” by composing his report, he writes his own identity into being.   He 
ensures that his report performs the identity ascription and resolution that are the 
purposes of a detective’s report, and in so doing he becomes the detective that he purports 
to be. He is thereby offered as a model to the reader as an enforcer of identity for himself 
and others. The detective monitors disruptive actors in society, thereby making them 
knowable.  This composition of others’ subjectivities requires a narrator whose own 
subjectivity is coherent and recognizable to the reader and which is the premise for his 
evaluative narration about the “criminal” he seeks. The detective fiction form thereby 
mandates a prescriptive and archetypal configuration of subjectivity for both the 
characters being narrated and narrators themselves.  Beckett’s method of exposing the 
rigid conventions that perpetuate this mandate reveals their inherent conventionality.  
More importantly, his method shows that this popular form—which, unlike 
autobiography and bildung, does not have as its purpose the depiction of identity 
formation—produces narrative identity through its own uniquely coercive methods.  
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Beckett’s writing in the trilogy also indicts the limits of modernist efforts to 
dismantle narrative conventions.  Certainly, innovative modernists sought to move 
beyond the narrative tendencies of the nineteenth century; as Paul Sheehan observes, “the 
experimental, formally diverse modernist novel… offers a powerful commentary on the 
various struggles to break free of narrative—or at least to find a different order for its 
particular conventions” (5-6). The novel form in particular lent itself to modernist efforts 
to produce new modes of writing by transforming well-worn genres.  According to 
Sheehan, the novel’s protean ability to “reappropriate the literary technique of the past 
and ‘make it new’ promotes it to the forefront of the modernist endeavour” (14).  The 
novel is a site of modernist experimentation wherein authors self-consciously enlist, 
reject, revise, and reanimate established narrative structures.   
Even many of modernist fiction’s most revolutionary narrative techniques, 
however, seek to express characters’ and narrators’ deepest selves; the stream-of-
consciousness narration, free indirect discourse, narrative impressionism, and “moments 
of being” that constitute many of classic modernist fiction’s most radical innovations 
reflect a subjectivism that both posits and seeks to depict subjects’ inner lives.27  
Certainly, these techniques reject the nineteenth century materialist practices, embodied 
in the work of George Eliot, Charles Dickens, and others, that sought to represent life 
empirically through exhaustive exploration of social communities, character attributes, 
and physical environments.  Modernist fiction writers came to view this mode of 
narration as naïve and sought to instead depict individual human consciousness in all its 
complexity. Beckett’s critique of modernism’s innovative techniques reveals, however, 
                                                
27 The canonical modernist fiction writers whose work exemplifies these tendencies are James Joyce, 
Virginia Woolf and William Faulkner.  
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that they nevertheless perpetuate the reification of the subject that Beckett’s narrative 
seeks to undermine.  Beckett’s enlistment of the nineteenth century conventions that 
modernists refused is, paradoxically, the means by which he mounts a radical critique of 
the conventional modernist investment in interiority that displaced them.  
The very first phrases in Molloy’s narrative focus attention upon the mysteries 
surrounding the “I” who narrates: “I am in my mother’s room.   It’s I who live there now.  
I don’t know how I got there” (7). Molloy’s self-introduction thereby both undermines 
the notion of an autonomous and truth-telling narrator that governs autobiographical 
narrative, but also hints at the extent to which this notion continues to act as a powerful 
mandate upon the “I” who narrates.  This introduction underscores not only the quandary 
that Molloy the character faces—how did he come to inhabit his mother’s room?—but 
when read as a question about his origins as narrator, the sentence furthermore focuses 
attention on the mysterious dynamic by which articulate selves are “created” by and in 
narrative. Here, by the novel’s third sentence, Beckett inaugurates his interrogation of the 
method by which narrative coerces subjectivity into being.  When read as this type of 
interrogation, the sentence encourages a particular line of questioning: how did the text’s 
narrator come to narrate the text?  How did this become a story to be read?  To what end 
do novels call subjects, figures, characters, narrators into being?  Beckett’s trilogy, as it 
posits and dissolves subjects via a disintegration of the narrative structures by which they 
are typically created, serves as a complex and lengthy exploration of these questions.  
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Narrative’s Coercion of Subjectivity 
Molloy’s elliptical and often self-canceling mode of narration prevents him from 
becoming a subject whom readers can “know” as a result of his own self-disclosure; he is 
instead a figure whose status—both textual and ontological—is recalcitrant to 
conventional modes of understanding. As David Weisberg argues, “Beckett embeds the 
figure of Molloy in a narrative structure that complicates the idea of self-expression 
implicit in first-person narration (88). Indeed, Molloy does not narrate the events of his 
life from a position of omniscience.  Rather, his narration insistently casts doubt upon his 
own authority and continually revises the details of his story as they accumulate.  If 
Molloy is the text’s “speaker,” his function as speaker is to persistently call his 
audience’s attention to the conventionality of the narrative frame that would cast him as 
such. This function violates the conventional premise that governs first-person narratives: 
namely, that a narrative is brought into being by a subject.  As the text’s ongoing critical 
interrogation of this premise builds momentum throughout the trilogy, it produces 
awareness that subjectivity—the narrating “self”—is produced by the conventions that 
govern narrative.   
Molloy begins with a strident first-person declaration: “I am in my mother’s room.  
It’s I who live there now” (7).  The text thereby begins with the assertion of information 
about an “I”: we know the speaker’s location, and we sense that a change must have 
occurred to prompt this declaration (the narrator is compelled to assert that it is he, not 
another, who lives there at the time of the text’s present).  This is, in the context of 
Beckett’s novel as a whole, a relative abundance of information. And yet: in the next 
sentence, the narrator asserts “I don’t know how I got there,” introducing the doubt about 
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his origins which is both the impetus for and the limiting factor in the narrator’s quest to 
find his mother (7).  As the novel progresses, the reader understands that the narrator’s 
uncertainty applies not only to his physical state and location but also to more 
fundamental questions of selfhood.  Molloy identifies and undermines, denies and 
reasserts his familial and ontological origins.  Molloy’s persistent interrogation of the 
nature of his own existence (and his reasons for being) is concomitant with Beckett’s 
interrogation of the coercive positing of subjectivity that is inherent to narrative. 
At the very outset of the novel, the insistent assertion of “I” is intermingled with 
the equally persistent sensation of not knowing that prevents Molloy from being or 
developing into a subject. Molloy continues, stridently asserting “I have taken her place.  
I must resemble her more and more.  All I need now is a son.  Perhaps I have one 
somewhere.  But I think not” (7).  Immediately following upon a self-assured statement 
(“I have taken her place”), then, Molloy places his own discrete subjectivity under 
suspicion by hinting that his identity is merged with his mother’s.  Molloy further 
undermines his autobiography by casting doubt upon his own assertions of fatherhood. 
This very early moment in the text inaugurates the theme of a return to origins that is one 
of the central means by which Beckett undermines the narrative of development 
mandated by autobiography and the bildungsroman. Molloy’s assertion that perhaps he 
has a son, but he thinks not enacts this theme by suggesting that, were Molloy’s identity 
to merge with his mother’s as he implies (“I have taken her place”), he would then be his 
own son.  This strange narrative moment, which occurs on the novel’s first page, suggests 
that Molloy may be his mother, and so therefore may be his own son, but in no way 
confirms these suggestions.   
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This passage also inaugurates Beckett’s complex method of undermining the 
category of subjectivity by creating character dyads that, likewise, suggest but never 
confirm the two characters’ sameness.  Here, Beckett simultaneously evokes 
conventional notions of individual subjectivity (Molloy is a man who is telling a story) 
and undermines them by hinting at the blurring of one subjectivity into another’s (Molloy 
may be his mother). To cast Molloy as his own mother in this way conceives a dynamic 
in which Molloy may “give birth to himself” through the ongoing process of narrating a 
coherent story that, in turn, narrates his subjectivity into being.  This is precisely the 
process that the trilogy interrogates.  The themes explored in this inaugural scene—the 
return to origins and the merging of identities—begins this interrogation; from the 
novel’s very outset, Beckett dismantles narrative conventions from within.    
In a relatively basic way, then, Part I of Molloy begins by undermining the first 
sentence’s strident assertion of individuality.  Molloy finds himself to be 
indistinguishable, at times, both from other humans and from inanimate objects.  This 
depiction undermines conventional ways of representing subjectivity and replaces them 
with notions of interchangeability, arbitrariness, and indecipherability.  That Molloy is 
not in possession of even basic personal details violates the reader’s expectation that a 
first-person narrator will enact the disclosure of the truths that constitute his or her 
selfhood. This novel’s first person narrator is no more in control of the “facts” that 
constitute his identity than the reader; his narrative unfolds not as the expression of an 
extant “self,” but as a series of quandaries about who he is and how he came to be.  
 Molloy’s dissembling and insistence upon self-canceling details about his own 
life are a means by which he resists the mandates of narrative coherence and subject 
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formation that adhere to autobiographical storytelling.  The novel’s opening inaugurates 
Molloy’s narration as an autobiography; this is an emphatically first person narrative that 
seeks to explain how its author came to be located in his particular time and place.  But 
Molloy persistently resists the formal strictures of autobiography even as he continues to 
narrate.  As such, his narrative refuses to endorse the powerful cultural assumption—
operational even upon Molloy himself—that a “self” exists within Molloy, waiting to be 
translated into language and rendered “legible” in such a way as to coerce the reader into 
acknowledging this conception of being as normative and desirable.   
But his narrative also capitulates to this assumption throughout, despite Molloy’s 
recalcitrance; this reveals the extent to which the construction of narrative coerces a 
performance of selfhood that becomes, in turn, interpreted as proof of individuals’ pre-
existing subjectivity. Sidonie Smith builds upon Judith Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity to explain the dynamics of autobiographical storytelling: “people 
assemble, if only temporarily, a ‘life’ to which they assign narrative coherence and 
meaning and through which they position themselves in historically specific identities” 
(108).  In so doing, Smith argues, “the autobiographical speaker becomes a performative 
subject” (108). The individual subjectivity that appears to preexist one’s life story is 
therefore a phenomenon born of the act of telling this story. 
Importantly, narrative itself is the medium through which this performance of 
subjectivity is enacted. Smith claims that because “the self is not a documentary 
repository of all experiential history running uninterruptedly from infancy to the 
contemporary moment . . . The very sense of self as identity derives paradoxically from 
the loss to consciousness of fragments of experiential history” (108). Because an 
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exhaustive account of one’s life cannot be remembered, it must be narrated.28 The notion 
of selfhood posited as the premise of narrative is thus, instead, the product of its 
construction.   
The initial premise of Molloy’s narrative makes literal the enactment of 
subjectivity that occurs when one undertakes to tell one’s life story.  Molloy writes his 
autobiography because “there’s this man who comes every week.  Perhaps I got there 
thanks to him.29  He says not.  He gives me money and takes away the pages” (7).  This is 
a literal transaction, the result of which is that Molloy writes himself into being; the 
reason he exists before the reader is because he is being paid to write his life story.  By 
inaugurating both Molloy and Molloy’s process of writing with this concrete transaction, 
Beckett insists upon the inherent performativity that characterizes the construction of 
Molloy’s autobiography.  
Molloy’s narrative furthermore exhibits and exaggerates the “loss to 
consciousness” of fragments of experiential history” that characterizes the performance 
of subjectivity via autobiographical narrative (Smith 108).  Molloy acknowledges the 
                                                
28 Smith is extending Benedict Anderson’s assertion in Imagined Communities (1991) that our 
estrangement from our own personal histories requires a conception of identity that must be narrated 
because it cannot be remembered.   
 
29 The conflation of “here” and “there” in this opening passage is another way that Beckett spotlights 
autobiographical conventions’ delimiting effect upon Molloy’s narration.  Though the first line of the novel 
is “I am in my mother’s room,” Molloy follows it by saying “I don’t know how I got there” (7).  Though 
the story begins in the present and therefore enacts the autobiographical premise that Molloy is in the act of 
writing his autobiography, to speak of his mother’s room as “there” implies that he is no longer located 
within it. In this way, Beckett draws attention to another aspect of the conventional construction of 
narrative: he must bring the protagonist from the past into the present in such a way that “the protagonist 
and the narrator eventually fuse and become one person with a shared consciousness” (Bruner 28).  
Molloy’s narrative has already been written (he was “there”), though the present tense creates an 
impression that a narrative is being written (he is “here”). He is not, at present, the figure whose ongoing 
identity formation is narrated throughout this text; rather, convention compels him to create this illusion.  
This is an explicit enactment of the prescriptive subjectivity required by narrative.  However, by claiming 
that his mother’s room is “there” and not “here” (thereby cagily acknowledging that his narrative has 
already taken place), Molloy disrupts this enactment, revealing that the autobiographical convention that 
one must narrate the events of one’s life as they unfold conditions and limits Molloy’s narrative.  
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gaps in his knowledge of his past: “The truth is I don’t know much.  For example my 
mother’s death.  Was she already dead when I came?  Or did she only die later?  I mean 
enough to bury.  I don’t know” (7).  This salient element of his own life story is lost to 
Molloy’s consciousness.  Yet he continues to narrate the autobiography that his 
transaction with “this man” obligates him to construct.  Molloy’s persistent narration 
despite gaps in his self-knowledge enacts the dynamic by which one narrates one’s life 
story because that story cannot be remembered in all its fullness.  Despite his own 
explicit admission that he is not in possession of the “facts” of his life, Molloy speculates 
about, invents, retracts, and corrects these facts in order to produce a narrative that 
conforms to the tenets of autobiography.  
In this way, Molloy’s ongoing performative enactment of his own subjectivity 
underscores the coercive dynamics of narrative that mandate this performance, and which 
are obfuscated in more traditional examples of autobiography. The initial premise of 
Beckett’s text, wherein a first-person narrator both resists and enacts the narration of 
selfhood, demonstrates that “there is no essential, original, coherent autobiographical self 
before the moment of self-narrating” (Smith 108).  Rather, as Smith argues, the 
phenomenon of subjectivity that is enacted in instances of self-expression is an effect of 
conventionalized elements of autobiographical storytelling.    
 This narrative performance of the self is furthermore enforced by powerful 
cultural imperatives. Discourses of identity and truth-telling govern the autobiographical 
enterprise; readers demand that “life stories” are true, and that they disclose the identity 
of the speaker (Smith 108). The positing of a self through narration is therefore not 
merely an elective process in which the narrator “fills in the blanks” that exist in memory.  
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Rather, it is enacted in response to powerful prescriptions: that one is both unique and 
recognizable as a member of society; that though one’s circumstances change, one 
remains the selfsame individual throughout one’s narrative; that one’s identity emerges in 
response to events that “really happened.”  
As Smith argues, these same prescriptions underpin the post-Enlightenment 
conception of the individual whose membership in the social sphere depended upon his 
or her self-perception as being both free and autonomous. The “selfhood” mandated by 
the conventionalized tenets of autobiography is therefore precisely the “selfhood” that 
governs the process by which bourgeois individuals are “civilized” into productive 
citizenship.  Autobiographical discourses thereby act as hegemonic strategies for the 
cultural reproduction of normative selves (Smith 109).30  The logic of autobiographical 
storytelling is therefore the same logic by which individuals become subjects of the state: 
both discourses assume an interiorized self to be regulated, while in fact individuals enact 
selfhood through a self-regulating performance of the prescriptive subjectivity that is 
amenable to citizenship (Smith 109).  In this way, autobiographical narrative itself 
becomes one means by which to reify and regulate the bourgeois subject. When one 
undertakes to construct an autobiography, therefore, one performs an act of self-
regulation wherein self-expression is conditioned and delimited by not only narrative, but 
also by broader cultural and political imperatives.  
Beckett dramatizes the role of cultural and legal imperatives in coercing the 
performance of subjectivity when a policeman who disapproves of Molloy’s “resting” 
posture astride his bicycle confronts him.  The policeman demands that Molloy display 
                                                
30 In making this claim, Smith builds upon Michel de Certeau’s analyses in The Practices of Everyday Life  
(1984).    
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his “papers;” presumably, these papers would ascribe an identity—a name, an origin, a 
home address—to Molloy.  The presentation of these papers would be a performative act, 
making him into a subject of the state on the spot.  Without these papers, Molloy is 
merely a nameless wanderer whose presence disturbs the authorities whose role it is to 
keep “public order, public decency” (20).  In this moment, the policeman is literally 
demanding that Molloy enact his own subjectivity so that it can then be policed.  
Rather than enacting the performance the policeman demands, however, Molloy 
asserts “Ah my papers.  Now the only papers I carry with me are bits of newspaper to 
wipe myself, you understand, when I have a stool” (20).  He continues: “In a panic I took 
this paper from my pocket and thrust it under his nose” (21).  Rather than capitulate to the 
self-regulation of his identity demanded by this interaction, Molloy commits an act that 
the policeman interprets as defiance; hence he is taken to the police station.  The 
absurdity of this transaction—the policeman’s demand that Molloy declare an identity 
and Molloy’s absolute failure to comply—emphasizes that subjectivity is an effect of, in 
this case, the performances mandated by the legal discourse of identity.  The policeman’s 
demand expresses the cultural imperative that Molloy must be someone; Molloy’s refusal 
to capitulate amounts to a refusal to claim or acknowledge an extant interior selfhood.  
In addition, by proffering this specific kind of paper rather than the bureaucratic 
records that the policeman requests, Molloy links the production of such records with 
scatology.  This association appears throughout Beckett’s work, and both delegitimizes 
and renders absurd the kind of official records that the policeman requests.  Importantly, 
too, to directly associate these “papers”—a written record of an individual’s archetypal 
and universal identity—with bodily waste is to suggest that the system that requires such 
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papers is itself wasteful.  The policeman understands the “papers” to be a state-sanctioned 
means by which to keep order through the policing of individuals; for Molloy, they are a 
receptacle for his physical waste.  In this sense, it is not the state that “begets” Molloy 
through the production of records that document his identity, but Molloy himself.  This 
comic moment undercuts the ascription of identity to Molloy and rather insists upon the 
possibility that Molloy may produce his own identity. Beckett thereby insists that the 
system by which Molloy is forced to account for himself through official “papers” is 
bureaucratic and wasteful, while Molloy’s “waste” is productive of a selfhood that is not 
delimited by the records kept by the state.  In addition, Beckett’s scatological 
representation of Molloy’s resistance to this objectification emphasizes that the process 
of becoming “someone” inevitably produces objects of the most abject sort. 
Certainly, by proffering these particular papers to the policeman, Molloy 
manifestly repudiates the policeman’s—and thereby the state’s—authority over the 
definition of his identity.  Though he will be dragged into jail for doing so, he refuses to 
capitulate to the fundamental delimiting of his selfhood that presenting the “correct” 
papers would perform.  Furthermore, Molloy’s action also calls into question the 
discourses of value and waste, and of self and object, as they are perpetuated by the state.  
The state’s authority over individuals resides in its ability to document and police these 
individuals; this regulation is endemic to the value system by which the state maintains 
its functioning.  Beckett’s depiction of Molloy’s actions and their consequences focus 
attention upon the wastefulness of a system that would jail a physically feeble and 
homeless old man for lacking some particular document.  Furthermore, as a result of his 
action, Molloy refuses to become an object of the state’s surveillance.  The “papers” that 
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the policeman requests reify individuals’ subjectivities by formalizing their state-
sanctioned identity; in so doing, they transform individual selves into objects of state 
authority.   
David Lloyd claims that autobiography’s coerciveness is rooted in its status as a 
literary genre within a canon of “major literature.” 31   The most salient characteristic of 
major literature is its role in the “production of an autonomous ethical identity for the 
subject” (19).  Lloyd describes the dynamic by which this occurs in autobiography as 
follows:  
In most general terms, autobiography, including fictional autobiography, tends to 
represent the ethical self-realization of the writer from a perspective of self-
consciousness through which the repetition of a life endows it with the appearance 
of a providential or predestined pattern.  But while autobiographical texts are 
devoted to composing the unity and integrity of a personal identity through 
repetition, they are necessarily devoted at the same time to producing the 
individual as autonomous, that is, as self-authenticating and self-authorizing 
(162).   
                                                
31 In Nationalism and Minor Literature (1987), David Lloyd examines the historical role of aesthetic 
culture in establishing the authority of the bourgeois nation-state. Lloyd claims major literature posits a 
conception of the human individual that acts as a coercive exemplar upon readers: major literature claims 
“representative status,” positing the individual subjects as “universally valid and archetypal” (19).  “Minor 
literature,” by contrast, is defined by its oppositional relationship to both the literary canon and the 
canonical form of the state: minor literature “not only ‘writes back’ against the universal standards of the 
literary canon, but also contests the canonical form of the representative individual and questions the 
teleological narrative of modern social cohesion” (19-20).  Patrick Bixby, in Samuel Beckett and the 
Postcolonial Novel (2009) explores the ways that Beckett’s trilogy enacts the function of “minor literature.”  
I certainly concur with Bixby’s analyses.  My argument, however, focuses more centrally on the trilogy’s 
critical orientation toward major literature.  To analyze the ways that Molloy’s narrative in particular resists 
the ascription and modeling of autonomous identity reveals the method by which Beckett undermines the 
usual role of autobiography in mounting a universally valid and archetypal conception of subjectivity.  
Molloy strenuously resists capitulating to the mandates of major literature, thereby positing a conception of 
selfhood that is not prescribed by canonical literary forms, including autobiography and bildung.   
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The positing of an individual whose subjectivity appears inevitable and preordained 
despite its ongoing composition is inherent to the structure of the autobiographical genre.   
Lloyd’s analysis also highlights the degree to which the aesthetic experience of 
reading autobiography creates ethical identification between a text’s narrator and its 
reader.   This ethical identification powerfully suggests commensurability between the 
narrator’s life and the reader’s life, which constitutes a model and enactment of the 
coercive nature of subject formation. Lloyd describes how this dynamic of ethical 
identification functions in works of major literature: “since ethics involves the capacity to 
judge as from the perspective of archetypal man, and since the aesthetic experience is the 
mode in which that perspective is most purely achieved, the writer as writer appears as 
representative man, and the work as a representation of representative human experience” 
(20).  The “humanity” or subjectivity of the autobiographical narrator becomes a model 
to which the reader aspires, and the canonical text thereby functions as a model of what it 
means to be human. In this way, the conception of subjectivity represented in text 
exercises a coercive influence upon individuals, who police their own subjectivity to 
conform to autobiography’s aesthetic standards.   
 Beckett’s ongoing refusal to posit the autonomous subject established in canonical 
novelistic forms as the “essence of the human” marks his critical orientation to the canon 
of major literature. By initially constructing Molloy as a first person narrative in which 
the narrator sets out to explain himself and his reasons for being, Beckett inaugurates the 
aspect of major literature wherein canonical texts set out to produce an autonomous 
ethical identity for the subject (Lloyd 19).  As his text progresses, however, Beckett’s 
more complex project becomes apparent: he seeks to undermine the production of 
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autonomous ethical identity by dismantling both his narrator’s identity and the 
autobiographical form itself.  This dismantlement begins with the undermining of 
Molly’s subjectivity and becomes yet more pronounced as the trilogy progresses: in the 
trilogy’s third novel, The Unnamable, the protagonist is unrecognizable as a literary 
“subject” of the kind represented in works of major literature, and the text is a skewed 
version of autobiography that resists the form’s prescriptions at every turn.32  As such, the 
trilogy resists the dynamic by which works of major literature produce readers’ ethical 
identification with the autobiographical narrator.  This dimension of Beckett’s texts 
underwrites the radical possibility for new fictional depictions of the self that is 
inaugurated in the trilogy. Beckett’s invocation and deformation of a conventionalized 
genre suggest the possibility that a notion of selfhood not delimited by the prescriptions 
of major literature is representable in narrative.  The contours of this selfhood can be 
deciphered not in terms of what is directly presented or in terms of the teleological 
“destination” of narrative, but in the novel’s repeated confessions of falsity and failure. 
 Patrick Bixby has insightfully explained how Beckett uses another 
conventionalized form, the bildungsroman, as additional ground for his investigation of 
the process by which subjectivity is compelled by narrative.  Bixby analyzes the degree 
to which Beckett’s fiction is inflected by Irish and national concerns even at its most 
seemingly abstract moments.  He thereby highlights the postcolonial dimension of 
Beckett’s writing, claiming that it enacts a “cultural performance that continually 
                                                
32 In The Unnamable, Beckett confounds the ascription of identity to the central character by not giving him 
a name that remains consistent throughout the text.  The protagonist may be Mahood, or Basil, or Worm, or 
each of these at different moments.  The text never explicitly declares, furthermore, that the protagonist is 
human; he is an embodied figure who lives in a vessel and who does not possess the power of speech.  
Though his process of narration suggests his humanity in a manner consistent with Beckett’s “suggestion” 
of subjectivity throughout the trilogy, Beckett never grants it fully. These are yet more radical 
manifestations of the dismantlement of the autobiographical form that Beckett inaugurates in Molloy.   
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interrogates the principles of canonical culture by writing back to the traditions of 
cultural nationalism and the canon of European literature” (20). Bixby’s analysis builds 
on Lloyd’s definition of “minor literature,” which, in turn, is indebted to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s elaboration of the minor function of Kafka’s work.  By asserting the trilogy’s 
status as “minor literature,” Bixby asserts that its function is to not only ‘write back” 
against the universal standards of the canon itself, but also to contest the canonical form 
of the representative individual and to question the teleological narrative of modern social 
cohesion (Bixby 20).33  Beckett’s method does not only resist the formal strictures that 
delimit novelistic expression; it contests the prescriptive formulations of selfhood and of 
society that these strictures perpetuate and enforce. 
 The bildungsroman subgenre is an ideal ground for Beckett’s project because it 
shares with Beckett’s writing “preoccupations with identity formation, national 
belonging, cultural dispossession, and narrative failure” (Bixby 20-1). These concerns are 
reflected in the threat of failure (to become a socially sanctioned individual) that has 
lurked within the bildungsroman form since its inception.  By dismantling the novel of 
formation, Beckett delivers on this threat, undermining the “Enlightenment 
metanarratives of progress and development” that bildung articulates (Bixby 33).  
Beckett’s deformation of this canonical subgenre highlights his characters’ failures to 
“become someone” in the manner prescribed by the bildungsroman form; in this sense, 
the failure is a formal one.  As such, Beckett’s redeployment of this form contributes to 
the complex intermixture of literary legacies and deformations through which he 
                                                
33 Bixby’s analysis pays particular attention to the ramifications of Beckett’s undoing of the subject for 
concepts of nationalism, national belonging, and postcolonial identity.  My chapter aims to highlight the 
variety of formal redeployments by which Beckett undermines the narrative subject in order to highlight his 
critique of previous forms of the novel and to address canonical modernism’s complicity in coercing the 
formulation of identity in the way Bixby explains. 
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constructs a new means by which to represent the experience of being a self.  But as 
Bixby articulates, Beckett’s critique has ramifications far beyond the realm of literature: 
his novels confront the “developmental narrative of modernity, interrogating the concepts 
of identity and identification, while challenging the necessity of assimilation and 
accommodation” (33).   
 
Beckett’s Late Modernist Siege on Modernism’s Investment in the Subject 
 Skepticism toward modernism’s insistence upon the textual representation of 
consciousness is a central tenet of Beckett’s late modernism.  In Late Modernism: 
Politics, Fiction and the Arts Between the World Wars (1999), Tyrus Miller counts 
Beckett—and his early fiction in particular—as an important contributor to a late 
modernist corpus that includes the work of Wyndham Lewis and Djuna Barnes. His work 
exemplifies the “apparent admixture of decadent and forward-looking elements” that 
prevents late modernism from inhabiting a “clearly defined place in the dominant 
frameworks of twentieth-century criticism” (Miller 7). By 1938, Miller asserts, Beckett’s 
criticism continued to defend and legitimate “high modernist writing in the tradition of 
Conrad, Joyce, Proust, Eliot and others” (175).  But precisely at the moment that he 
articulates a coherent modernist critical position, advocating the modernism he discerns 
in the fiction and poetry of other writers, “he is also working to sabotage its functioning 
in his own fiction” (Miller 176). Indebted though he was to the modernist sensibility that 
sought to deploy language and literary form in new ways, Beckett’s interrogation of the 
novel’s complicity in prescribing and circumscribing the boundaries of selfhood required 
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a “sabotage” of the conventions by which high modernists sought to represent and plumb 
the depths of the self.     
 An attunement to individual psychology marked the early part of the twentieth 
century and prompted the development of new narrative strategies that sought to 
represent individuals’ interior selves. Freud’s theory of the unconscious prompted a 
popular perception of the interior consciousness as a hidden but more deeply authentic 
version of the self than that which individuals display to the world.  A growing awareness 
of the psychologically traumatic effects of World War I further encouraged this 
perception.  “Shell shock,” the profound mental illness that afflicted many combatants, 
very often carried no outward signs.  Men who suffered from this condition could appear 
entirely normal on the surface. This legitimated the premise of Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious and encouraged a perception that individuals’ interior lives roiled beneath a 
veneer of socially acceptable attributes and behavior. For those living in the early years 
of the twentieth century, the self came to be understood in these terms of surface and 
depth; as such, interiority became a category that demanded exploration and 
investigation, both in life and in literature.  
 Modernist novelists sought to perform this work by depicting characters’ 
consciousness.  This investigation of characters’ deep selves acted as a corrective to 
nineteenth century narrative realism and materialism; the work of George Eliot, Charles 
Dickens and others is exemplary of this sensibility.  One of the era’s most canonical 
texts, Eliot’s Middlemarch (1872), for instance, emphasizes complex relationships within 
communities; while Eliot’s characters are richly depicted, her novels emphasize the 
consequences wrought upon characters resulting from their conformity—or lack 
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thereof—to the societies in which they live. Eliot constructs this rich materialist depiction 
of the town of Middlemarch through third person omniscient narration and dialogue.  The 
narrative “voice” in this text is both invisible and granted equal insight into the thoughts 
and emotions of each character, and dialogue offers relatively objective access to 
characters’ personalities.  These formal techniques are the manifestation of Victorian 
literature’s emphasis upon depicting daily reality and social life in rich detail.      
 Early twentieth century writers often maintained this narrative emphasis on social 
relationships; their materialist orientation furthermore resulted in novels preoccupied 
with the details of physical objects and environments.  This is the “materialism” for 
which Virginia Woolf excoriates her Edwardian counterparts—including H.G. Wells, 
Arnold Bennett, and John Galsworthy—in her oft-cited essay “Modern Fiction” (1921). 
She asserts that because such novels are “done to a turn” in terms of their airtight 
narrative construction and exhaustive depiction of physical detail, “life or spirit, truth or 
reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any 
longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide” (287).  For Woolf, “the essential 
thing”—the “moderns’ point of interest”—is “very likely in the dark places of 
psychology” (290). According to Woolf, the modern dispensation in fiction, which she 
pinpoints in Joyce’s Ulysses, seeks to depict individuals’ inner lives. Woolf’s essay 
underscores the degree to which this existence of a deep self that resides in the far 
recesses of characters’ consciousness becomes a premise taken for granted in high 
modernist fiction.  
 The result of the modernists’ rejection of their predecessors’ materialism and 
realism resulted in a new and revolutionary narrative orientation; modernist fiction 
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writers fundamentally altered the ethos of the novel.  Their innovative literary methods 
not only produced rich depictions of individual characters’ interior lives, but also 
reflected the fundamental perceptual shift that the advent of psychology prompted within 
modern culture.  Canonical examples of these new methods reflect this ethos: Woolf’s 
“moments of being” depict characters’ flashes of insight into their own unconscious; 
Joyce’s epiphanies are likewise moments in which characters become instantly aware of 
desires and beliefs previously hidden from consciousness; the stream of consciousness 
narration exhibited by these authors and others sought, through an accumulation of highly 
personal revelations, to depict characters’ interior lives in all their complexity.  Other 
characteristics of modernist writing included the fragmentation of narrative order, the 
shifting of narrative perspectives among characters, and narrative movement between 
materiality and interiority. These techniques exemplify the modernist fictional orientation 
that sought to illuminate the “dark places of psychology” residing deep within the self 
that, in previous eras, remained in darkness. As Miller points out, the high modernist 
novel’s purported ability to exhaustively represent the self became its crowning 
accomplishment, both in practice and according to contemporary critical consensus. 
 Beckett endorsed and legitimated high modernism’s revolutionary formal 
developments in his criticism but, as Miller observes, sought to sabotage what had 
become, by the time of the trilogy’s composition, a canon of modernist narrative 
techniques. Modernism’s subjectivist orientation posits a subject both unique and 
knowable; it is precisely the innovative methods by which modernist fiction depicts the 
“dark places of psychology” that produce the notion of an extant “self” whose 
consciousness is revealed by narrative.  The writer’s task is therefore framed as a 
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revelation of the content of  characters’ unconscious.  Beckett’s narrative method 
systematically undercuts this framework and insists instead that the techniques and 
underlying impulses of modernist narrative themselves produce the appearance of 
subjectivity. Beckett’s redeployment of pre-twentieth century narrative forms reveals the 
degree to which even modernism’s most radically innovative postures reenact a model of 
identity formation common to the novels of previous centuries. Modernist fiction’s 
formal innovations merely retrain writers and readers to compose and understand new 
conventions that carry strong traces of the conventions by which subjectivity is 
constructed in the genres that Beckett travesties, including autobiography, 
bildungsroman, and the detective novel.  
 Canonical modernism’s subjectivist narrative practices thereby enact the function 
of major literature that Lloyd theorizes wherein the major work is “directed toward the 
production of an autonomous ethical identity for the subject” (19). Though the 
innovations of high modernism are formally revolutionary, for Beckett they do not 
address the fundamental methods of coercion by which narrative both requires and 
models the formation of identity. The narrative techniques by which this coercion is 
enacted are, therefore, objects of Beckett’s critique.  As Miller asserts, “if consciousness 
was [the modernist] aesthetic’s castle of purity, then the formal conventions of modernist 
fiction, with its finely developed techniques for representing consciousness, was the point 
at which to lay siege on that citadel”(185). As Woolf’s “Modern Fiction” insinuates, the 
textual exploration of the unconscious was often understood as a “pure” form of 
narration: it was free of materialism’s focus on surfaces and devoid of realism’s 
obligation to narrate every character and scene in exhaustive detail.  Beckett, however, 
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insists that this method of narration is in no way “pure;” rather, it perpetuates the 
prescription of autonomous subjectivity so powerfully mandated in and by nineteenth 
century fiction.   
 Miller’s description of the modernist aesthetic investment in representing 
consciousness as a “citadel” furthermore highlights the manner in which this aesthetic 
both surveils and disciplines subsequent narrative practices.  Like a citadel which looms 
over the city that it both protects and monitors, the modernist investment in interiority 
casts a long shadow over the work of any novelist who undertakes to tell a story about 
human characters.34  Certainly, Beckett’s method indicates the degree to which his own 
project is monitored by the prescriptions of modernist narrative practice; Molloy’s every 
admission of his lack of development is an acknowledgement of the strength of these 
prescriptions upon his own subjectivity. Molloy is aware—and Beckett insists—that his 
non-identity is a rebuke to modernism’s investment in interiority.  The “finely developed 
techniques for representing consciousness” to which Miller refers are, therefore, the point 
from which Beckett’s own rebuke of modernist formal techniques originates.  
 Beckett therefore refuses to render subjectivity via techniques that by the time of 
the trilogy’s writing in the late 1940s and early 50s had in many ways come to take on the 
force of institutional authority.  More profoundly, the trilogy protests the obligation texts 
are under to “produce” a subject.  Indeed, Molloy is the first stage in a methodical 
breaking-down of the methods by which novels typically meet this obligation; by the end 
                                                
34 This schematic rendering of Beckett’s relationship to the modernist canon is consistent with Beckett’s 
own rendering of Molloy’s narrative perspective in the A & C episode in Molloy.  In this scene (which I 
explore in greater detail later in this chapter), Molloy voices an awareness of the narrative moves he should 
make based upon the conventions that circumscribe his narration.  In so doing, he performs a kind of 
narrative surveillance upon the content of his autobiography.  This policing of narrative content is 
consistent with the regulating function that Beckett perceives the modernist canon has upon his (and 
others’) narrative practices.  As Miller asserts, in the late modernist era, modernist aesthetics function as a 
sort of looming authority, policing the creative expression of writers working in the 1930s and 40s.   
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of The Unnamable, Beckett’s wholesale rejection of modernism’s “finely developed 
techniques for representing consciousness” renders his narrator as existing outside the 
framework of subjectivity by which modern readers have been trained to understand 
protagonists. This depiction not only makes possible new ways of narrating individuals’ 
experience of living, but it resists the coercive effects of both modernist narrative 
practices and the model of subjectivity inherent to autobiography and bildungsroman in 
particular.  
 Beckett’s formal intervention into what he perceives as modernism’s inadequately 
critical relationship to literary conventions’ coercion of identity is consistent with his 
assessment of modernism in his letters and early stories.  James McNaughton argues that 
in Beckett’s writing from the late 1930s and early 40s “everything from modernist 
postures and political positions to images and phrases appear to [Beckett] increasingly 
repetitive, imitative, and, in the sense that the usual appears novel, provincial” (56).  
Beckett’s early narrative forms are the means by which he evaluates “the failures of 
modernism to accomplish its promise of critique” (McNaughton 56).  Though 
McNaughton focuses on Beckett’s engagement with the consequences of modernism’s 
crisis of representation on Irish politics, the question of “how interpretive models can 
linger long after their usefulness has expired” is central not only to Beckett’s political 
engagement, but also to his interrogation of modernism’s complicity in the narrative 
disciplining of subjectivity (58).   
 Beckett’s method of undermining the narrative techniques through which this 
complicity is manifested highlights the underdeveloped promise of modernist innovation.  
The trilogy’s precise dismantling of the methods by which narrative both produces and 
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polices subjectivity reveals that modernism itself stopped short of fundamentally altering 
the depiction of selfhood rendered in text and, furthermore, reproduced the conventional 
prescription for the formation of identity that was characteristic of the pre-twentieth 
century forms that modernists so strenuously rejected.  In his early novels, Beckett frees 
himself “to examine the contradictions within modernism in his creative work” 
(McNaughton 65).  The result is a trilogy of novels whose mission to undermine the 
coercion of subjectivity produces an “unwriting” of the novel form, hence revealing the 
fundamental complicity of the form with prescriptions of identity formation that, in 
Beckett’s view, delimit both fiction’s imaginative possibilities and the potential for 
individuals to conceive of a self beyond these prescriptions.  
 Beckett’s critical orientation toward modernism’s investment in interiority is most 
pronounced in his treatment of narration.  The trilogy approaches narration as a process 
and a phenomenon that is both produced and mandated by the novel form.  The danger of 
canonical modernist modes of narration, for Beckett, is the obfuscation of their 
complicity with earlier narrative conventions and, therefore, with the coercion of 
subjectivity.  Modernist techniques did away with nineteenth century notions of narrative 
objectivity altogether, seeming to grant direct access to a character’s consciousness.  The 
reader observes not a novel’s “objective” events themselves, but a privileged narrator’s 
or character’s perspective of them.   
 Throughout Part I of Molloy, Molloy provides a running commentary on the 
necessity that his method of narration conforms to a variety of conventions. Beckett 
dramatizes this dynamic when Molloy interacts with a figure—A or C—that he has been 
observing.  Molloy pursues him and soon, he narrates, “I am up against him” (12).  In the 
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context of Molloy’s ongoing story, this means that he has caught up to the man on the 
road. As a meta-narrative statement of Molloy’s role within the narrative, however, this 
indicates that Molloy the narrator has “come up against” another character in the text and 
is now obligated to narrate this interaction.  Molloy becomes preoccupied with the 
process by which he gleans information about this figure: “I want to see the dog, see the 
man, at close quarters, know what smokes, inspect the shoes, find out other things” (12).  
Molloy desires to learn all the facts by which this figure could be constituted as a 
character in the text so that he can narrate them.  By disclosing this desire, Molloy 
highlights its conventionality: narrators know information and share it with readers, and 
readers expect that the narrator or narrating function will share this information.  Here, 
Molloy indicates his awareness that he bears the responsibility of knowing and narrating 
the content of his story. 
 But more profoundly, Molloy’s disclosure of this desire pinpoints the narrative 
function by which texts create subjects: that whom/which narrates must be in possession 
of a consciousness that both knows and can disclose the information that makes this a 
novel.  The reader, in turn, must recognize and share this sense of identity as part of the 
process of rendering the text intelligible. Molloy himself enacts this performance of 
narrative subjectivity when he “comes up against” another figure and endeavors to 
characterize him.  But Beckett’s rendering of this scene refuses to represent this 
performance as natural or inevitable. Molloy further comments upon the conventional 
premise that posits him as a conscious subject with particular insight into every aspect of 
the unfolding narrative that is Molloy: “There I am then, informed as to certain things, 
knowing certain things about him, things I didn’t know, things I had craved to know, 
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things I had never thought of.  What rigmarole.  I am even capable of having learnt what 
his profession is, I who am so interested in professions” (13).  Thus, Molloy is at once 
narrator and reader. Here, Beckett underscores the irony inherent in the narrating 
function: as a conventional and coercive aspect of narrative, it requires a conscious 
subject who can narrate, but the source of the “facts” that constitute this subject’s 
knowledge is obfuscated.  In other words, Molloy’s knowledge of the man’s dog, his 
smoking, and his profession is not actually the result of his conscious understanding, but 
of the prescriptive narrative framework wherein subjectivity is taken to be the condition 
for a novel’s narrating function.  As narrator of this tale, Molloy is under an obligation to 
“know things” about this man, and to indicate these “things” to the reader.  Beckett’s 
method, however, insists upon exposing this operation as obligation and, furthermore, as 
largely misinformed.  He thereby reveals consciousness to be an element of narrative 
fiction alongside plot and dialogue (for example). The process by which Molloy is both 
made into a knowledgeable narrator and then obligated to disclose his knowledge is the 
“rigmarole” by which narrative’s coerciveness is typically obfuscated and which 
Beckett’s trilogy undermines.    
 The trilogy furthermore reveals that the novel form itself—and the conventions by 
which it has developed over time—produces the premise of a speaking consciousness.  
For Beckett, the modernist revelation that narration is not always attributable to an 
identifiable figure does not go far enough because it does not acknowledge that narrative 
itself creates the appearance of subjectivity. The “subject” that is produced by 
narration—whether by a first person autobiographical narrator, or a third person 
omniscient narrator, or by any variety of modernist narrating functions—is a product of 
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narrative convention; Beckett’s insistent revelation of this phenomenon is a trademark of 
his late modernism. Narration functions in the trilogy not to represent individual 
consciousness, but to reveal that subjectivity is an effect, rather than the source or end, of 
narration. 
 
Narration & Subjectivity in Molloy 
 Beckett performs this revelation by exposing the mechanics of narrative by which 
a subject effect is coerced into being. Beckett’s explication of conventional formulas of 
narration contrasts directly with the obfuscation of narration that traditionally 
characterizes the novel form. Roland Barthes claims, “our society takes the greatest pains 
to conjure away the coding of the narrative situation: there is no counting the number of 
narrational devices which seek to naturalize the subsequent narrative by feigning to make 
it the outcome of some natural circumstance and thus, as it were, ‘disinaugurating’ it” 
(116).  The refusal of Molloy’s narration to posit the narrator’s extant subjectivity as the 
“natural circumstance” from which narration proceeds resists this disinauguration.  
Modernist novelists’ explorations of consciousness, for instance, are both grounded in a 
conception of subjectivity as a source for narration and rely upon the obfuscation of the 
means by which this subjectivity is created by narrative.  The success of a modernist 
exploration of interiority depends upon the “disinauguration” of the narrative; it must 
appear as the natural outpouring of an extant character’s inner consciousness.  By 
contrast, the trilogy obsessively “inaugurates” the act of composition, thereby refusing to 
make narrative appear to be the outcome of “natural circumstance.” By doing so, 
Beckett’s text forces the reader to recognize that it is not Molloy himself but the 
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conventions of the narrative forms to which he is obligated that produce and shape his 
narrative. 
 Beckett’s schematic configuration of Molloy’s narrative perspective is an 
important way in which he spotlights, rather than conjures away, the narrative situation.  
During an oft-cited passage at the outset of Molloy, the narrator observes two figures, A 
and C, as they encounter one another on an unidentified road.  He muses on the 
circumstance that makes it possible for him to “see”—and therefore to narrate—the 
events of the novel: “I must have been on the top, or on the slopes, of some considerable 
eminence, for otherwise how could I have seen, so far away, so near at hand, so far 
beneath, so many things, fixed and moving” (14).  As is so often the case, the narrator 
discovers—rather than declares—his status: he occupies, evidently, a position that 
facilitates a panoptic perspective.  His status on “some considerable eminence” implies a 
privileged view of the novel’s events. But though Molloy can “see” A and C, his 
befuddlement and the self-canceling descriptions he offers reveal his lack of knowledge 
about what he sees.  Molloy’s query—“what was I doing there, and why come?”—
ridicules the commonplace assumption that a narrator is a text’s locus of authority (14).  
Molloy may be able to observe A and C, but his lack of subjective insight about their 
meeting resists the notion that a text’s events matter insofar as they are processed through 
a narrating function that purports to possess consciousness. 
This early episode furthermore announces the trilogy’s ongoing project of 
configuring a narrative function beyond—or outside of—the “speaking subject” that is 
conventionally rendered as the source and the anticipated destination of narrative.  
Molloy’s answer to his own query—“These are things that we shall try and discover”—
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refuses to enact the narrative convention that configures narrators as speaking selves who 
“possess” their own stories (15).  By depicting Molloy at the top of an eminence, ignorant 
of how and why he arrived there, Beckett literalizes the dynamic that “narrational 
devices” typically “disinaugurate” (Barthes 116).  Molloy’s reflection about his 
privileged view of this encounter enacts a retrospective correction that reveals the 
artificiality of the conventional premise that would grant the narrator insight into all 
aspects of the narrative. The A and C episode undermines Molloy’s reliability, but more 
profoundly, it reveals the notion of any narrating function’s status as all-seeing to be a 
narrative construct.  
Molloy is incredulous about his own omniscience.  Even as he employs his 
narrative “vision” to watch as A and C meet on the road, he betrays his own suspicion 
about the limits of this perspective: how can he see things located nearby, things 
positioned beneath him, immobile things and things in motion (14)?   His incredulity 
points to the unlikely—even impossible—character of his panoptic perspective.  By 
casting doubt upon his own position as narrator, Molloy dismantles the manner in which 
a narrator’s status as a privileged bearer of facts is typically constructed and reveals that 
he has been coerced into being—and placed upon this “eminence”—by the requirements 
of narrative itself.  His emphasis on this point furthermore illustrates the degree to which 
Beckett’s writing is haunted by narrative convention: Molloy must appear to possess a 
narrative perspective in order to narrate.  Beckett’s portrayal of Molloy’s vision of A and 
C indicates that even this text, whose project is to dismantle commonplace configurations 
of narrative perspective, is circumscribed by these very configurations.  
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Molloy: Bildungsroman Foreclosed 
 Importantly, Beckett’s project is enabled by a deep engagement with the forms 
that he dismantles. Beckett invokes traditional modes of narrative as means by which to 
perform these complex interrogations. Beckett begins by constructing a recognizable 
narrative and works to dismantle its constitutive features; As David Weisberg claims, 
“Molloy retains the clear contours of traditional, modern, and popular narrative forms. . . 
in order to exploit readers’ expectations about the kind of information, pleasure, and 
meaning a good plot provides” (102).  The overall effect of Molloy’s construction is to 
“short-circuit the stable coordinates by which we orient our reading of a narrative” 
(Weisberg 102).  By exploiting the basic elements of popular and recognizable narrative 
forms, Beckett reveals both these elements’ fundamental role in coercing subjectivity and 
their inevitable necessity as the ground upon which his radical critique rests. 
 Bixby focuses particularly on the presence of anthropological discourse and the 
bildungsroman in Beckett’s fiction.  Beckett invokes and travesties these genres in his 
quest to expose their complicity in producing a limiting and limited understanding of 
subjectivity.35  As Bixby asserts, “Beckett’s prose defies and mourns a sense both of 
belonging and of Bildung in a rhetoric generated by these very tensions, which propel the 
incessant performativity, the failing and the going on, that distinguishes his most admired 
fictions” (203).  In the bildungsroman, an incipient subject is implied; the premise of the 
genre is to narrate the development of an individual self, through education, vocation, and 
                                                
35 Bixby explores the ideological and formal dimensions of Beckett’s redeployment of the bildungsroman 
form at length in Samuel Beckett and the Postcolonial Novel (2009).  Bixby claims that Beckett’s 
specifically postcolonial redeployment of the form confronts “the developmental narrative of modernity, 
interrogating the concepts of identity and identification, while challenging the necessity of assimilation and 
accommodation” (33).  Certainly, my argument is consistent with Bixby’s analyses.  In this chapter, 
however, I aim to highlight the formal dimension of Bixby’s argument by concentrating on the 
conventional aspects of the bildungsroman form that make it one of several ideal forms to undergo 
Beckett’s “unwriting.” 
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misadventure, into a socially sanctioned subject.  From its very outset, then, the end of a 
bildungsroman is present from its beginning; these novels’ purpose is to disclose the 
subject whose fully developed subjectivity was implied from the start. By depicting the 
dissolution of his characters, and by constructing (most identifiably in Malone Dies) a 
version of bildung that adheres in its contours to the form but resists and parodies its 
conventions, Beckett rejects the teleological and developmental orientation of the 
bildungsroman.  
 Beckett’s narratives do not enact the conventions of bildung; therefore, his 
protagonists do not become culturally sanctioned “selves.” Beckett’s invocation and 
deformation of conventional forms whose ideological function is to prescribe and 
sanction both characters’ and readers’ humanity facilitates his critical examination of 
bildung’s pedagogical function.  Indeed, as Part I progresses, Molloy refines his narrative 
stance yet further so that it explicitly engages and defies the teleological orientation that 
governs the bildungsroman: “the most you can hope is to be a little less, in the end, the 
creature you were in the beginning, and the middle” (32). Molloy’s theory of 
development follows the logic of subtraction.  Rather than becoming a more “whole” 
individual as a result of his journey, as bildungsroman traditionally prescribes, he hopes 
to become “less” of what he is: the produced subject of a bildungsroman.  The subsequent 
text is a record of his efforts to escape the strictures of both literary form and subjectivity 
that constrain him.36  
                                                
36 This assertion that the novel is a record of Molloy’s efforts to escape narrative obligation may initially 
seem to be at odds with my earlier arguments about the novel’s opening, which I claim suggests that 
Molloy might “give birth to himself” as the result of narrating himself into being. To configure Molloy as 
being “born” literalizes the point of origin for the ongoing performance of identity that Beckett seeks to 
undermine.  But this configuration is merely suggested.  As such, it exists alongside this later configuration 
of Molloy’s relationship to subjectivity wherein he seeks to become “less” of what he was in the beginning: 
an autonomous subject reified through text.  Molloy thereby configures its resistance to narrative’s coercion 
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 Paradoxically, Molloy’s failure to conform to the strictures of bildung generates 
the possibility for alternative depictions of the self in prose.  If Molloy can become “less” 
the product of narrative convention, then he may come to occupy a location outside the 
limits these conventions enforce.  In this way, Molloy’s failure reveals a radical 
possibility suggested by Beckett’s method: human consciousness may be represented in 
prose without being delimited by the coercive narrative of identity formation mandated 
by conventional literary forms.  
 
Dismantling of Form, Dissolution of the Subject 
 In the trilogy, each novel purports to be a character’s first person narrative. 
Beckett thereby engages the conventions of autobiography in addition to those of the 
bildungsroman and those high modernist techniques designed to depict authentic 
encounters with interiority. At the outset of each novel, its narrator—Molloy, Malone, 
Mahood (later or perhaps also Basil or Worm)—is also its central character.  These first 
person “selves” set out to narrate their life stories.  As the novel progresses, 
autobiography becomes both the vehicle for and the object of Beckett’s critique of the 
role its conventions play in positing an exemplar of human identity. Beckett’s wrenching 
of this form into the version readers experience in Molloy forces a recognition of its 
ideological function and insists that narrative can be mobilized not only to bolster, but 
also to question, the conventional view of the autobiographical work as “a representation 
of representative human experience” (Lloyd 20). 
                                                                                                                                            
of subjectivity both as a negation of the story of origins that would inaugurate a novel of development and 
as a story of Molloy’s “unbecoming.”   
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 Theorists of autobiography have pinpointed the genre’s particular tendency to 
shed light on the complex problematics that emerge from the premise that the author is 
identical to the subject (Marcus 5). Laura Marcus observes that the manner in which 
autobiographical writing muddles “the postulated opposites between self and world, 
literature and history, fact and fiction, subject and object” threatens the stability of an 
intellectual context wherein these are seen as irreconcilably distinct (7). Indeed, the 
“proliferation of classificatory and categorizing systems in autobiographical criticism 
testifies to the extent to which autobiography is seen as a problem which requires control 
and containment” (Marcus 7). Its status as a threat to both literary classifications and to 
rigid conceptions of selfhood and fiction, in particular, make autobiography an ideal 
ground for Beckett’s interrogation of these concepts.   
 As Marcus observes, autobiography has historically been understood to exemplify 
the unity and harmony that are some of Western literature’s most highly prized aesthetic 
values:  
in philosophical terms, autobiography is seen to secure … the much desired unity 
of the subject and object of knowledge.  In aesthetic terms, the elevation of 
autobiography to the status of a literary genre has involved its endowment with 
the properties of the unified work of art.  In the broader terms of an Arnoldian 
account of ‘culture,’ the ideal autobiography may be seen as expressing 
humanity’s ‘approach to totality, and to a full, harmonious perfection.’ (5) 37 
Because autobiography is a central genre in the canon of Western literature, the path of 
self-realization and development undergone by an autobiographical narrator has come to 
                                                
37 For Marcus, Augustine and Rousseau are “ideal” autobiographers whose texts are the model and standard 
for subsequent iterations of autobiography. 
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play the role of exemplar for readers.  The “harmonious perfection” achieved by 
canonical autobiographers is a manifestation of major literature’s claim to realize the 
autonomy of the individual subject to such a degree that the individual subject becomes 
universally valid and archetypal (Lloyd 19).  
 By invoking and undercutting the autobiographical form, however, Beckett 
critiques the complementary unity of the subject and unity of form that it typically seeks 
to achieve. Beckett undermines any perception of unity between Molloy the narrator 
(who, in a manner consistent with autobiographical narrators, narrates his story after it 
has already occurred) and Molloy the character (who is being narrated as the story 
progresses). Molloy’s meta-narrative commentary throughout—which expresses both his 
ignorance about Molloy the character and the circumstances that confront him, and his 
obligation to invent pertinent information—prevents “the much desired unity of the 
subject and object of knowledge” (Marcus 5). Because Beckett systematically undoes the 
conventions of autobiography, the reader can never imaginatively collapse the Molloy 
who narrates into the Molloy who is narrated.  Beckett’s specific deployment of 
autobiography, therefore, is not an expression of humanity’s approach to totality, and to a 
full, harmonious perfection, but rather a critical disassembly of the notion of human 
perfection that the form conventionally prescribes.  
 As is true of the bildungsroman, autobiography posits a model of subjectivity 
premised upon development. As Lloyd claims, in composing the unity and integrity of a 
personal identity through repetition, autobiographical texts are devoted “to producing the 
individual as autonomous, that is, as self-authenticating and self-authorizing” (162, italics 
in original).  This autonomy, in turn, comes to be understood as the goal and end of 
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individual development.  The ideal autobiography’s conformity to the elements of the 
canonical form produces a model of the fully integrated human subject.  Conversely, 
Beckett’s rendering of autobiography inverts the narrative of development in order to 
subvert the universal and archetypal individuality that it prescribes. Several of the 
trilogy’s major themes perform this work: in Molloy, the foreclosure of progress ensured 
by the novel’s circular structure resists the autobiographical mandate of development; 
Molloy’s ongoing resistance to knowledge of autobiographical details undermines the 
notions of autonomy and self-authorization that underpin the logic of autobiography; 
Beckett’s depiction of both Molloy’s and Gaber’s physical decrepitude indexes their 
regression backward from the trappings of identity that they possess at their stories’ 
outsets. In a characteristically Beckettian way, then, Molloy’s proliferation of text 
paradoxically undoes this canonical literary form and the ideological mandate of identity 
formation that is fundamental to it. 
Throughout Molloy, Molloy indicates that the conventions of autobiography exert 
particular formal requirements upon his narrative; his explicit attention to their 
prescriptiveness constitutes his resistance to the formulation of identity that they posit. 
The narratorial challenges that confront Molloy are those that confront the 
autobiographer. Jerome Bruner describes these:  
 A narrator, in the here and now, takes upon himself or herself the task of 
describing the progress of a protagonist in the there and then, one who happens to 
share his name.  He must by convention bring that protagonist from the past into 
the present in such a way that the protagonist and the narrator eventually fuse and 
become one person with a shared consciousness.  Now, in order to bring a 
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protagonist from the there and then to the point where the original protagonist 
becomes the present narrator, one needs a theory of growth or at least of 
transformation. (28) 
Molloy’s obsessive meditations on the nature of his narrative both enact and spotlight this 
dynamic.  Whereas traditional autobiography seeks to close the gap that exists between 
the protagonist “in the here and now” and the narrator that exists “in the there and then,” 
Molloy explicates this convention even as he enacts it.  As he describes his difficulty 
when riding his bicycle—a difficulty that, owing to his physical immobility “in the here 
and now,” confronted him in the past—he does so in the present tense.  “When I try and 
think riding I lose my balance and fall.  I speak in the present tense, it is so easy to speak 
in the present tense, when speaking of the past.  It is the mythological present, don’t mind 
it” (26).  Molloy’s assertion of “the mythological present” calls attention to the way in 
which an autobiographical text simultaneously demands that its narrator’s story is 
constituted by events from the past and that this story is told from a position in the 
present.  By telling parts of his story in “the mythological present,” Molloy emphasizes 
the “collapsing” of the distance between one’s present self and one’s past self in 
autobiographical writing.   
 By describing this present as mythological, Beckett highlights the similar 
functions performed by myth and the phenomenon of unity between narrators and 
characters that autobiographical writing produces.  Molloy’s mythological present 
invokes a suspended temporality in which the past becomes present.  This eternal present 
is the temporality of myth.  A myth that retains cultural significance is never “over:” even 
when it is “about” the past, myth seeks to explain the present. Molloy’s employment of 
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this temporality in the context of self-writing underscores its manipulativeness.  
Autobiography, which is posited on the ongoing development of the individual, insists 
upon a mythological construction wherein the events of the narrative appear to be 
ongoing in the present, though their narrator exists in the future and narrates past events. 
The mythological present thereby produces the appearance of narrative autonomy, 
though the autobiographical form itself wrests this autonomy from narrators.  By calling 
attention to the manipulative dimension of the mythological present, Beckett exposes the 
schemes that autobiography engages to cover over the ongoing coercion of identity that 
its conventions produce. Molloy calls attention both to the mythological present imposed 
by the form and to his own narrative’s violation of this temporal scheme by asserting 
“don’t mind it.”  Beckett thereby ironically highlights the typical ways that narrative 
obfuscates its schemes by disinaugurating the mythological present (Barthes 116).   
  Molloy’s narration is furthermore preoccupied with what Bruner calls the “theory 
of growth” or “transformation” required by autobiography.  From its very outset, Molloy 
resists the notion that his narrative is one of transformation or development.  Indeed, 
Molloy casts his goal of reaching his mother—Part I’s “plot,” insofar as it exists—as not 
so much an accomplishment as a return to his beginnings: “if ever I’m reduced to looking 
for a meaning to my life, you never can tell, it’s in that old mess I’ll stick my nose to 
begin with, the mess of that poor old uniparous whore” (19).  The meaning of Molloy’s 
life, he asserts, can be found not in whatever progress he undertakes or transformation he 
undergoes, but in his mother’s reproductive organs.  In other words, meaning lies 
precisely in the antiprogressive configuration of a return to the womb; to find oneself in 
precisely the same location as where one was born is precisely not to progress. The 
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“goal” of Molloy’s narrative is, then, to forestall progress of any kind by regressing into 
the womb.  But Beckett depicts this regression as a journey from one location to another; 
Molloy both develops and resist development as he enacts the “plot” to which his 
narrative is obligated.  By constructing Molloy’s goal as the forestalling of development, 
but his narrative as the story of progress toward finding his mother (which, by the end, he 
has done, as he is in his mother’s room, but their reunion is not depicted), Beckett 
underscores the power that autobiographical conventions exert upon first person 
narratives; even this text whose purpose is to depict a return to beginnings must work 
against the trajectories of growth, transformation, and development that autobiography 
demands. 
 An additional defining feature of autobiography is its emphasis on the 
exceptionality of the subject’s narrative. As Bruner asserts, a narrative must answer the 
question “Why?:” “‘Why is this worth telling, what is interesting about it?’  Not 
everything that happened is worth telling about, and it is not always clear why what one 
tells merits telling” (Bruner 29).  The exemplars of the genre—narratives by Augustine, 
Rousseau, Wordsworth—are not only unified texts about “completed” persons, but are 
textual proof of their writers’ exceptionality as writers, artists, intellectuals, and ethical 
beings.  The conventions of autobiography therefore mandate that not only must a 
narrative be about a sequence of events over time, structured in terms of cultural 
canonicity, but “it must also contain something that endows it with exceptionality” 
(Bruner 29, italics in original).  An autobiography should narrate the development of the 
individual in the context of his culture—it must sanction his membership in society—
even as it proves his uniqueness. 
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In Part I of Molloy in particular, Beckett plays upon this expectation and 
highlights the distinctly mundane qualities of Molloy’s narration.38 Like any author of 
autobiography, Molloy “began at the beginning,” “whereas now it’s nearly the end” (8).  
He therefore invokes the convention that Bruner describes, by which protagonist and 
narrator eventually fuse and become one person with a shared consciousness (28).  Even 
as he does so, however, Molloy doubts that his narrative demonstrates the type of 
exceptionality that autobiography requires: “Here’s my beginning.  It must mean 
something, or they wouldn’t keep it” (8).  This author himself is unclear about why, as 
Bruner puts it, his own narrative “merits telling” (29).  Molloy inaugurates his 
autobiography not of his own volition, but because a figure outside himself prompts him 
to do so.  Molloy identifies this figure as both “this man” and “they;” the fact that neither 
Molloy nor the reader knows who “takes away the pages” of his autobiographical 
narrative is Beckett’s canny indication of the generalized coercion that operates upon 
autobiographical narrators.  Unlike the narrators of canonical iterations of autobiography, 
Molloy writes not out of a belief in the exceptionality or instructive value of his story, but 
both because “they” pay him and, by his weekly reappearance, “this man” both monitors 
and coerces Molloy’s narrative.  Molloy’s wishful declaration that “it must mean 
something” gives voice to the powerful mandate of exceptionality that governs the form 
in which Molloy writes.   
Molloy’s inauguration of his autobiography also positions Molloy as a “reader” of 
his own autobiography who is expected to discern that every moment in his life has 
meaning.  His narrative emphasizes the way in which the autobiographical form produces 
                                                
38 Malone, in Malone Dies, obsessively points out the banality of his narrative. His profuse narration is 
punctuated throughout with the statement “what tedium” and others like it (187).   
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this awareness and coerces him into performing the role of autobiographical narrator, 
wherein his narrative’s every event is endowed with exceptionality, or, as Molloy puts it, 
“must mean something” (Bruner 29, Beckett 8).  As is characteristic of Molloy’s 
narration, however, his capitulation to this mandated performance is punctuated by 
irritated insights into the power it exercises over his “telling” of his story.   
At one point in the midst of his journey, Molloy meditates on the accumulation of 
details that constitutes narrative, and the seemingly arbitrary assignation of significance 
to some of these and of insignificance to others.  He asserts: “you cannot mention 
everything in its proper place, you must choose, between the things not worth mentioning 
and those even less so.  For if you set out to mention everything you would never be 
done, and that’s what counts, to be done, to have done” (41).  Here, Molloy is mindful of 
the degree to which his narrative will cease to conform to the conventions of 
autobiography if he “mentions everything.”  Molloy acknowledges, “Oh I know, even 
when you mention only a few of the things there are, you do not get done either, I know, I 
know.  But it’s a change of muck.  And if all muck is the same much that doesn’t matter, 
it’s good to have a change of muck” (41).  The mundane nature of the events that 
constitute Molloy’s life do not, he recognizes, contribute to an understanding of him as an 
exceptional individual on a path of progression toward autonomy.  In this moment, 
Molloy betrays his insight into and desire to meet the formal requirements of 
autobiography, and indicates that his life, as it is, does not conform to the standard of 
exceptionality inherent to the form.  Though he strategizes how to endow his narrative 
with this exceptionality by choosing which details to narrate, in the end he acknowledges 
that these details are, in fact, all “muck.”  In this respect, the “muck” that constitutes 
 178 
 
Molloy’s autobiography, and therefore his autobiography as a whole, strenuously resists 
the imperatives of the form, which demands that his tale be interesting, thereby revealing 
its narrator’s exceptionality. 
Molloy’s reading of his own autobiography explicates how autobiography acts as 
a mandate for subjectivity.  Despite his stated goal of returning to his beginnings, Molloy 
is under a powerful imperative to develop into an autonomous individual.  This reflects 
Western culture’s usual orientation to autobiography: a central principle of 
autobiographical writing is the transmutation of the model or exemplary life “into that of 
the model or exemplary text: one whose exemplariness, paradoxically, lies in its 
representation of the uniqueness and singularity of the individual life” (Marcus 2). 
Molloy’s narrative indicates his awareness that, because he is writing an autobiography, 
his life should be exemplary of the development that the form demands; as such, he 
continuously capitulates to the formal and thematic conventions that would make his 
narrative into a model autobiography.   
However, the degree to which his narrative cannot be constrained—despite his 
best efforts—to achieve conformity to these conventions underscores the irony inherent 
in the notion that autobiography represents the “uniqueness and singularity of an 
individual life.”  Whereas autobiography purports to represent this singularity, in reality it 
prescribes a specific arc of development, thereby circumscribing both the form and the 
self-representation of the writer.  As Molloy’s autobiographical narrative—and the 
straying of his consciousness beyond its formal bounds—reveals, the autobiographical 
form’s ideology of identity formation constrains that which can be revealed about a 
narrator.  As such, it can never be a full depiction of the narrator’s “life,” but is always 
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rather a representation of a prescriptive form of development delimited by the 
conventions of the form.  Molloy’s persistent commentary upon these conventions, 
however, allows the reader a glimpse “beyond” autobiography and into the truly unique 
selfhood of an individual whose life does not conform to the formulation of narrative 
progress that autobiography demands.   
 
Narrator as Narrative Effect: Part I 
Molloy’s effort to capitulate to narrative’s demands despite his evident 
bewilderment underscores the coerciveness of these demands.  As Marcus observes, 
autobiographical narrative acts to secure the “unity of the subject and object of 
knowledge” (5).  Autobiography demands that the narrating subject—in this case, 
Molloy—come to know himself. Throughout Part I, Molloy makes an effort to perform 
this unity by asserting the details of his biography; in every instance, however, he undoes 
these assertions with revisionary or self-canceling statements. His narration 
simultaneously strives to capitulate to and resists the autobiographical convention of 
unity. 
 But Molloy is not merely a man with dubious origins confused about his own 
biography; Beckett’s writing forces the yet more radical recognition that Molloy is a 
product of textual composition.  Beckett puts the lie to the premise that Molloy is a 
“figure” or “character” by showing the reader’s conception of him as such to be an effect 
of the novel tradition in which Beckett’s work is situated. Molloy’s sporadic 
acknowledgement that his narrative is being constructed—and that, as a result, it must 
capitulate to certain formal conventions—does not merely dismantle Molloy’s status as 
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an individual, but more profoundly undermines the premise of subjectivity that is 
fundamental to the novel form.  Furthermore, as Lloyd and Bixby argue, as a result of the 
novel’s cultural and aesthetic status, the model of subjectivity that is its destination acts 
as an exemplar for readers.  The novel form therefore plays a fundamental role in 
constructing and constraining subjectivity for real people.  Beckett’s trilogy invokes and 
dismantles this form in order to underline its role in enforcing and normalizing this 
regime of subjectivity.  In so doing, Beckett calls attention to an aspect of narrative—its 
coercivity—that is typically overlooked.    
Beckett’s text furthermore highlights the novel form’s coercive effect upon 
readers, whose training as readers both provides a coercive model for their own 
subjectivity and makes them complicit in creating the subject effect that convention 
demands. Narrative theory offers insight into this dynamic.  In a conventional narrative, 
as Barthes describes, “each time the narrator stops ‘representing’ and reports details 
which he knows perfectly well but which are unknown to the reader, there occurs . . . a 
sign of reading, for there would be no sense in the narrator giving himself a piece of 
information” (110).  Molloy, however, does not “know perfectly well” the details of his 
own story.  In fact he knows so little about himself and the events he narrates that he 
cannot tell the difference between himself and a landmark, or remember his name, or 
know whether he ever owned a bicycle.   
Molloy’s explicit avowal that he is composing his narrative, the details of which 
are obscure to him, goes beyond being a “sign of reading” to become a sign of 
composition: in these moments, the reader is forced to recognize that she is in the act of 
reading a narrative that is being composed and one that composes in turn the mutually 
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constraining roles of writer and reader. Molloy acknowledges “I no longer know what I 
am doing, nor why, those are things I understand less and less, I don’t deny it, for why 
deny it, and to whom, to you, to whom nothing is denied?” (45). Here, Molloy speaks 
directly to the reader’s role as a disciplining agent: the reader expects that the novel’s 
narrator will possess knowledge of his own story, thereby producing the subject effect the 
reader has been trained to anticipate.  Molloy claims that he does the things he does—
narrates the things he narrates—in order not to deny the “you” to whom his narrative is 
directed.  This depiction associates this “you” with the “they” who come to take away the 
pages at the outset of the text; these parties enforce the narrative imperatives that are 
operational upon Molloy and his story. Here, Beckett clearly asserts that the reader, as 
well as the conventions of narration, acts as a policing force upon Molloy’s narrative.  
Molloy is never free to narrate what he will, but must narrate what is required by the 
reader, whose expectations and demands are conditioned by the canonical forms that 
circumscribe his narration.  
Molloy’s question also emphasizes the power of literary convention to delimit 
readers’ imaginative capacity. As Peter Brooks claims, “structures, functions, sequences, 
plot, the possibility of following a narrative and making sense of it” belong to one’s 
training as a reader of narrative (19). Upon encountering this text, the reader immediately 
recognizes that Molloy’s narration violates the principles of subject formation enforced 
by the novel form.  Molloy’s method of grasping for pieces of information to “give 
himself” is his effort to correct this violation. To complicate Molloy’s “signs of reading” 
in this way indicates the extent to which Molloy’s narration is both produced by narrative 
convention and policed by the reader’s training. But Beckett’s explicit avowal of the 
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text’s ongoing narration violates the expectations produced by the “reader’s literary 
competence” to create profound disorientation (Brooks 19). It thereby induces the reader 
to participate in Beckett’s ongoing—and disorienting—project of undercutting the 
conventional ways in which narrative typically acts to “produce” subjectivity. 
 Molloy’s narration furthermore calls attention to his own contradictory status: he 
must appear to possess a consciousness that is the source of his narration, but his 
existence is in fact a subject effect of the narrative in which he is situated.  Beckett 
underscores this contradiction when he depicts Molloy’s explication, in a moment of 
frustration inspired by his inability to recall the name of his hometown, of the complex 
way in which “invention” and “saying” become conflated during acts of narration:  “And 
truly it little matters what I say, this, this or that or any other thing.  Saying is inventing.  
Wrong, very rightly wrong.  You invent nothing, you think you are inventing, you think 
you are escaping, and all you do is stammer out your lesson, the remnants of a pensum 
one day got by heart and long forgotten” (31-2).  Certainly, this meditation points up the 
conventionality of language at the level of the word: the expression of thought is limited 
by the words available by which to express it. This moment furthermore illuminates the 
conundrum in which Molloy is trapped: he is both posited as the “inventor” of his 
narrative and yet acts merely as the vehicle for the playing-out of conventions that pre-
exist him.  Molloy’s assertion that “saying is inventing” expresses the view of narration 
perpetuated in and by canonical autobiography and bildungsroman: the formulation of 
identity mandated by these forms posits an autonomous—that is, self-authenticating and 
self-authorizing—narrator who is the originator of his own story (Lloyd 162).  The 
premise that a conscious subject is the “inventor” or source of narrative is furthermore 
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fundamental to the experimental modernist techniques that are invested in depicting 
characters’ interiority.   
 Molloy’s initial sense that “saying is inventing” would cast him as the speaking 
subject and source of his narrative.  He immediately reverses this assertion, however, 
saying that it is not only “wrong,” but “very rightly wrong.”  The strange construction of 
this assertion slyly indicates Molloy’s insight into the complex dynamics of narrative 
construction: he recognizes that, though convention produces an appearance that his 
narration is a process of invention, in fact it is merely a channeling of pre-existing 
narrative requirements. Molloy’s insight into the artificiality of this premise of narrative 
invention, as expressed in his ongoing meta-narrative commentary, confirms that it is 
fundamentally incorrect—“very rightly wrong”—to believe that saying is inventing. A 
narrator invents nothing; he thinks he is inventing and by doing so seemingly “escapes” 
the conventions of narrative by which he is created.  But in fact, a narrator must 
“stammer out” the elements of narrative that combine to create the subject effect that give 
him a “voice.”  Importantly, the “lesson” that he stammers out was “one day got by heart 
and long forgotten;” the fundamental functions of narrative are so culturally dominant as 
to be invisible.  
 The dynamic Molloy describes here also precisely inheres in the relationship of 
the novel form to narrative convention.  Even in this novel that sets out to dethrone 
human consciousness from its position as the locus of meaning in narrative, Beckett is 
yet—in substantial part—beholden to the conventions that govern the form to which 
Molloy, despite its resistance, conforms.  Though Molloy proposes a radical 
reconfiguration of human consciousness as depicted in literature, it nevertheless 
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“stammers out its lesson:” it is obligated to enlist autobiography, the bildungsroman, the 
detective novel, and narrative itself, in order to mount this reconfiguration.   
Even so, the text’s insistence upon its own composition undercuts its “stammering 
out” of conventional generic forms. Molloy’s awareness of both his interchangeability 
with others and his own uniqueness highlights his status as the product of Beckett’s 
composition.   When a stranger approaches him, Molloy says he “must have seen the rock 
in the shadow of which I crouched like Belaqua, or Sordello, I forget” (10).  This 
interchangeability amongst a number of protagonists underscores the error inherent in 
conceiving of these figures as “different people.”  These figures are not discrete subjects 
but rather the varied results of the “stammering out” of the subject effect required by the 
novel form.  Molloy’s conflation of himself with these other Beckett protagonists reveals 
that no real difference inheres between them; they are all effects of the respective 
narratives in which they appear.  
Importantly, Belacqua and Sordello are characters featured in Beckett’s earlier 
fiction collection More Pricks than Kicks (1934).  Sordello, furthermore, appears in 
previous canonical literary works: a figure by this name features in the Purgatorio 
section of Dante’s fourteenth century Divine Comedy, and is also the title character in 
Robert Browning’s Victorian era narrative poem Sordello.  The Sordello who appears in 
Dante’s poem is furthermore based on a thirteenth century troubadour whom Dante 
valorizes, along with several other poets and musicians, as a creator of transcendent 
secular art that is ennobling but nevertheless lacks the “anchorage in the sacred Word” 
required to achieve spiritual rebirth (Schnapp 98-9).  According to Jeffrey Schnapp, this 
lack of anchorage in the word has the result that Sordello and other secular artists “can 
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lose their way with tragic consequences” (99). This interpretation of Sordello as an 
instigator of a mode of creative expression apart from a divinely inspired “Word” 
resonates with Molloy’s own self-conscious efforts to distinguish his own narrative from 
the canonical narratives that pre-exist and condition it.  By constructing Molloy’s 
narrative as directly contesting the dominance of the “sacred” genres that constrain it, 
Beckett advocates for a critical engagement with the “Word.”  Molloy does not merely 
enact the precepts of conventionalized canonical genres, but self-consciously reflects 
upon the way that these genres dominate both novels’ construction and their reception.  
Molloy’s complex invocation and undermining of canonical forms illustrates the novel’s 
willful disconnection from a culturally sanctioned order so powerful that it acts as a 
divine foundation for narrative.  
 Sordello’s status as a purgatorial figure whose art Dante considers ennobling but 
not spiritually complete is also resonant with Beckett’s depiction of Molloy. Sordello is a 
fully developed character who is, according to Dante’s theology in Purgatorio, 
nevertheless unable to achieve spiritual rebirth.  In this way he is a precursor to Molloy, 
who, as narrator of his tale, is both a literary figure and yet—because his narrative resists 
declarations of discrete subjectivity, narrative movement toward resolution, and the 
individual subject formation prescribed by the bildungsroman and autobiography—he 
remains “incomplete.”  He therefore resides in a sort of novelistic purgatory.  Beckett’s 
insistence that the narrator is himself an effect of the narrative that produces him both 
undermines the “divine” status of autobiography, bildungsroman, and other canonical 
forms by which subjectivity is coerced into being, and draws attention to the narrator’s 
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entrapment within a literary purgatory.  Molloy does not wholly capitulate to the formal 
elements that constrain him, but neither can he escape the novel itself. 
   
Detective Fiction: Coherence Undermined 
  The detective fiction form is also fundamental to Beckett’s interrogation of the 
process by which narrative coerces subjectivity.  In Part II of Molloy, he capitalizes upon 
detective fiction’s deterministic orientation to perform this interrogation; because the 
form requires that a crime be solved, it is predicated on coherence and resolution.  
Beckett’s use of this popular form as an additional vehicle for his critique reveals that not 
only those pedigreed forms expressly focused upon narrating individual formation—
autobiography and bildung—prescribe subjectivity; popular genres, too, contribute to this 
textual policing of the individual. Moran’s narrative in Part II conforms to several of 
detective fiction’s highly prescriptive conventions: Moran is an “agent;” he is 
commissioned by a superior agent to pursue a target (Molloy); he writes a report that 
describes his investigation.  In other ways, of course, Beckett’s writing resists the 
conventions of the genre: the reason for Molloy’s apprehension—his “crime”— is 
unknown to both Moran and the reader; Moran does not accumulate clues in order to 
“solve” the crime; Moran’s narrative focuses much more on his own mental and physical 
undoing than on Molloy’s whereabouts.  In a manner consistent with his technique of 
invoking, morphing, and remobilizing literary genres, Beckett dismantles the conventions 
of detective fiction to reveal the delimiting effect of the narrative drive toward coherence 
and resolution that this form requires.   
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Tzvetan Todorov’s “The Typology of Detective Fiction” delineates the 
conventions of classic detective fiction that Beckett invokes by composing Part II as an 
investigation. The two-part structure of Molloy, in particular, plays on the “duality” that, 
claims Todorov, is “at the base” of the classic detective fiction that reached its peak 
between the two world wars (Todorov 44).  Todorov calls this classic iteration “the 
whodunit;” this type of novel “contains not one but two stories: the story of the crime and 
the story of the investigation.  In their purest form, these stories have no point in 
common” (Todorov 44).  The first of these two stories is the story of the crime, which 
“tells ‘what really happened,’ whereas the second—the story of the investigation—
explains ‘how the reader (or the narrator) has come to know about it’” (Todorov 45).  
This meta-narrative relationship is central to the form; the story of the investigation must 
shed light on the story of the crime and eventually reveal “whodunit.” In this sense, the 
first story ends before the second begins (Todorov 44). 
Works of detective fiction are therefore bifurcated into two linked but distinct 
stories; though concerned with the same event, the “first story” narrates the event itself, 
while the second story narratively reconstructs it. Todorov defines these stories’ 
differences by invoking the Russian Formalist concepts of “story” and “plot:” “the story 
is what has happened in life, the plot is the way the author presents it to us.  The first 
notion corresponds to the reality evoked, to events similar to those which take place in 
our lives; the second, to the book itself, to the narrative, to the literary devices the author 
employs” (45). This structure makes the form particularly liable for the kind of meta-
narrative exploration that is Beckett’s project in the trilogy.  As indicated by his 
reworkings of narrative conventions throughout Molloy, Beckett insists that narrative’s 
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coercive effect resides in its conventionality, which is to say its construction according to 
a set of textual prescriptions.   The narrative construction of the “second story” that is 
ongoing throughout works of detective fiction makes the form an ideal ground for the 
extension of Beckett’s critique in Part I of narrative conventions’ coerciveness. 
  While Part II of Molloy is explicitly the story of Moran’s investigation, it does 
not contain the story of “what really happened” (Todorov 44). The novel’s structure 
thereby both awakens a reader’s expectation that the story of the investigation will 
explain the crime and annihilates that expectation.  Though Part II does not reveal 
“whodunit”—indeed, the reader never learns what “it” was—it is nevertheless explicitly 
composed as Moran’s narration of his pursuit of Molloy.  That he is ignorant of the 
explanations that might exist for his commission does not detract from the fact that he 
was commissioned and that the story before the reader is his narrative reconstruction of 
his investigation.  Furthermore, Moran avows his role as investigator of a case: “Peeping 
and prying were part of my profession,” he acknowledges (94).  Before embarking, he 
lays down to consider carefully “the Molloy affair,” adopting the language of detective 
fiction (98).   
 The necessity that Moran construct a report in which he narrates his findings—
indeed, in which he “solves the crime”—expresses the power of text to both delimit an 
author’s expression and to police the subjectivity of the figures within a text.  Gaber is 
the agent who commissions Moran to seek Molloy; he tells Moran, despite Moran’s 
professed lack of interest in the case, that the “chief,” Youdi, “wants it to be you”  (94).  
Moran is thusly appointed as the pursuer of Molloy; as such, he is enlisted into a 
subservient relationship that obligates him to find the object of his quest, write the 
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narrative report that reconstructs this quest, and turn this report over to his superior. In 
this regard, Moran finds himself in almost exactly the same position as Molloy: he is 
coerced into writing by an outside force and possesses only the scantest sense of what 
elements might legitimate the narrative’s purpose or lend it coherence.  Moran’s own 
agency is subject to the requirements of his profession, which he acknowledges: “we 
agents often amused ourselves with grumbling among ourselves and giving ourselves the 
airs of free men” (95).  The agents’ lack of freedom is rooted not only in their obligation 
to pursue the targets of their investigations, but also in the conventionality of the reports 
that reveal “whodunit.”  The shape and character of the narratives they produce are 
conditioned; the “second story” of a detective novel must build toward coherence and 
resolution; this is its raison d’être.  
 Moran is therefore subject to the necessity of constructing a report that conforms 
to the formulation that Youdi requires—namely, a “solution” to the crime. Youdi’s status 
as Moran’s “chief” literalizes the extent to which the conventions of the detective fiction 
form exercise a coercive power: Moran must produce a report for his superior in order to 
remain employed, and this report can come to only one conclusion.  The remainder of 
Part II, of course, is Beckett’s emphatic refusal to grant this conclusion: the circularity of 
Moran’s quest, his physical dissolution, and the eventual cancelation of his commission 
prevent him from enacting the kind of resolution that detective fiction requires. The 
coherence required by the “second story” is thereby foreclosed in Part II, and this 
foreclosure is a fundamental aspect of Beckett’s method of undermining the coercive 
power of textual convention.  
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   Moran’s report—as do detectives’ reports in general—also facilitates a meta-
narrative commentary on the method by which the detective fiction form coerces into 
being—and then polices—the subjectivity of the “criminal.” As a result of Moran’s 
commission to write a report, Molloy becomes the product of Moran’s narrative 
construction and the subject of his surveillance.  Moran finds that when he takes a 
moment to consider his mission, he calls up a picture of Molloy and seems to possess 
knowledge of his attributes.  Moran narrates the odd dynamic whereby he seems to have 
substantial insight about this figure he has never encountered:  “Perhaps I had invented 
him, I mean found him ready made in my head.  There is no doubt one sometimes meets 
with strangers who are not entire strangers, through their having played a part in certain 
cerebral reels” (112). Here, in a way consistent with Molloy’s correction of “inventing” 
to “saying” in Part I, Moran initially conceives that he is “inventing”—creating wholesale 
the figure of Molloy out of his imagination—only to immediately alter this to assert that 
Molloy is “ready made in my head.” In this way, Moran’s image of Molloy acts in a 
manner analogous to those literary conventions to which both autobiographers and 
Beckett himself are obligated to conform.  Because these conventions both preexist the 
text’s composition and perform a coercive function, they act as “cerebral reels” that 
condition its form and content. 
 The text’s two-part structure furthermore ensures that Part I’s characterization of 
Molloy has been planted as a “cerebral reel” according to which readers will evaluate the 
accuracy of Moran’s assessment of him.  By structuring the text in this way, Beckett 
makes explicit the coercive effect of narrative conventions: a reader’s consciousness of 
the Molloy narrated in Part I becomes a script that conditions her evaluation of Moran’s 
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notion of Molloy. The conventions that produced Molloy in Part I—the elements of 
autobiography and bildungsroman that Beckett invokes and deforms—have hence made 
him into a subject. Despite Beckett’s relentless dismantling of the conventions associated 
with genres of individual formation, then, Molloy’s subjectivity is coherent enough for 
Moran to perceive of it as a “cerebral reel,” and for the reader to recognize when Moran 
is “misapprehending” aspects of Molloy’s character.   This dimension of Part II magnifies 
Part I’s revelation of the dynamics by which autobiography and bildung coerce 
subjectivity into being. Beckett’s subsequent undermining of the conventions of detective 
fiction in Part II—particularly its “dual” structure—offers yet more insight into the 
deeper truth that subjectivity is an effect of narrative convention and not merely the 
narrative expression of extant individuals’ consciousness.  
 The two-part structure of Molloy also instills in the reader a desire for unity and 
coherence; this is yet another way that the novel systematically awakens and annihilates 
readers’ habits of reading. 39  According to Porter Abbott, Molloy is characterized by “a 
symmetricality complicated by a more unyielding disorder” (92): 
                                                
39 Molloy’s two-part arrangement acts upon the reader’s and critic’s desire to seek narrative coherence.  
Some common interpretations that satisfy this desire is that Part II, despite its location after Part I in the 
text, is a preamble to it, or that Moran is an as-yet not fully physically decrepit Molloy. These 
interpretations seek an explanation for both the mystery that Moran seeks to solve and for the book’s 
composition in two parts. Yet while the text’s structure suggests a relation between characters and events in 
Parts I and II, neither Beckett nor Moran explains the events or circumstances that lead to Moran’s being 
commissioned to seek Molloy. Porter Abbott captures the reader’s and critic’s desire for coherence in a 
series of questions: “Does Moran become Molloy as his decay in physique and appearance would suggest?  
Is it the Molloy he stalks within him, one of five Molloys he enumerates at the outset?  If so, what is 
Molloy?  And what does Molloy become in his turn on his quest—his mother?” (95).  These questions 
pinpoint the way in which the novel’s structure both awakens the reader’s desire for unity and frustrates it.  
The novel’s refusal to confirm or deny the coherence and symmetry suggested by its two-part structure is 
characteristic of Beckett’s method, which is simultaneously grounded in narrative forms that mandate 
coherence (in this case, the detective novel wherein there exists the story of the crime and the report of the 
investigation) and seeks to dismantle these forms from within.   
 
 192 
 
The problem for the reader is that Molloy is divided into two parts that appear at 
once to be intimately related and to have no relation.  The parts are distinct, yet 
they abound in parallels and cross-references.  Essentially, this is a concentrated 
example of what Beckett does throughout his entire canon when he has names and 
objects reappear from work to work.  But in Molloy the repeated elements seize 
the reader’s attention with greater urgency because now the separate narratives 
are squeezed between the same covers.  What echoes there are take on great 
weight because they are the only clues we have—in our obsession with unity—to 
go on in finding the connection.  The strain is increased by the very abundance of 
parallels. (99) 
For Abbott, it is not the mere fact of this structure but its character—the two parts abound 
in parallels and similarities and are also profoundly different and distinct—that creates a 
particular effect.  As a result of readers’ “obsession with unity”—and of the convention 
that mandates narrative unity within a single text—we seek explanatory relationships 
between Parts I and II (Abbott 99).   
 Beckett’s invocation of detective fiction imposes an additional layer of 
expectation onto the text: according to the conventions of this genre, readers should 
anticipate a resolution in which the second story (that of the investigation) fully 
reconstructs the first story (that of the crime).  But because the two sections are both 
symmetrical and characterized by an “unyielding disorder,” and because detective 
fiction’s duality is both mobilized and foreclosed, the text’s relationship to the events it 
contains is both explanatory and mystifying. The novel’s structure facilitates Beckett’s 
revelation that despite the absence of a crime, which is the basis for plot in detective 
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fiction—the conventions of the form nevertheless exert such power that the reader strives 
to instill unity and coherence into this text.  In this way, Beckett demonstrates how 
formulaic literary forms limit at once readers’ modes of understanding and the ability of 
authors to compose novels that exceed or exist outside of these modes. 
 
Beckett’s Doubles and the Collapsing of Narrative Subjectivity: Part II 
 Part II of Molloy performs much of the same work as Part I: Moran, its narrator, 
struggles to configure narrative even as he works against the prescriptions of narrative by 
which he conceives of himself.  The resulting text engages both the indecipherability of 
identities that characterizes Part I, and simultaneously capitulates to and resists the 
mechanics of narrative that both generate and obfuscate the category of selfhood as it has 
traditionally been forged in fiction. It further complicates the way Part I performs this 
work by adding another layer of narration: whereas Part I is Molloy’s first person 
narration of his predicament, in Part II Moran narrates both the events that are the 
material for the report and the composition of the report. As such, Part II explores more 
deeply the power dynamics that inhere in the production of narrative: its status as a 
commissioned report dramatizes narrative conventions’ coercive effects upon narrators, 
characters, and readers alike.  
 Part II continues to dismantle the textual means by which the premise of 
subjectivity is typically created. Abbot claims that “the central mystery of Beckett’s 
detective story is the mystery of self,” from which a “panorama of contingent mysteries” 
radiates (93). Beckett’s invocations of all the forms he dismantles—autobiography, 
bildungsroman, the detective novel—facilitate both his explication of the ways 
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convention coerces subjectivity and his insistence that representations of selfhood can 
and should exceed or exist outside of these conventions.  Molloy’s and Moran’s 
resistance to and questioning of the identities they are ascribed underscores this 
insistence.  Both narrators reflect upon and experience the mysteries that circulate around 
the experience of being a self: who am I?  What differentiates me from others?  What are 
the criteria by which I define my self?  These queries both motivate their journeys and 
foreclose their completion; they seek to define themselves but in the process of seeking 
self-definition, their bodies and their “selves” disintegrate.  
As Molloy pursues his mother and Moran pursues Molloy, the text suggests that 
they are simultaneously approaching clarity about who they are and discovering the 
artificiality of this construction of selfhood.  The effect of the text’s two-part structure 
combined with its deployment of detective fiction is, then, pronounced resistance to the 
reification of the subject that characterizes the genres—autobiography, bildung, detective 
fiction—that Beckett invokes and reconfigures in Molloy. The text’s “symmetricality 
complicated by a more unyielding disorder” undoes the discrete boundaries that the novel 
form historically renders around the individual subject (Abbott 92). One way Beckett 
achieves this effect is through a persistent invocation of dyads: characters and entities are 
paired together, suggesting symmetricality and the possibility that each member of the 
dyad might promote clearer understanding of the other. But Beckett collapses these 
dyads’ two halves into one another, blurring the boundaries between entities and 
characters.  This is an additional manifestation of the unity complicated by an unyielding 
disorder that constitutes Beckett’s complexly wrought refusal to become complicit with 
canonical literary forms’ coercion of subjectivity. 
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The dyadic relationships of reader to writer and narrator to narrated are crucially 
important to Beckett’s meta-commentary on the complicity of traditional narrative 
structures in both prescribing habits of reading and perpetuating the brand of identity 
formation mandated in canonical literature.  By casting Molloy as both the reader and 
writer of his own text—he polices his own autobiography according to the requirements 
of the form—Beckett indicates the power these requirements exercise over both readers 
and writers.  The former evaluates a work of fiction in terms of its conformity to the 
conventions of its genre, while the latter’s creative project is circumscribed by these same 
conventions.   
Moran’s status as a detective further magnifies the collapsing of the distinction 
between reader and writer.  He must compose his narrative so that its contours conform to 
the requirements of the “second story” of detective fiction; in this way, like Molloy, he 
becomes the “reader” of his text.  But the conventions of this “second story” are precisely 
what bring him into being as the writer as well.  
The narrator to narrated dyad operates in a similar way: Molloy and Moran both 
narrate their respective journeys, but each is consistently aware that his narrative is 
deeply conditioned by convention.  In this way, though their role as narrators creates a 
premise of autonomous narrative authority, they are in fact both narrated into existence 
by the conventions of the forms they invoke.  Both narrators’ assertions about a lack of 
freedom speaks to this formal circumscription; though they would wish (and at times, 
indeed, they seem) to be independent subjects capable of generating stories, in fact they 
are merely vehicles for the execution of formal conventions.40   
                                                
40 Moran bemoans his lack of freedom when he asserts “we agents often amused ourselves with grumbling 
among ourselves and giving ourselves the airs of free men” (95).   As I argue, Moran is not free because 
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These more abstractly configured dyads are thematically consistent with the 
method by which Beckett arranges his characters into dyads throughout Molloy. Beckett 
pairs textual figures by establishing their family relationships, depicting remarkable 
similarities between them, and assigning them names that are the same or almost the 
same.  These connections seem to simultaneously establish the characters’ connections to 
one another and their distinctiveness. These dyads include: Molloy and his mother; 
Molloy and Mollose; Moran and Moran’s son; Molloy and Moran.  Each protagonist 
seeks to assert the differences between himself and the other member of each dyad, but as 
his narrative progresses, the distinctions between them begin to collapse.  Molloy 
suggests that he may be his mother; Moran defensively (and, as it turns out, ironically) 
suggests that sharing a name with his son “cannot lead to confusion”; Molloy and Moran, 
in their physical decrepitude, share an increasing number of attributes (92).  These 
constructions invoke the premise that textual figures are distinct and coherent subjects 
only to foreclose this possibility by blurring the distinctions among these figures.  
Though the binary structure of these dyads suggests that they will provide clarity about 
the individuals and relationships they represent, the collapsing of differences within them 
makes these aspects of identity less, not more, decipherable. 
 Though characters’ identities will become increasingly indecipherable throughout, 
at the outset of Part II, Moran presents details with the surety of fact.  Given the ending of 
Part I, wherein the narrator acknowledges that he cannot remember the details of the 
                                                                                                                                            
both his narration and his agency are circumscribed by his obligation to compose his report according to a 
set of conventions. Molloy configures his lack of freedom as physical; at the end of his narrative, he asserts 
that he “could not, stay in the forest I mean, I was not free to” (86).  This scene literalizes the compulsion 
toward narrative resolution mandated by conventional novel forms. Molloy is not free to foreclose an 
ending to his narrative; rather, he is obligated to pursue an ending.  In the context of Molloy’s 
configuration, this would mean escaping the forest. 
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preceding narrative and poses questions about his own experience, Moran’s strident 
opening declaration—“It is midnight.  The rain is beating on the windows”—
distinguishes him as a self-authorizing and self-authenticating narrator, confident of the 
“facts” that constitute his tale (92, Lloyd 162).  Moreover, the first paragraph of Part II 
clearly delineates the kinds of details that, by the end of Part I, are unknowable or 
indeterminate.  The narrator asserts that he goes to his desk, that he cannot sleep, and that 
his “lamp sheds a soft and steady light;” he furthermore establishes that he has a son (92).  
The straightforward manner in which the narrator relays these details distinguishes him 
from Molloy, whose ignorance of the details of his own narrative is, by the end of Part I, 
total.  Moran’s fatherhood furthermore contrasts with Molloy’s uncertainty about his own 
status as a father and Molloy’s depiction of himself as a son craving an origin.  Unlike 
Moran, who authors a new identity by producing a son, in undertaking his journey, 
Molloy seeks to understand his own obscure selfhood.  
 Moran’s growing recognition of the ways that textual convention determines the 
content and character of his narrative, however, undermines his initial self-conception as 
a self-authenticating and self-authorizing narrating subject. He initially conceives of the 
figure he is obligated to pursue as “Mollose,” but “since Gaber has said Molloy, not once 
but several times, and each time with equal incisiveness, I was compelled to admit that I 
too should have said Molloy and that in saying Mollose I was at fault” (112-13).  This is 
Moran’s recognition that an identity has been ascribed to the figure he will pursue, and 
that identity is expressed in the ascription of a proper name.  The power dynamic that 
inheres between Gaber and Moran furthermore dictates that Moran must conform to 
Gaber’s way of perceiving Molloy.  On this important point, then, Moran alters his own 
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narrative perspective in order to capitulate to Gaber’s way of ascribing identity to the 
figure Moran is commissioned to pursue.  His self-authorizing and self-authenticating 
perspective hereby begins to erode. 
 Here, Beckett again invokes the verb “say” in order to express the dynamic that 
occurs when a narrator enacts convention, thereby revealing that the narrator is not in fact 
the source of narration but rather a vehicle for the conventions that circumscribe it.  In 
“saying” Mollose, Moran is “at fault;” to invent another name would be to violate the 
premise of subjectivity that Gaber’s naming of Molloy has already established. At this 
early stage in his tale, Moran capitulates to a central tenet of narration wherein a narrating 
consciousness tells a story that reports on the seemingly “unfolding” events that are 
enacted by a set of discrete individuals.  As Beckett reveals, however, and Molloy 
articulates in Part I, this “saying” is not, as it appears, a narrator’s act of invention, but 
rather the “stammering out” of one’s lesson (31-2). Beckett depicts Moran as having fully 
internalized the lesson of identity formation taught by the narrative conventions of 
autobiography, bildungsroman, and detective fiction: namely, that identities—both 
narrators’ and characters’—are both fundamental to narrative and unimpeachable.  
Beckett’s project throughout the trilogy lays siege to this “lesson,” demonstrating that 
subjectivity is an effect of narrative convention and not its source or end.   
 
Conclusion: Ends  
 As Molloy progresses toward its ending, Beckett dismantles the requirement that a 
narrative proceed toward an end that retroactively lends meaning to its events. Peter 
Brooks asserts that, in novels, “meanings are developed over temporal succession in a 
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suspense of final predication” (19).  Conventionally, the meaning of a text becomes 
apparent in light of its ending; the reader’s knowledge that a narrative will end motivates 
the sense-making that she performs between a novel’s beginning and its end.  We read; 
this takes time; what we read accrues meaning in light of a revelatory ending.   As was 
true in Part I, the ending of Part II interrogates this requirement that a narrative move 
toward resolution. The reader does not retroactively gain clarity about the events of the 
novel in light of its ending.  Rather, like Molloy, Moran becomes increasingly physically 
decrepit and therefore struggles to proceed toward home after Youdi calls off his 
assignment.  The purpose and premise of his narrative—the composition of his report—is 
eliminated; rather than complete his mission, he merely returns home (slowly and with 
difficulty).  This ending does not grant final predication to the events that precede it. 
 This lack of resolution enacts a strenuous resistance to the conventions of 
detective fiction in particular.  The detective story itself is entirely predicated on 
resolution; the crime must be solved.  But in Part II, when Youdi’s authority is 
withdrawn, Moran is no longer obligated to compose his report, and so the drive toward 
narrative resolution evaporates.  The coercive effect of the conventions prescribed by the 
detective report is embodied in Youdi’s authority.  Without this coercion, Moran’s 
narrative ceases to facilitate the “sense-making” that readers typically perform when 
reading a novel. 
  Ironically, however, Moran does, in one sense, “find” Molloy: by establishing 
uncanny parallels between them, Beckett collapses the two characters into one another.  
Moran appears increasingly like Molloy; the binary relationship that seemed to exist 
between them at Part II’s outset is increasingly blurred.  This suggests that identity 
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inheres between the characters without making this identity explicit.  Beckett’s 
construction of the dyadic relationship of Molloy to Moran therefore functions to suggest 
that Moran has “found” Molloy, but that this is not the result of his own narrative 
authority—or even his narration more generally.  In this way, Beckett suggests closure to 
this narrative without composing an ending that adheres to the conventional function of 
endings, wherein resolution retroactively ascribes meaning to the novel’s events.  His 
suggestion of the merging of Moran into Molloy, moreover, generates a kind of closure 
without ascribing a fully developed and socially sanctioned identity to either figure.  
 Beckett’s depiction of Moran’s increasing physical decrepitude further confounds 
the conventional narrative drive toward closure.  In addition to suggesting (though the 
novel in no way confirms) that he and Molloy may be one and the same, Moran’s 
paralysis discourages his movement toward home—and therefore toward the novel’s 
ending.  Though his legs are stiff and physical movement is painful, he remains 
determined in his movement, the culmination of which is ultimately his return home. The 
story therefore ends where it began; in this sense, there has been no real movement.  
Moran went on a journey, to be sure; but this journey did not produce a more 
intellectually or socially integrated individual.  Rather, Moran is less a man than he was 
before the journey: he is partially paralyzed and literally sloughing off body parts.  This 
depiction makes literal his narrative’s resistance to the individual development that is 
fundamental to both autobiography and bildung. As his narrative nears its end, Moran’s 
physical body and his subjectivity exhibit dissolution rather than increasing coherence.  
Beckett constructs Moran’s journey as an arduous but circular ordeal that results in his 
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undoing; in so doing, he mobilizes and deforms narrative’s prescriptions for both 
movement and the completion of an individual life.     
Nevertheless, Molloy cannot continue into infinity. Brooks comments on the 
necessity of making an end, even for those novels that resist the tenets of the form:  
Our most sophisticated literature understands endings to be artificial, arbitrary, 
minor rather than major chords, casual and textual rather than cosmic and 
definitive.  Yet they take place: if there is no spectacular denouement, no 
distribution of awards and punishments, no tie-up, through marriages and deaths, 
of all the characters’ lives, there is a textual finish—we have no more pages to 
read. (Brooks 314)   
As he nears home, Moran acknowledges this necessity when he declares “Now I may 
make an end” (174).  In the ending that he “makes,” he returns to his bedroom and writes 
precisely the same words with which he began: “It is midnight.  The rain is beating on the 
windows” (176).  By coming full circle in this way, this novel resists narrative’s 
requirement of an ending that lends coherence to the text that precedes it. Rather, this 
“ending” is both the cessation of words on the page and also a return to the beginning.  
The book must end, but by casting this ending not as a culmination or resolution, but 
rather as antiprogressive, Beckett forecloses the “cosmic and definitive” function by 
which conventional endings confer retrospective meaning onto the novel’s events 
(Brooks 314). This foreclosure is precisely what encourages readers to speculate that Part 
II is perhaps the precursor to Part I, or that Part II narrates a different time period in the 
same figure’s life as Part I.  Because the “end” that the narrator “makes” does not adhere 
strictly to the narrative code wherein the meaning of the text itself becomes apparent in 
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light of its ending (because this is not, strictly speaking, an ending), many of the text’s 
most central premises collapse.  
 Moran undercuts the autobiographical premise of the preceding narrative yet more 
profoundly with the subsequent and final lines, which he writes: “It was not midnight.  It 
was not raining” (176). These lines obliterate the truth-telling premise that is the basis for 
the autobiographical enterprise.  By casting doubt upon the most basic conditions of the 
narrator’s present circumstance, Beckett radically and explicitly disinaugurates the 
conventional premise that autobiography is a true account narrated by an individual 
possessed of a pre-existing subjectivity.  If it is not raining, then the assertion with which 
the novel begins is rendered false; the possibility therefore exists that none of these 
events ever “occurred.” Beckett’s addition of these two lines at the end of his text thereby 
indicates the absurdity of the notion that autobiographical writing is merely the setting 
down on paper of one individual’s experience which in turn renders legible his universal 
and archetypal identity.  Moreover, by making these final lines expressly the product of 
Moran’s composition, Beckett forcefully asserts that writing is fundamentally complicit 
in narrative’s obfuscation of the means by which it positions subjectivity as its source.   
   Many of the most estranging and challenging elements of Beckett’s trilogy are 
finely rendered inversions and deformations of the methods by which narrative 
conventions have made subjectivity into both the premise and purpose of the novel form.  
The trilogy does not itself belong to any generic category precisely because its purpose is 
to dismantle the conventions of those genres.  Molloy therefore initially appears to be a 
stubbornly abstract and experimental text that little resembles the canonical forms its 
undermines.  But close attention to the specific ways that these forms haunt the trilogy, 
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and to the complex techniques by which Beckett’s writing interacts with and dismantles 
these forms, reveals the trilogy’s revolutionary function: to unseat subjectivity as the 
premise for fiction.  Molloy marks the beginning of Beckett’s pursuit to configure a kind 
of writing suited to this function; the trilogy extends and continues this pursuit.  Beckett’s 
rigorous immanent critique of narrative subjectivity constitutes the author’s insistence 
that the experience of being a self in the world warrants a mode of expression beyond the 
limiting and limited one prescribed by conventional narrative forms.  
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